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'tHESIS 
ABSTRACT 
The primary purpose of this study is to describe and 
analyse the events associated uith the development of the policy 
enacted into legj.slation in 1973 for the establishment of three 
independent corporations to run broadcasting in New Zealand under 
the overall control of a Broadcasting Council. The Study is 
designed a case study of policy development. Attention is 
focused upon the genisis of the policy and upon the procedures 
\"hich ,'lere used to develop the policy. In explaining the 
development of the policy, reference is made to the political 
systems model of analysis, in particularly as developed by David 
Easton. In EastonDs terminology the study focuses upon the inputs 
to the , . pO.LJ.cy. and upon the. corrversion process adopted in 
developing the policy. The study also takes cognisance of a 
num.ber of media effects theories, especially those developed by 
Colin SeYillDur--Ure and .Janet Horgano· 
The }~eS2arcll lnvolved the c.ollec.tion of doc.um.entary data 
and s~pplementary intervie\~ data. The Hon.R.O. Douglas, 
Minister of Broadcasting at the time, gave the writer aec.ess to 
certai.D of his papers that are on deposit with the Alexander 
Turnhull Library. Other than that the documentary data was 
d01irnited to documEnts availaLle in the lie domain. The data 
model. 
The study concludes that the policy was developed very 
quickly by a small group of peopleo Although not totally 
incongruent with the governmentOs election policy, it was a 
dramatic departure from what was expected and was, to all intents 
and purpose~ a radical new policy. However, overall,the policy 
was consistent with the new govern;:nentOs aim to move quickly and 
decisively. The broad parameters of the policy were developed 
\"ithin the political system and a measure of public involvement 
was subsequently utilised to build support for the nascent 
policy. The study conc.ludes that there itl<lS no mass ov,e:ct public 
support for the ne,,, p'Jlicy. It was the result of changes demanded 
from within the political system and at all stages of the policy-
making process, 
political system. 
the initiative. remained firmly Hithin the 
The development of the broadcasting policy vas notable for 
the degree of pol&risation it created both within the political 
system and within the broadcasting organisationo In attempting 
to explain these ~leavage8 the study concludes that there are 
permanent tensions between broadcasters and politicians. Such 
tensions exist because political and broadcasting structures 
\-iithin Ne",1 Ze::~l.Jnd have developed from c.onflic.ting philosophic.al 
politicians carry out their roles as °actors O on the broadcasting 
o rcali ty co; ana bro~dcasters and politicians 6ften perceive 
iii 
themselves as seeking the same ends using ~astly different means. 
Finally, the study concludes that the political systems 
model, whilst adequately' explaining the policy deve.lopment 
process, Has unsa tisfae,tory , for commenting on the °valueso of 
policies, most particularly why they fail or succeed. As an 
alternative the study offered a number of reaSOIcS for the failure 
of this policy: The policy-makers failed to gain the support of 
key broadcasters vlithin the broadcasting structure; the Committee 
on the Future of Broadcasting had such a restricted brief that it 
was unable to make changes to the policy that may have generated 
more support; politicians had media effects ,perceptions that were 
incompatihle with the principles of the policy; the policy was 
too radical to be put into place by a three year, one term~ 
government; and the principle pressure groups active in the 
policy formation process fell into °cumulativeO cleavages Hh1ch 
highlighted division and prevented if 'not consensus, then 
compromise. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE ISSUE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On the 31st January 1973 the lion.R.O.Douglas, Minister of 
Broadcasting ~n the recently elected third Labour Government 
announced his inten.tion to restructure broadcasting In New 
Zealand. The announcement took the country by surprise. Labouros 
election manifesto made no reference to such a major move. Indeed 
Ln a mere half a page devoted to broadcasting in the manifesto 
Labouros aLms appeared to be the strengthening of the NZBC and 
the reinforcing of a long standing policy of .conmitment to public 
broadcasting, (Labou~ Manifesto, 1972). It served warning to 
existing private broadcasting organisations and those hopefuls 
waiting Ln the ~ings that under a Labour Government public 
service broadcasting would take priority. (See Appendix A). 
much front page and editorial coverage to the announcement:. The 
MinistarOs press release was not made until 7.00pm on the evening 
of January 31. Hm.;rever:, the Chri:3tcflurch and Auckland Starso both 
featured a major article on their third page hinting at the 
proposed changes and making some very accurate °predictions O , 
The next morning all the major dailies devoted aZ least half of 
repo~rtiDg on t~he. 
factually .. Ly the tirne evsning newspapers came 
°NZEG executlves shocked. 
1 
angry over gvt decision D was the four column headline in the 
Christchurch Star. DHanging. dra~ing and quartering performed 
with the most IDodern surgical techniquesO, began "the major 
article on the television page. The evening papers carried a 
number of comments from unidentified NZBC officials: °People are 
wandering around in a state of shock. No-one seeIDS to know whats 
going on or what will happen to theme (Christchurch Star,page 1). 
Their surprise wa~ shared by members of their executiVe and 
board of the He\-! Zealand Broadcasting Corporation. So stunned was 
Director Gene-ral Lionel R. Sceats thai: he iIWlleciiately vlrote a 
letter to his Minister, a.thinly veiled plea for informatio~ 
under tr!e guise of °protecting staff morale. ° 
"Your annoucement yesterday on the 
restr~cturing of Broadcasting in New Zealand 
is as you stated "dramatic". It has certainly 
had that effect on staff. 
My immediate "and urgent concern 
is to maintain staff mo~ale. There was only a 
brief reference to existing staff," viz. one 
salary structure will apply throughout the 
Broadcasting Service and the salary levels of 
existing staff \ViII be protected", 
the absence of any prior 
c.onsulatation or formal do(:um2.ntation it is 
extremely difficult for me to eive the staff 
more speci£:Lc information to 'vlhich they feel 
entitled. I regard this matter as warranting 
li.rgent attention E.-lid vwuld appreciate a 
~ritten reply as soon as possible."(l) 
The passage into legislation of this new proposal was not 
a SElooth one. This stUelY c::-:araine.s the development of Labouros 
fiuBl legislation, ,and seeks to explicate the factors that were 
influential both in the developm~Dt of tho poljcy and itOs 
2 
implementation. 
2. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The main purpose of this study is to describe and analys~ 
events associated with the policy enacted into legislation in 
1975 for the establishment of three separate and independent 
public corporations for broadcasting in New Zealand. 
In order to describe and analyse the events associ2.ted 
with this policy the following questions will be addressed: 
1. vJhy did the development of a three-
corporation broadcasting system in New Zealand become an 
issue for the nations policy-makers? 
2. . Hhat individuals and groups were involved 
iri the development of that policy? 
(a) Hho initiated the discussion and 
~Jhy? 
(b) lma supported the idea? 
(c) Hho opposed the idea why? 
(d) \~rhich gronps had influence? 
(e) T-Ihat \<7ere the bases of the groups 
influence? 
3. What proceedures were followed in the 
development of the ne"" poli.cy? Specifically, 
role was played in the formation of the policy 
by the 
Labour Party Caucus:;. the 
') 
J 
alld the 
l~daDl ComD,it tee and the 
c· 
Parliamentary select committee? 
These research questions follow closely those posulated by 
Hall (1982) in his case study of Educational policy development 
in Canada< 
3.SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This study will focus upon the development of one 
broadcasting policy; the development of the three-corporation 
system for New Zealand as legislated by the third Labour 
Government 1972-1975. There is evidence to substantiate the 
significance of such research. 
In the vernacuL':-1J: of °Star I'lars 0 
can be described as °The ForceD oE 
television 
today. It 
~s the frarne in. \"hich vre 'vie~v the diID8Ilsions 
of our society. It reflects the quality of our 
culture and the character of our priorities. 
It is a determining influence on our politics, 
our eC()l1Olclics, our ethics,-our aesthetics, as 
well as our psychological and social 
perceptions. 
Larry Grossman, President, 
Public Broadcasting Service 
(Quo~ed in .Cole, 1975, p.v) 
Right now television. in every country, 13 a 
tool used by °themO to influence °us o The 
°thanlO In.,,_y be advertisers se 11ing a product, 
politicians pushing a party line. or 
celebrities offering ~heir Vlews. But the 
message only flOl:-,1S in one direction~. 
Alvin Toffier (1975) 
What we fate is a race. As the nrteries of 
continued increase in pollution, a continued 
suicidal devotion of manos efforts to dozens 
of hostile military ~achines, and all this 
will keep the situation deteriorating. 
Which one will win out? 
Statements such as these, far from being Ul1coTIh':l1on, 
dominate much of the literature about bt~arlc8sting. There is a 
sense of awesomer:.2SS in tbe \'lriting as if broadcasting like 
nuclear power is ultimately beyond the control of human beings. 
Televis1.on in particular features prominently across the total 
spectrum of human endeavouT. It has polit:i.c.al, cultural, social, 
economic, commercial, psyc."bologi.cBl and even spiritual 
implications. (Smith. 1977, page 9). Yet above and beyond all 
this it is a superb entertainer. .Smith (1977) sees the 
incompatibility- of the la tter \d th the former list as the cause 
for all the quarrels over broadcasting that have taken place over 
the last ten yec:rs In virtually every cOl:ntry) East or "Jest, 
\}here television has reached maturity. 
The 19708, as far as the broadcast media are concerned; 
may come to be known as the decade of enquiries. All developed 
societies and many others - have endeayoured to take their 
. bearlngs!> as it vlel:-e j in the unc11a1.~ted oceans of COillIT:unication 
iss~es by holding one or more public investigations. 
Hany of them have teen d::Lrec.t.cd simply at 
deciding 
televisi.c'n~ 
speculati'1e 
hov! 2nd 
others have been directed vt more 
prol~\lenl~; by rnOO.er-rl 
have become aware of the 11~elihoad that aoy 
conclusion n~2.c.bed p:U.l be quickly ove:ct2ken 
'by E:\Tents" But the sp2ed of eb.arlge). 811d iLS 
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shifting directions (n6t all of them 
forwards), have-only e~couraged further acts 
of investigation. (Smith) 1977) page xii) 
All this authoritative inter~st in b~oadcasti~g has 
spawned a significant literature. In thr.:; United Kingdom \Hiters 
such as Briggs (1961,1965,1979), Hill (1974) and Paulu (1980) 
have sLudied the history and df:velopment of broadcasting. Smith 
(1974,1977,1979,1980), Goldie (1977) ) Burns (1977) and 
Schlesinger (1978) have contributed to the growing debate on 
broadcasting policy, Hood (1980), MacShane (1979), Clutterbuck 
(1980) and Heller (1978) have reseoxched social issues in 
broadcasting. Blumler (1979). Butler and Stoke.'> (1974) and the 
GlasgoVl Hedia Group (1976,1980) have pioneered renewed study on 
broadc.3s ting politics particularlj as it applies to 
persuasion theory, agenda setting and accountability. 
The volume of literc.ture from Aroe:cica is even greater Hith 
Schiller (1970). Katz (1971). OOKeefe (1975), Baggaley and Duck 
(1976), Friendly (lS76) and Levin (1980) being significant 
contributors", 
Although He" Zealand is high upon the list of those 
nations that have had major enquiries consequential 
legislati\re c:harlg/-:;s to :lts 1rj:oadc8sting st:cuc.ture~ a sirnila.r flow 
although dL1}~iJlg Britain 
1.eJces t (::r, Le~ds and Birminghrun universities; 
.il!ll 
and America and Canada continued to: develop their long-standing 
pre-eminence in the fields of cornmunicati.on theory aDd mass media 
study; New Zealand failed to respond 0 By th(~ enn of the deco.de no 
university had any formal research or teacliing programme in the 
broadcast media and there pas apallcJty c:E \.;rriting in the area 
also. Apart from one or tpo" popuL;.r" acCC)UntE; of broadcasting 
during the 1960s <'lnd early 1970s (Edwards ~ 1971; Bick, 1970;), 
an "official" history of Broadc.asting in Nel>.' Zealand that stopped 
at 1954! (Hall, 1980), and a sample of small, and very discrete 
thesis from a couple of universities (2), there is little to 
show. Indeed a major. public library in a m~~ropolit3n centre does 
not have 0 broadcastingO listed in its subj'c;ct fiJ-,,~s. 
Commenting on this lack of seri.01.13 research into New 
Zealand broadcasting, Hugh Templeton previ.cusly l1inister of 
Broadcasting in the National Government, 1976-1980) said: "it is 
a fertile field for research, sadly untouched bearing in mind the 
significance of broadcasting in the political and social history 
of NeH Zealand." (3) 
There is merit therefore in attempting further research 
into aspects of broadcasting ~n New Zealand. 
This study viII [clso refer to the ran[.F: of pollcY--lllaLing 
models found in the literature and. in particular, will relate 
the events '! ., mOCiel-5" The study 
conclude~' that no on~ model is sufficiently flexible for 
the New Zealand conditions - that from the United Kingdom 
rejecLs formal structural analysis };:J. I2VO:"'lT. of a more nODilative 
apPl-oach \i'h ich among other things HIJ.o~\7s for tlH~ asking of su('.1l 
questions a~l ,~hat ought to be. (if) 
4. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The limitations of this study are related to the research 
methodology used, that is examination and analysis of docume.ntary 
data and supplementary interviews. The documentary data were 
limited by availability. Da~a were obtained from public sources 
and some supplementary material was made available to the writer 
by persons who had been involved in the pblicy making process. In 
particular permission was given to peruse the personal papers of 
The Hon.R.O.Douglas and to read some material held by the 
Opposition Research Unit. Such records are open to a variety of 
interpretations. The writer did not have access to the files of 
the He.,,' Zea13nd B}~oadca3tiT,g Corpo1~aticn. Avail.:.::ble time and 
limited financial. resources restricted the numbeT of 
supplementary interviews. 
Th2 It lS 
as 
trying to demonstrate ~h2t ~n some ~2spect or other broadca~ting 
exerts a maS31ve and indi82~iffilnate influence on the views of all 
exposed to it. Likewise. 
it :tS -not 
possible to state that politicians by definition are paran012C 
when it comes to broadcasting. The study bears in mind the 
comments of the Pilkington Report (1962), "so far there is little 
conclusive evidence on the effects of television on values and 
moral attitudes." Further comments by the Social Horal1 ty Council 
(1974) stress that: 
••• one conclusion that may safely be dra"m 
from the body of existipz resEi'<n:ch is tl1at 
broadcast content will often"~ffectdifferent 
people in different ways, deperiding partly on 
the variety of other circumstances in ,.;rhich 
they are placed. (page 74) 
However, the °circumstancesOof politicans suggest ·that 
they are °placedo vis-a-vis broadcasting in a . somewhat: .. unique 
relationship. Smith (1977, page 15) gives an account of De 
Gaulleos visit to the ne",ly l:Lberated French Cameroons in 19116. 
Even then some politicians were aware of the power of the 
broadcast medium. De Gaulle was a compulsive broadcaster during 
the'Ylar years yet he VIas °astonished to discover how his image 
had preceded him. D When he heard the vast crowds at the quays ide 
chanting his name, he realised that he \vould hL(Ve to get to knovl 
this Ode Gaulleo, the man created 'by the radio broadcasts, a 
°secondary self, more potent than the primary self.O(Ibid) 
Smith goes on later.in the book to deliver one of the 
verdicts of recent research into broadcasting effects: 
The General Election Campaign as the cTeation 
of organised parties j_fi made to 2xh;t by t.hem 
in ways dictated by the presence of the mass 
media in general and television in 
particular. Senior party leaders organise 
their w~lk~bouts to get the best coverage "in 
the early. even:'u~g bulletins on all till'f:£? 
channels. The coutant of the big set-piece 
Speec.112s at public b.,slls in tIle e·Vt~::-Lin~~~f.~ 1.8 
designed partly to catch the he2Caine the 
9 
following morning, but mainly to get live 
coverage·in the mid-evening news b~lletins and 
the later discussion prograimnes on television. 
The morning press conferences given by all 
three parties are designed to get pithy 
statements into the early afternoon rad10 news 
prograIr' •. Jies. (pages 86-'87) 
The evidence supports the c.ontention· that broadecc5ting 
dominates politicians lives perhaps more than any ·other single 
occupational group in society. OWe hate the B •••••••. s! But oh 
God l"e need them!, 0 ~ a comment by one member of parliament 
confirms that the situation is little different in New Zealand. 
However both the scope of the study and the limited resources 
available to the author allows such issues to be raised only in 
passing. 
5. DELIHITATION OF THE STUDY 
The development of policy is dynamic, changing and 
ongoing. Hhatever time period is chosen it will to some extent be 
arbi trary and the selection of beginnings and endings mi.~leading. 
A decision was made to delimit this study to the period 1973--
1975. Ou the 31st of January 1973 ~he Minister of Broadcasting 
announced a new policy for broadcasting in New Zealand. On the 
1st of April 1975 the legislation resulting from the policy 
became la hT • 
The study is also delimited to i'tvaiL3.blc documentary dc:ta 
a-hd to intervie\vs \-lith seJ.ected reSpOl1l~ent.";" An atte;::,pt is made 
in this study to ~valuat~ the implemontation of the policy under 
review. 1l0\qever. the COT'illJents are ILmited in scope and need to. be 
10 
i; 
I 
I 
I 
i 
considered within the total spectrum of broadcasting policy-
making from 1961 to 1981. Such an evaluation is beyond a study of 
this kind. It must be left to another occasion. 
6. ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one 
introduced the topic and made some comment upon the significance 
and scope of the study. Literature pertaining to the study is 
reviewed in Chapter t'\w, in vlhich consideration is also given to 
the politics of broadcasting, the subject of this policy-making 
analysis. The literature on policy-making is discussed, models 
are introduced, and comments are made on the general role of 
pressure group activity. The research methodology used in the 
study is outlined in chapter three noting in particular the 
utility of Easton"s political systems model. The subject of media 
analysis is introduced , ana. the case study method outlined. Some 
comment is also made. on the task of intervie'~ing. The antecedents 
of the policy under study are outlined in chapter four. Chapter 
five is the account of events -surrounding the development of the 
policy under study. It is in effect the first part of the case 
~ 
study,. Chapter six analyses the events in terms of the theory 
outlined. The final chapter offers alternative analyses of the 
events. conclusions are dra'l-.rTl from the s~1Jdy and areas for 
further regearch suggested. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEI~ OF RELATED ITl'ERATm:n 
1. THE POLITICS OF BROiillCASTING 
The current ferment of ideological debate and disc.u[3sion 
about the form and content of broadcasting belies its humble 
beginnings. The first moves to organise regular public radio 
broadcasts attracted little generalattentfon or concern either 
in Nevl Zealand or overseas. "identic.'".l noises to all and sundry" 
was a contemporary description of radio quoted by Asa Briggs in 
his History of the BBC. ·(Briggs~ 1961. page 15) 
society 
It seemed to most people, iDcluding 
politicians, to be a matter of relatively 
minor - technical operation in a commercial 
field or relatively little public importance. 
(Heller, 1978, page 8) 
Indeed, like many developments, radJo ';.7:18 imposed on 
by a small number of enthusiastic inventors and 
commercial interests Hho sa,.)" potential p:cof:Lts inlliDllufacturing 
and distributing the new machines. There is uO evidence to 
. suggest that any society demanded the introduction of 
broadcasting" Such soci~ll pressures ',Jere a long tiTHe in coming. 
Other than .for the fact that broadcastingOs proposed 
activities intruded upon 6ne of the ~ost jealously guarded 
sectors of Government telecomrl~un:tcati.o::t:::; > 1.-1[deh hacl ah~ays b2en 
centrally controlled as 2~ luattc:r of uotional security, 
broadcasting may have never attracted governmentsO :Lnterec:t and 
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consequent interference. As it 1',',-"{S the enterprising moves of 
radiO enthusiasts quickly attracted the attention of always 
vigilant post office officials. Thus it was the almost 'accidental 
combination of 8tC2te interest and i.n\!(::Dtorial e:nt,husiasm that led 
to the ineVitably close :lnvoJVf~:fT'.2.nt ofgove)~nments \-lith 
broadcasting. It waG scarce allocation'of alrw~Ves and not broad-
casting content that firstbrousht the fledgling new 
communicc:ttions system to the attention of officialdom. As 
Williams notes in his perceptive book "Television: Technology and 
Cultural form": 
It is not only that the ~:;urpJy of Bl:oadcasting 
facilities 'preceded demqud; it is tha~ the 
means of communica.tion . preceded their 
content. (\~illiams> 197 1:) 
Thus broadcasting played little any role in the 
pereeived government or social serviees of the time. It was a 
peripheral activity conceived purely as a function of marketi.ng 
radio equipment. As Heller (1978) poin~s out, this is exactly the 
same as today i.7ith cable and satel1:Lte television, viewdata and 
teletext all searchibg for social fun~tions outside the military 
research that created them. Thus the historical pattern of 
broadcasting developme;.lt baving form before , content is 
reinforced. This historieal precedence of technology over demand 
explains tbe :ce.rrJ2r]:able absence 0"£ concern sho"Hn at the time for 
wha t 'h'as ae tuaJ,J.y broad.:::ast. In 1925 the CTCi'vford Commit tee in 
the me cou.ld disTUiss tbe eon.te~lt issue \\;It}l feloJ \·,ords: 
A moderate amount. of controvet'sJal matter 
sbo~ld be broadcast. provicl~d it is of high 
quality and dis tri buted \",j, lh scnJpul,jus 
fai1;ness~ 
13 
The overall assumption was that everybody agreed on what 
it ,.;ras desirable for the publlc to hear •. In New Ze.aland the 
emphasis was on "recordings of the "I.JOrld t) s gre.atest artists" and 
"engaglng only the best local . artists" (OODonogh~e,. .. 19I.f6) 
Occasionally there would be a re-broadcastor an outstanding 
international event such as a Monarchos speech or the Oxford and 
Cambridge boat race. Indeed any controversy generated by the 
budding broadcast services seemed to centre around those who saw 
a comDlercial disadvantage or threat: 
The Press was afraid that broadca~ting had 
come as a strangling euemy~ church. authorities 
avowed that this modern intruder would keep 
people away from chur~h; crick~t and fuotball 
organisations refused to allo"(.] the5.r club 
games to be broadcast lest tl1eir patrons 
should stay at home ••••• and for years racing 
clubs refused to allow the word 
"broadcasting" to be mentioned". (OODonoghue, 
1946, l'a.ge 7) 
The stateOs interest in early broadcasting was therefore 
essentially negative. Thif] being expressed by the stateOs control 
of frequency allocation and the legal r~gulation (by licensing) 
of the right to receive and transmit messages. There was also an 
"unspoken" concensus abont what should be avoided lead.ing to a 
set of negative prohibitions: it was necessary to avoid 
Vulgarity ~ to omit ne,,'s in deference to ne,,7spaper interests) to 
avoid controven;ial topic.s sllch as politj.cs. "Positive mat:::crs of 
content and fjoc.lal purpose) on the other har-ld ,. ,'Jere oLiginally 
seen as peripheraL" (Heller. 1978, page 12) 
What brought about the change? How did the state become so 
inextrlcablY'bound up with broadcasting? 
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In New Zealand three major factors were influential in 
determining broadcastingOs future rclationsh:Lps \-7ith the state:: 
1. The influence ofth~ BBt 
2. The actions of Brcadc:astcn:;themselves 
3. The election of the firt:t I,abour Government 
(1) The Influence of the BBC 
As is many other areas the influence of the "Old Country"· 
on New Zealandos broadcasting development was substantial • 
•••• The United Kingdon had adopted 
almost from' the inception of broadc2sttng, as 
part of its system, corporate control as the 
form most appropriate to the dc:velopment of 
this new social service. New Zealand was 
greatly influenced by the apparent success of 
the system ••• (Marshall, 1966, Pag~ 243) 
As mentJoned earlier matters of transmission and ainvaves 
licensing were the consuming interest of officialdom in the UK as 
well as elsewhere during the pioneering days of radio. Two 
exhaustive enquiries into broadcasting dealt exclusively with 
technical and management problems. The British Broadcasting Co. 
Ltd. established in 1923,the result of "an accidental conjunction 
of state interest and commer~-ial enterpJ.;ise". (Heller, 1978, page 
£) was only to have a short life. In e~rly 1926 the British 
Broadcasting Company Ltd. was replaced by the British 
Broadcasting Corporation. Created by Royal Charter, it followed 
an established British tradition of establishing ad hoc bodies of 
differen t kind s vi th autonomous or seTiJ.i-"dutonomous status to 
handle v8rious services and utilities of concern ~o the general 
l5 
I 
, 
I 
public. Even at this stage it was seen as having a function not 
dlssimml1ar to The Port of London Authority or the Forestry 
Commissiono 
Developments at the BBC were, influenced by. two Qther 
factors, one less forceful than the other. The first Has the. so 
called "American experience". Throughout British broadcasting 
history the example of what happened in the United States of 
America has provided "an immensely influential devilos advocacy 
of alternatives." (Heller, 1978, page 12). Radio in the United 
States was developing rapidly on an unstruc~ured and unrestricted 
"free-enterprise" basis. Peter Eckersley J B, pioneer Briti,sh broa-
dcaster records th'e American experience as "a great stimulant" 
and referred to the people pho came over to Britain from the 
States during the 19200s as having made "vast sums of money" in 
radio. There were "hellfire accounts of chaos and tastelessness, 
stirring images of freedom, enterprise and imagination". (Heller, 
page 22). No doubt there was also accounts of technical anarchy 
and unbridled airvlaves piracy all of \'7hi::::h helped the two 
Committees reject outright deregulation and opt for a form of 
control that .. lOuId at the least eliminate the profit motive and 
avoid the possib:Llity of disorderly exp~oitation of scarce public 
The second and hy far more dominant f:"c.tor pas John Reith 
(later Lord Reith) himself. Unique in the world of hroadcasting 
this man towered like a giant over all the ot11~r personalities, 
both broadcasters and politicians. for over a decade. Indeed 
SOme would say hLs "ghost" still haunts th(~ corLLdors of the BBC 
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ensuring his special brand of corporate control remains untouched 
and unsurpassed. He was a Scot, tall in stature with craggy 
features that made a gift to political cartoonists. 
He came from a religiou8~ackground and his 
high standards of moral and religious 
rectitude had been enforced in sound 
broadcasting. His word ,1as law. There must be 
no light entertainment or political 
contr·oversy on the Sabbath; no breath of 
scandal must touch any member of his staff; 
the dignity of the Corporation must be 
maintained at every point; announcers, even 
although they were not seen, must vlear dinner 
jackets in the evening. (Goldie, 1977, page 
28 ) 
Reith was totslly obsessed with the inheren.t possiblities 
of radio. The force of his V1.S1.on and his connnitment to 
efficiency and public responsibility was·s~ch that he carried all 
before him, For him management was essentially an affair of 
experts to \-Ihom it was indispensible to give vlide discretionary 
po\o!ers and a lib;::ral freedom to experiment with new methods. 
IiUnencumbered, unembarrassed, and uncondi.tional efficienc.yll he 
wrote was the major reason for the establishment of the BBG. It 
could then be: 
normally untrammelled by any 
politic?-l interference, by any delegacy, by 
any Civil Service procedures, by any political 
party expectations and claims, by any demands, 
by impatient shareholders - not one factor of 
the kind that disquiets the life of most 
adminis tratm:s and m8.Dagers, (Reith> quoted ~n 
Wedell, 1966, page 21) 
Strong words of independence. But such was Reiths 
rectltu.cl.e, his total belief in, 3.ncl respect. for, a'.l thori ty, , ann 
total COIllIcL1.tment to the VDlu"2s of the British ,::,stahlishment ·that 
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in reality the BEC became the voice of the ·Government. The 
behaviour of Reith in the 1926 General Strike confirms this. He 
himself ",rate later in his diary~ " they know' that they' can trust 
uS not to be really impartial." (Reith; 19/f9) page 108). And 
Bald\\dn told Reith that Broadc.aEting. had. "triumphantly shm,red 
ltself in a sea.rching test." (Quote.d in Briggs, 1961, page 38 /.). 
Thus Asa Briggs "las able to conclude that it \,7aS the form and 
content of radio services under Reith at the British Broadcasting 
Company that played a decisive role in shaping the future of 
broadcasting legislation. Contrary to general belief it was a 
private company and not the British pove;~n.illen t ~::> ",\ that effectively 
placed broadcasting within the bc)Uude.def; of a public, service. 
The first Chairman of the BBC Lord C1;'11':endon saH' it as an 
"inevitable and logical result" of the policies adopted right at 
the beginning of the broadc.s.sting story in 1922. "All this was 
ReithOs doing." (Briggs, 1965, page 3) 
" 
FollO'\~ing closely the Brit:Lsh experience it is no \'70nder 
that NGv!.Zealand initially., .. esche,<ied' American .com!Ilercialism~ 
admired the principles of Reith and topied the structures that he 
espoused. 
(2) The Actions of Broadcasters 
Admiration is one thing t the cil!j_ltty to be able to 
satj_sfactorily re~reate the strut: tt,rC'3 is 'Hlothc:c. \\lith the 
limited resources of money and equipment~ a much sma.ller 
potential listening aUGlenCe and a country 'of exceptionally 
rugged terrain with its pockets of population spread widely apart 
New Zeal~Dd broadcasting could onJ.y poorly copy that which it 
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admired so much. Further it lacked the genius of a Reith to mould 
and hold the structure. Good men all were the first directors of 
the Radio Broadcasting Company of N.Z.Ltd and the New Zealand 
Broadcasting Board, its successor. But who recalls them no\.;? 
oODonaghue suggests: 
.those great business men behind the 
Charter engaged New Zealand talent in all its 
branches and were ever on the lookout for the 
best available talent from other 
countries ••.••• Under the direction of the 
Company very many outstanding events studded 
the programmes ••••• The Management was ever 
progressive in seiztng the opportunity of 
introducing sensational hapRe~ings to 
listeners. (1946. p~ges 7-8) 
On the other hand Edwards suggests: 
Really bad were the programmes •••••• In 
the slang of the day,they were 
chronic ••••• Night after night listeners were 
tuning out stridulous vocalists and fault-
fingered instrumentalists, defective 
elocutionists, unfunni humori.sts ,. profoundly 
uninteresting speakers on recondite topics 
- the unpaid and untalented seemed almost as 
numerous as the unemployed; certainly they 
were as unpopular. (1971, page 56) 
Be that as it may, the listening public des~rted the A 
stations in droves for the less secure, less officially 
acceptable ~ but ovenlhelmingly more popular B stations. 
It was on 1ZB in Auckland that Colin Scrimgeour - Uncle 
Scrim of the Friendly Road to most of his listeners - drew the 
largest listening audience. Scrimg£our ~as one of the first 
people to fully understand the po"\;)e1:" of the Devl medj_um, He vias 
also one of the fev vjith the talent to exploit it. His precarious 
freedom to broadcas t from lZB .,..ras an immense thorn in the flesh 
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of authorities. So much so that, authority began to resent him. 
Broadcasting under the Board was~bcavily regularised and 
regulated. The B stations, policed b)~c the,Fost and Tel~graph 
Department 1,rere subjected to the constant attention of inspectors 
whose job it had become to ensure that these stations¥lere as 
innocuous 1L1 their presentations aS~~re-those controlled by the 
Board. Sytematical1y Scrimgeour incurred the wrath of the 
inspectors, the Board and finally the Minister of Post and 
Telegraph himself Adam Hamilton. pcri~11g~ourOs crusading 
Methodist ministry background made him very cocisciou8 of the 
social and moral evils of tlJC 'depression. rL~' ..... 73S even more 
consc1..ous of abuse of pOvler 111 the political process. His 
Ilrighteous angerll led him to use his radio station as a platform 
to attack his opponents. Thousands of Aucklanders became his 
£0110\<7ers, a devoted audience that Ilhung on his every word". 
ScrimgeourOs sympathies towards the Labour Party led him into 
close involvement with the partyOs hierarchy. He even 
contemplated standing for parliament In the. 1935 General' 
Election., That was not to be. However he m~de sure that Michael 
Joseph Savage and others were well aware of the political 
potential of broadcasting and then set about to use his own 
position and power to bring about n Labour victory. 
A victori.ous Labour Gov,el~n'!l."~nL \vas 10:ft in' no doubt as to 
the power of broadcasting and a defeated and demoralised 
opposition. \vel~e con-VinCC2G al.so., ~}Q TllU.cl1 .so· that :tn the last days 
of Colalition Party office Adam Hamilton used his position to 
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,illegally jam statiofr 1ZBos transmission. 
3.The first Labour Gove'rnment 
By 1936 Labour was convinced of the need to "protect" 
broadcasting from "hostile" elements. Faced \,)1 th almost toUtl 
media opposition from a conservativenndanti-'-socialist press 
Hichael Joseph Savage saw the viilue of placing broadcasting 
within the orb:i,t of the public service. Such CV,Tas this value that 
he made himself the first Minister of Broadcasting. In 1938 he 
was recorded as saying "It is a grand thing to have a hand on 
Radio these days." (OODonoghue, page 21) Broadcasting in New 
Zealand was firmly. in the hand of politicians' a~d there it 
remained for many years. 
In retrospect, the beginning of broadcasting was an 
extraordinarily. casual affair. As pointed out above, originally, 
the services ,.;rere begun in response to technical and commercial 
demands rather than to popular demand or any preconceived or 
developed Government policy. Any challenge presented by this 
fledgling communications medium to state interests Has primarily 
in the field of telecommunications. It \Yas in this ar'ea than 
initial legislation retained for the State ultimat~ control. The 
model of the public corporation was conveniently to hand in the 
U.K. to provide protection fro~perceived unsavoury effects of 
COmmercialism and profit and ensure the independent pursuit of 
efficienc.y. NeT", Zealand with muc.h less cultural' commitment to 
these values nevertheless. in true colonial style. followed. As 
for the awakening disquiet about the social and politic.al 
Consequenc.es of broadc.as ting; ""hat arnde ties that existed in the 
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U.K. V?ere allayed by ReithOs zeal in dedicating radio "to the 
cause of social uplift and improvement." In New Zealand it was 
necessary to go one step further. By making broadcasting a 
Government Department the concepts of brop.dcas;:l.l\Z "in the 
national interest" or true "publi0c< Ferv:i_ce broadc.asting~: carne to 
New Zealand perhaps before nny other country. 'Both concepts, 
however~ have come to dominate the conduct and discussion of 
broadcasting services. 
Policy can be defined,as the ..... gencTD.l principles Hhich 
guide the making of laws, administration)' and executive acts of 
governments i.n domestic. and international affairs. Policy has to 
be distinguish~d from doctrine - the systems of beliefs and 
values '"hieh generate policy and which purport to describe the 
ends to which policy is the means, ,and from philosophy, the 
" '-. 
underlying justification given for doctrine and policy together. 
Policy analysis is finding out "'hat governments do, \vhy' 
they do it, and what difference it makes. 
Dye and Robey (1980) identify three separate but 
interrelated tasks: describing ~ublic policy. determining its 
causes and assessing its consequences. 
The descriptive task in policy analysis 
should not be undere~tlmated. Describing gove-
rnment p?:ogramm.es and po11.cH:~s -- surveying 
enabling legislation, examining authorisations 
and appropriations, indentifying agencies vith 
responsibilities for adllii~istratlon and 
implementation, and, most importantly, finding 
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out just exactly what these agencies do - is a 
formidable undertaking. 
Studies of the causes of public policy 
learning why governments do ,,,hat they do - is 
an even more challenging task" Early politicitl 
science texts frequently ,qe:;o;cr::Ulc "hO\>l a bill 
becomes law", and many politIcal scienttsts 
today continue to focus. on the 1;:uQ-'11l8king 
process in their approacli to the'detenHnants 
of puhlic policy. But in recRnt years 
systematic~ comparative research on 
determinants of public policy has developed 
very rapidly. 
Still another task in policy anaysis is that 
of assessing the consequences of public 
policy. This may be the most difficult task 
confronting the policy analyst: finding out 
what difference public policy makes in our 
lives or if it malces ~lJ.;l, d~,ff~~erlce 2t. all. 
(1980, page ,3) 
This study is basically descriptive, however some attempt 
is made to look at the determinants of public policy as they 
relate to decisions on broadcasting during the period under 
review. 
3. THE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLICY 
Unlike what appears to be the naive thtnking of some 
public policy determiners, policy analysts cannot'approach the 
task thinking that there is a disc.rete problem, requiring a 
distinct solution. Rather" as Hild,lvsky (1979) points out. we 
must think differently about th2 nature of social and political 
action, not as puzzles to be solved (Douce and for all o as some 
politicians are Hor,t to say») but 3S "prublems that r,12.y be 
alleViated or eventually superc.eded." Policy analysis must be 
c.oncerned more \7ith problem suc.cession and displacement than "lith 
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problem solution; 
It is not resolution of policies but evolution, 
that should inte'rest us. 
A better compar1son is to controst ,the 
problems we have now with thRs~ we ~u~ before. 
Instead of thinking of permacneel;.: solutions we 
should think of permanenl':'i<'p:::-oblems 1n the 
sense that one problenl ahiaYD succeeds and. 
replaces another. (page 206) 
Tbus the major question we should perhaps address 
ourselves to when involved in policy analysis is whether todayOs 
response to the problems 1S more moral or more effective than the 
solutions they succeeded or vlhich theY.!flight replace. 
4. HODELS 
Various models for policy analysis have been developed 
over the last thirty years or so. Many are American in origin and 
reflect that nations commitment t-o various degrees of behavioural 
and structural analysis within political theory, 
In the 19600s American political scientists and business 
management theorists diverged from one another; the latter 
concentrating on the development of decisioIllllaking ·theories the 
former studying broader base'd policy ar:alysis. Anderson (1975) 
d ' t' '1 b ~ d" 1 ' '1 ' l' .!S -lnguls1es e ween eC1Slon maslng moa2_S ana po lCY an.alysis 
models. He determinod that decisiofl<OT)<::1.d.ng U;,lS a shorter term 
event contributing to the ultireate developmsnt of an overall 
policy. 
5. HODELS FOH .. POLICY !"IV1LYSIS 
2A 
Decision making theories included: 
(1) !ational-comprehensive 
Probably the best knovm decision th"'Ol-Y vhi.ch sl;;;;gests 
that the rc:: tional decision,.m,,;lcer ~lill behave logically· and 
consistently~ choosing a decision t::3r- tlill most closely mateh 
the original goals after havinp; L:lkcTI. into account all the 
options and analysed all the various consequences of each 
alternativc choice. 
(2) Incrementalism 
Lindblom (1968) developed. t.hi~;: Lheo:;:-y to replace rational 
decision~making in the b~lief that administrator's on the w110le do 
not behave as entirely rati.onal beings. Decision-makers operate 
in conditions of uncertainty therefore it is prudent to agree 
about a policy without ever being too clear about what is the 
most appropriate objective. The science is one of "muddling 
through". Incrementalism recognio3es that decision-makers lack the 
time, of ten the intelligcnc:e Cl.ud the re.source.s needed to engage 
in comprehensive rational decisions. 
This theory' ·whilst agreeing vith Illuch oitha criticism 
agai~st rational theory is also critical of incrementalism. Creat 
or fundamentHl decisions (e.g. declarations of war) do not corne 
within the a~bit of incrementalism. Such deci~ions are highly 
significant and are prob2hly IDBde vithin the best attempts at 
rational decision making. General]y sp22king the greater the 
capacity of decision makers to utilize resources and intelligence 
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to implement decisions the more scanning they can realistically 
engage in and hence the more effective the decision making. 
(Etzioni, 1967) 
Decisions are distingui~bed from policies by suggesting 
that policies are the cUIDulativ·e'result of decisions taken. Once 
again there are a number of models: 
(4) Group Theory 
This states that struggle~and interaction among groups of 
human beings is the central fact of political and social life. 
Groups make competing and conflicting claims upon institutions 
and governments. Individuals ate only significant in pol~tics 
when they· belong to or identify with) groups. Government 
decisions will reflect the dominant groups and public policy will 
alter as various groups rise and fall in significance. (Trllman, 
1951) Criticism of this theory rests upon ·the argument that it 
overstates the case. "'Thilst interest groups are important in 
society, so are independent and creative individuals and even 
more so '-lhen such lndividuals arc themselves public officials. 
(Anderson, 1975, page 20) 
(5) Elite TheoEL. 
This theory suggests that only a small ruling elite 
actually determine public policy and not the people as a 
collective mass. Only this small number allocate values for the 
Whole of society. They tend to come disproportionately from the 
upper socia-economic group in society and they protect their 
Position by ensuring that movement from the non-elite into the 
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elite whilst difficult is not impossible. It is slow yet 
continuous to ensure social stability. The masses are suggested 
to be, on the whole, apathetic and they accept the prevailing 
values of the elite. Changes in public policy t,end to be 
incremental rather than revolutionary. Elitesinflu2nce J masses 
more than masses influence elites. This· "rather provocative 
theory" (Anderson, 1975, page 21) foc.uses attention on the role 
of leadership with its suggestion that the few govern the many. 
It is still contentiously debated. (Dye & Ziegler, 1978, page 6) 
(6) Functional Process Theorz 
Lasswell (1956) is the supreme functionalist. He presents 
a scheme involving seven categories of functional analysis. 
1. The gathering of intelligence by policy makers and how it 
is processed. 
2. Hmv are recommendations (or alternatives) for dealing 
with various issues made and promoted. 
3.How general rules are prescibed and by whom. 
4.1.Jho determines whether given behaviour contravenes rules 
or laws and who demands application of such rules or laws. 
5. How are the rules or laws actually enforced. 
6. Hov, are the operations of policies appraised in terms of 
their success or failure. 
7. How are tbe original rules or lal'i8 terminateu,. conU_nued 
or modified. 
In true. fun~tionalist form - seven words predominate: 
Intelligence, RecOl=endation ~ Prescription, Invocation, 
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Application, Appraisal, Termination.,. 
Standard criticism of functionalist theory applies. Its 
form is too rigid, it fails to re~pond to psychological variables 
and to environmental effects. Policy fOr~atioQ 18 much more than 
just an intellectual process. 
(7) Political Systems theory 
In this theory public policy may be seen as a response of 
a political system to demands arising from its envlronrnent. The 
Political system as defined by Easton (1979) is cOillposed of those 
identifiable and interrelated. institution~ and activities in 
society that make authoritative d~cisions or allocations of value 
that are binding on society. Itiputs into the political system 
consist of demands and supports that are made upon it by the 
environment. The environment is all the conditions and events 
that exist outside the political system. ~ndividuals. to satisfy 
their interests make demands on the system and so do groups~ 
Support is rendered to the political system ¥lhen groups and 
individuals pay taxes, abide by election results, obey laws and 
in other ways accept the decisions and~ctions' that recognised 
. authority impose. These ~mpositions are the authoritative 
allocations ot social value and constitute public policy. The 
coneept of feedback ensur~s that policies, or outputs, are able 
to be subsequently changed so as to better respond to the demands 
generated by the environllk.'l1t. Such feed1:)ack also has its ovm 
effect of altering the character of the political system itself. 
Policy outpu ts lllay produce ne,'! demands ~ I-lhich lead to further 
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policy outputs. And so it continues, producing a never ending 
flow of public policy. 
Harman (1979) as quoted by Hcil.l (19g2~ page 30) criticises 
"the limited repertoire of theories" used by mostwrit2r~ ; and 
then goes on to develop twelve different models ofpolic:ymaking 
including bargaining, organisational models and the process 
model. 
6. PROBLEMS OF MODEL APPLICATIONS 
There are some major problems associated with applying any 
of these models to the analysis of sOcial policy in NeVl Zealand. 
One is inherent in the models themselves. In isolation each model 
has weaknesses- that become apparent the moment they are applied 
to' concrete issues. Some of these v7eaknessness have been 
mentioned. Others focus around the ~erging of public policy and 
social action - the question of hm, "theory" or "analysis" can 
properly be related to practice. White (1976) sees ,this issue 
emerging with increasing urgency. Still more are related to 
perceived confusions betweeri planning and politics. Wildavsky 
(1979) argues that platming focuses almost exclusively on the 
ranking of objectives. He argue~ that politics often seeks upon 
agreed ends at any cost. Policy analysis models often concentrate 
on one at the exclusion of the other. Good analysis, claims 
Wildavsky, must alw&ys consid~r resources and objectives, means 
and ends, together.' 
"The proper comparison for the policy analyst 
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is alHays bet,,'een alternative programs, "'hich 
combine resources and objeGtives in different 
ways, but not the one or the other in 
isolation." (Hildavsky 1979, P73) 
A further major problem in applying nDy ~xistin~ models to 
New Zealand lies iri the lack of any. signifJcant ¥lOrk in policy 
theory that responds to the peculiai' New Zealand condttions. Most 
theory. ::'.8 mentioned above, is American in origin and designed to 
respond to a set of political and social conditio~s markediy 
different from those experienced in New Zealand. 
What little v70rk that has been done tends to accept as 
given the overseas ·models. For example Ensor (1975), takes the 
incremental model of decision making as the theoretical basi.s for 
an analysis of '.yooi marketing reform and a systems model is 
identified as being used by Hoadley (1975) and Roy (1975). 
PolaschekOs (1958) seminal work on Government Administration in 
New Zealand is purely descriptive and the ~eforms suggested are 
of an administrative nature only and reflect the historical 
concentration of training in public. administration in New Zealand 
on the production of the °compleatO bureaucrat. 
For the purposes of this study the view is held that 
EastonOspo1iti.cal systems theory coupled with elements of group 
theory (presure groups play a significant role in New Zealand 
policy making)} ellte t.heory ( . , eVJ..Genc:e broac:asting 
policy was determined by very few people) and incremental 
, . ) 
aeclsion making (many moJificationswerc made along the way are 
all necessary to supply a theoretical basis for this study. 
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6. PRESSURE GROUPS 
(1) Definitions 
Alan Robinion (1970) defines a pressure group 
....... a privately organised., group which. seeks 
to lnfluence govcrnnlentpolicies mainly by 
means other than that of seeking political 
office. It differs from a political party 
which is mainly concerned ,,,i th 0 bta:1.ning or 
retaj,uing political office". (page 17) 
Levine (1975) states: 
"Interest groups when behaving politically may 
be described as private concentrations of 
pm"er devoted to the achievement of g03.1s that 
may not be necessarily shared by the majority 
of the popuiation." (page 199) 
Almond and Powell (1966) suggest: 
(interest groups) ••.. "articulate political 
demands in the society, seek supports for 
these demands among other groups by advocacy 
and bargaining) and att~mpt to tt-ansform these 
demands into authoritative pu[,lJ.c policy by 
influencing the choice of political personal, 
and the varlous processes of public policy 
making and enforcement." (page 74) 
as: 
Each of these definitions is accept2.ble but further comment is 
necessary. 
Some v!ri ters make a distinction between the terms 
·';'j.nterest group" a.nd. "pressure group". There is the suggestion 
that "pressure gIuUp" has overtones of disapproval. However) the 
negative cornl0tatiD~S of the latter seem hardly strong. enough to 
merit banishR~nt. Furth~r. Robinson (1970, page 52)) draws 
attention to ambigu:i.ties in .the m2aning of "interest". Beeros 
(1962) definition as quoted in Levine (1979) is useful: 
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"By interest He mean here"simply a disposit-
ion to act to achieve some goaL" (page 127) 
For the purposes of this study the terms '''interest group" 
and "pressure group" will be interc;hi3.Dgable. 
(2) Types of Pressure Groups 
A number of typologies of pressure groups have been 
developed (e.g. Almond and Powell, 1966) but that of Levine 
(1979) has the advantage of being particular to New Zealand. His 
classification is sho-cm in figure 1 b 
He divides gl:OUpS into thos'~ which are "protective" and 
those. that are "promotional". Protective groups have long' term 
interests and usually have strong sectional or economic backing. 
He describes promotional groups as being set up to achieve 
certain purposes relating tQ particular and often highly 
controversial political issues. Levine sees them as more 
transient and yet receiving the most publicity. He attributes 
this fact to their general lack of political influence with 
deci.sion-makers hence the need to have a high media profile to 
attract a wider public. 
./ 
Beer (1962) also hypothesised a. distinction 
special-interest groups and gencral--interest groups, suggesting 
that the special-interest group is primarily out to benefit 
itself vlhilst the e2.l'2ral-interest group seeks to benefit others. 
Levine rejects this: 
Since most groups persuade themselves that 
satisfaction of their O,,7ll interests \/ill pro-
. mote the interests of everyone else~ this 
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Type of 
intCTest group 
Economic 
Environmental 
Moral 
Racial 
.. 
TABLE 6: 1 Types of New Zealand Interest Groups 
Basis oj membership 
Occupation 
Ideological (may involve 
local residents and 
ra tepayers in certain 
disputes) 
I deological (may 'involve 
affected persons or 
organisations) 
i dcological; racial 
Objectives 
Protect membership; 
inAuence budgetary 
allocations; secure 
economic benefits 
Protect cnvironment~ 
preserve natural 
features; oppose 
pollution: support 
stringent planning of 
etonomic development 
Promote particular 
structure of values; urge 
government support.to 
.ensure desired pztlcrn of 
values is implemented.; 
oppose incompatible 
programmes 
Protcct membership; 
ensure that government 
policies arc not 
prejudicial: jnn~encc 
government's foreign 
policies 10 su rrort non-
VI'hitc 'third world' 
struggles 
Political influence 
Considcra blc: partici pa te 
regularly in the policy 
process 
Sporadic and irregular; 
depends on issue and 
extent of public 
involvement in ad hoc 
Issues 
Sporadic and irregular; 
depends on issue and 
extent of public 
involvement; elite 
mem bcrship may be 
decisive 
Considerable at 10caJ 
level; irregular at 
na tional level; depends 
on issue and extent (and 
content) of media 
coverage 
Examples 
Trade unions; Federation 
of Labour; 
lv1anufacturers 
Association; Federated 
Farmers 
Ecology Action; Action 
for Environment; 
Environmental Defence 
Society 
SPUC; ALRANZ; 
NOV!; \Varnen's 
1 ·lbr>r~t·l·on' rny L· ,.ld , uc 
Liberation: spes; 
r' d P , I....oncerne aren lS 
CARE; HART: 'Nga 
JamaiOa; Polynes~J.n 
Panthers . 
I-rj 
H 
GI 
C 
2S l'j 
.\-.1 
distinc.tion requires too subjec'tive an 
assessment of the °ben~fitsO of group activity 
to be very useful."(1979, page 128) 
Policy analysts who support the Group Theory (e.g. Dahl, 
1967; Truman, 1951) argue that all po}~itical conflict is group 
conflict and therefore 'the vhole process of politics must involve 
antagonism between groups and the consequent success or failure 
of various groups to win support from the government or adminis-
tration. Levine dues not counter this argument with any passion, 
which is surprising bearing in mind the significant role 
individuals have pl~yed in New Zealandos political process. 
Anderson (1975) believes this po~ition overstates the case 
for group activity and understates the independent and creative 
role individuals, particularly in the form of public officials, 
play in the policy process. 
Pressure groups may function basic.ally for the purpose of 
making demands upon policy-making bodies in order to achieve 
their own goals but they are also more than that. They help to 
define the wider goals of the, social system and prOVide a flow 
both of fresh ·information and feedback Hhich assists policy-
lllaking bodies to keep in touch both ",ith v:hat is happening in 
socie ty and hOI', opinion-makers are thhlking. Some political 
scientists go so far to suggest that the e~istence of interest 
groups is a distinctive feature of del:lOcratic pol1tics< (see 
Levine. 1975. page 199). This se2IDS to unvarrently suggest that 
other forms of political society lack such pressure groups-
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Cleveland (1972,. page 13) lists ways in Mhich pressure 
groupS can be useful to governments: 
1. Attempt to initiate or to influence legislation; 
2. Help to frame publi~ policy by acting as a linkage 
between government and a widefield of Sfjecial organisations 
and interests involved with it in a c~ntinuous. two-way 
process of consultation and interaction; 
3. Dissemin3.te information do\~"'Ilwards to mass publics as 
well as up,,'ards to goverment by, means of advertising and 
publicity campaigns) lettei: \';Titing, the wd.ting of 
telegrams) lobbying and making formccT 81.1 bmissions to parlia-
mentary organisations; 
4. Provide a flow of lnformation, ideas, suggestions and 
criticism to activists throughout the whole field of 
government and politics and thus help to stiumulate their 
performance; 
S. Provide an additional channel for the representation 
of aspects of public opin16n \rltich micht otherwise not be 
heard. In this ,-lay they aug11lent the vwrk of the political 
parties and the mass media by expressing specialised and 
minority opinions; 
6._ Act as \,7at~c.hdogs, kf:(,ping an additional) critical 
check on the work of govcnneut; 
7. Define aspec.ts of pu1)lic opinion 2t levels i,rhich 
parties only occasionally touch. Parties are interested in 
winning power at elections. Pressure groups are active all 
the time. Any group of citizens can form a pressure group and 
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this helps in the representatid.n of voters who might other-
wise be unfairly treated. The two basic democratic principles 
involved in this are the right to participate in policy-
making and the right to petitJon.those in authority and 
obtain access to them. PreSS1.,,~e >group activity· a110lvs 
minorities to be clearly heard - one of the essentials of 
democracy. 
lYithin the overall framework of policy-making, 
particularly when referencing systems theory, attention must be 
given to the relationship between pressure groups and the 
government in the framing of public policy, Negotiation and 
consultation are the two types of activity that Eckstein (1960) 
suggests may occur when pressure groups itivolve themselves with 
government in the formation of new policies. 
Negotiations take place when a governmental 
body makes a decision hinging upon the actual 
approval of organizations interested in it, 
giving the organi.zation a veto over the 
decision; consultations 'occur wIlen the views 
of the organisation are solicited and taken 
into account but are not considered in any 
sense decisive" (page 411) 
Whether in negotiation or consu\tation the success of an 
intereE:t group in having its v:i.e"'points adopted will depend on 
its infl\;ence. 
Hall (1982) 8uggest~ that influence is the extent to ~~lich 
an lnterest group:L8 able to legiU.mate its delllands. Anderson 
(1975) write.s: 
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Thc influence of interest groups depends on a 
number of factors. These may include .••••• the 
size of the groupOs membership, its monetary 
and other resources, its cohesiveness, the-
skill of its leadership, its social status, 
the presence or absence of compctlng 
organizations, tbe att:Ltude:; of ',' publJ.c 
ffi '~ 1 co nd the site'~ Of: r1'''CJ" c~o-~-" .. ,'1:'-;, '"' it) o C.La-'- ...... J a ' . . '_ _1.<.. ___ uJ- 1. .. ~ .. _.u)":,I.~\.. ..... _ ... 16 
the political ~ystem. (page 27) 
Robinson (1970) traces Ne~l Zealand 0 s history in terms of 
pressure group activities. Local and regional groupings dominated 
the nineteenth century usually concentrating on gaining a fair 
share of public works. Larger groupings witb economic bases vied 
with eacb other from the 19305 ttl-ough to the 19505. It was the 
peak of party development and competing groups sought control of 
the parties in order to control the state. Tbe most recent 
period has seen the rise of powerful national interest groups 
concerned with altering or defending details of the centrally 
controlled economy and the welfa~e state. 
This pattern of development bas had a number of stimuli~ 
Robinson (1970, page 52) lists them as: 
1. The' impact of fluctuations in Ne'\.l Zealandos overseas 
markets, leading to unified requests for action at the 
national level and the -submergence of provincial and local 
loyalties; 
2. The specialisation of labour in the economy, leading to 
the self-cortscious creation of professional associations 
based on occupation; 
3 Improvements in commul1ic3.tioJl ClLH1 transportation> enabling 
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local organisations to am3lgamatellio:re easily; 
4. The widening ra~ge and scope of ~tate involvement in 
society, leading to requests [or special services and the 
entry of °privateO issues into the political arena for 
settlement by the government. 
There is considerable concern in ~6TIle of the literature 
about trends in New Zealand pressure group activity that may be 
unhealthy. Truman (1951) observed that one of the salient 
features of American interest group activity vas the complicated 
and diverse interlocking of relationships that lerl a flexible and 
stablilising element to the American Policy making process. 
Lipset (1963) varns: 
A stable democracy requires a situation in 
vhich all major political parties include 
suppor-ters from many segments of the 
population. A system in which the support of 
different parties corresponds too closely to 
basic social divisions cannot continue on a 
democratic basis, for it reflects a state of 
conflict so intense and clearcut as to rule 
out compromise. (pages 12-13). 
Levine (1979, page 130) picks up this theme. He argues 
that political parties and interest groups are more and more 
corresponding to basic social divisions such as social class, 
race) sex and political ortentation. The °cross-cutting 
cleavagesO so essential for Truman and Lipse.tOs democratic 
process become °Ct1Iuulative cleavagesO leading .to Do. state of 
conflict so intense and clearcut as to rule out compromise.o If 
this J' C _Q 
disc.overed 
happening . in New Zealand then ,0 analys ts will have 
yet another potential source of "veakness and 
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instability in New ZealandDsdeceptively fragile political 
concensus.D(Levine 1979, page 131)." 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the research methodology used in the 
study. Firstly the case study approach is explained and commented 
upon. This is followed by a description of the political systems 
model (Easton, 1965, 1979), which provides the framework for the 
collection and analysis of data. Secondly media effects models 
(Seymour-Ure, 1974, Horgan 1982 and Steele, 1981) are discussed 
with particular reference to poltical effects that may influence 
policy-makers. An attempt to intergrate 'the these models is not 
made at this time but reference is made later to this 
possibility. Con~ent is made on the concept of disciplined 
enquiry and finally, the procedures which this study follows are 
explained. 
2. THE CASE STUDY 
The case study approach has had a long history of 
acceptance as a method of research in social science. Back in 
1950 Gee writes of the method: 
The case study may be an individual, an 
institution, a corm:nunity, or any group 
considered as a unit for study. Case study 
method emphasises the total situation or 
combination of f~ctors. the description of the 
process or sequence of events in which 
behavi6ur occurs, the study of individual 
behaviour in its total setting and the 
analysis and comparison of cases leading to 
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hypothesis. (page 20) 
Most of the books and articles ,written about policy 
process take the form of case studies (Hofferbert, 1974). 
Hofferbert defines a case study as 0 ••• an in,-depth eXlli'111nation of 
a particular instance of something~ •••• a det<:dled rendition of a 
particular dynamic instance that is, in some essential respects, 
an example of general ••• behaviour.o (Page 89). 
This case study is descriptive in content. It pertains to 
both the processes of p6licy making and the substance of the 
policy itself. The objective is to highlight the processes by 
which the policies ,,'ere formed Hhilst at the same time • seeking 
out the forces that determined the behaviour of the policy-
makers themselves. 
Case studies tend to have a fairly common format. Hall 
(1982) lists: 
1. A single public-policy decision ..• or a set of closeli 
related policy decisions is isolated for investigation. 
2. The case analyst gives a history of the development of 
policy in the particular area. 
3. Most case studies focus on political conflict. The 
investigator attempts to identify the interests of the 
individuals involved in harcmering out a policy product. 
Certain issues are selected becaus~ they seem) by some 
standard or other) to embody o representat:i:ve 0 
participants in the policy process. Affected pressure 
groups are identified and an effort is made to assess 
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the impact of their activities. 
4. Finally, an attempt is made to reconstruct, within the 
context of a bargaining model, the attitude of the 
participants and the actions they undertook.. The 
various components that are perceived to have . been 
operative in the policy- making proc.ess are weighed and 
their relative effect on tile .output is gauged and 
assessed. (page 44) 
(1) Advantages~!. Case Studies 
Lipjphart (1971) states that very frequently caSe studies 
are praised for their "hypothesis generating poyee. Nelson 
, 
(1978) claims thi~ as ~ very important role. Case studies are 
seen as the "mining effort which provides the raw materials for 
that segment of empirical research which follows the mould of: 
Hypothesis - test - affirmation/contradiction - evaluation 
integration." (page 20) 
Hall (1982) quotes the classic case of Young ·(1933) who in 
a pape~ that is still widely quoted today listed the many 
advantages of the case study format. They include: 
The method gives a continuous picture ·over 
time of an event through the yerceptions of 
those that were involved. 
This in itself gives rise to new meanings and 
neVI responses. (This is c.onfil:I<Jed by Lijphart"s 
analysis.) 
By using the case study method inferences and 
generalisations are based on nn intimate 
knowledge of the situation and of the· habits 
and actions of the persons interacting. (page 
45 ) 
41 
(2) Disadvant~Bes 
There are obvious disadvantages also. And as a counter 
balance Young lists a number of these. Most importantlY, memory, 
judgment and perception may be faultYe Also the res8.3rcher has 
difficulty in m!3-king qualitative checks on .much of the data some 
will be, by itsvE:ry nai:ure ~ anecdotal and 
impressionistic. Finally, some inforniatlon may be downright 
3. POLITICAL SYSTEMS :HODEL 
In opting for'a policy Scie)1ce theory that would meet the 
criteria for a study of public service broadcasting tfie writer 
determined on the political systems mouel developed by David 
Easton (1965, 1979). The model is used with precision by Hall 
(1982) in his case study of educational policy- making 
Broadcasting like education pervade~ the total social structure 
of modern democratic societies. It therefore requires a moder 
that is °totalO in its focus. By total is meant that the focus of 
the model deals with the totality of social behaviour. EastonOs 
framework meets this for he ident:Lfies his focus as "the set of 
'interactions abstracted from :the totality of social behaviour. 
through which values are authoritatively allocated for a 
S .' ,. oelety, (page 57). Easton belieyes that his model can be 
applied to any °para-politicalO group in ".,hich values or 
resources are authoritatively allocated for members of that 
system. 
Essentially EastonOs system is a °black baxo process. 
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Inputs are made, conversion takes place, and outputs result. The 
system converts demands into decision/policies as outputs. 
Society is composed of major o. rmb-sets indent:Lf12d as 
institutions schools, churches"political parties, the economy 
and so on. Individuals react ,<lith' one ::mother and with these 
institutions ~n a pattern that betrays their ways of belief and 
their activities. That pa~tern constitutes a distinctive culture. 
One of these institutions is the political system. Easton labels 
this as different from the others because it alone is the source 
of "authoritative allocation of values) those interactions 
through which values are authoritatively allocated for ,soc:Lety." 
(Easton, 1979, page 21). A political system emerges within a 
society simply because demands made on that society by 
individuals and"groups cannot be fully met. 
(1) Inputs 
Demands and supports comprise the input 
political system. Demand is defined by Easton as: 
an expression of opinion that an authoritative 
allocation with regard to a particular subject 
matter should or should not be made by those 
responsible for doing so" (1975,page 38) •. 
to the 
Any system is always facing demands for scarce resources. 
These demands may arise either from the environment in "7hich the 
system operates or from within the system itself; Easton calls 
the latter a '\qithinput". A withinput he clc'Oscribe:s as an "aHb7ard 
term" but it does suggest the sourc>o: of a ,particular type of 
input that is generated not from the environment itself but from 
within the polit~cal system. ~eople already with power in the 
political system may use that power to f~~quent their own ends. 
In fact, in parliamentary democracies, it is a common "my of 
introducing new policy. 
These demands do not arise from the 
experiences of persons uho have acted in roles 
outside the political sector of society. They 
emerge directly out of political roles 
themselves, that is, from within the system. 
(Easton. 1965, page 55) 
Easton is emphasising that these withinputs differ from other 
demands which are shaped by such parameters as culture, economy, 
society, religion and the like, whereas withinputs are 
apolitically determi~edo. (page 55) 
Not all demands become issues that. require action within 
the political system. Some demands ,,,ither away either through 
lack of strong support or equally lack of strong opposition. 
A second element is also present as an input within any 
poli.tica1 system. This he 1abe1s~. This second input is 
essential to en~urc the continuance of the system as a set of 
processes for converting demands into outputs. Support refers to 
a necessary condition that takes the form of another transaction, 
like demand, but qualitatively differeht. The input of support 
appears in the form of behaviour - i.e. actions which promote the 
goals, interests or action~ of another, and sentiments Le. 
supportive states of mind such as a "deep-seated set of attitudes 
or pre-dispositions, or a readiness to act on behalf of another 
person" (1965, page ·390). 
Inputi as a form of support can exist then for a total 
community ~ for ·a particular. government structure, for a 
particular regime, 6r for a particular action of that regime. 
Support can be generated in two ways: Either by ,outputs 
from the system "'hich satisfy demands over a period of time or by 
politicisation of the society. Politicisation is the process by 
which members of a society come to accept norms of belief and 
behaviour. 
The conversion of inputs in the form of demands and 
supports into outputs is the policy-maki.ng process within the 
system. 
It is the conversion of inputs~ through the 
application of resources within the system, 
into outputs that approximates.a specific act 
of policy-making. (Schoettle, 1968, page 169) 
(2) Conversion Process 
The conversion process refers to the process which changes 
the input into outputs. It is left to other writers to dwell on 
the process. Easton does not deal at length with it. Two teams of 
'Vlriters, Almond and POIvell (1966) and Hazzoni and Campbell (1976) 
have presented broadly similar ways of analysising the conversion 
process. There are four distinct areas of analysis. 
(a) Interest Articulation. Almond and Povell classJfy the 
articulation stage as the beginning of the conversion pr6cess. 
Individuals and groups within soc:iety make known their clcmands by 
articulation. These demands are cOlUID;mj.cated to tbc authorities. 
For Mazzonl and Campbell thls is the °issuc definition° stage 
When the preferences of indlviduals and organisations. are 
translited into what Easton classifies as °political issueso thus 
requiring government action. 
(b) Interest aggregation. This is the second stage of the 
conversion process v7hen demands are translated into . general 
policy alternatives. Mazzoni and Campbell see this stage as 
having two distinct phases: 
1.Proposal formulation: being the process by 
which issues are developed as specific 
recommendations for either a change in policy 
or for maintaining the status quo. 
2.Support mobilisation: described as the 
process by which individuals and groups are 
motivated to support or oppose the various 
policy proposals. 
(c) Rule making. There are tvJO types of rules primary 
and secondary. (Almond and Powell,1966).Primary rules are those 
laws which require of a person that they act or refrain from 
acting in stated ways. Primary rules impose duties or 
prohibitions. Secondary rules are those which give the 
authority to make and implement primary rules - e.g. a 
constitution. 
Decision enactment. The final stage of the conversion 
process is detailed by Hazzoni and Campbell as decision· 
enactment; the process by ,,,hich an authority, such as 
governments, m2.ke policy choices from among alternative 
proposals. 
The conversion process being completed~ the decisions and 
actions of the authorities become the systems outputs. Easton 
perceives the poltical system as a vast and perpetual conversion 
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process. The system takes in demands and supports as they are 
imputed from the environment and operates upon them thus 
producing outputs. In turn these outputs satisfy a demand and 
produce support. The political system relates ~onstantlJ and 
dynamically with its environment. 
It is useful to interpret political life 
as a complex set of procesEies through which 
certain kinds of inputs are converted into the 
type of outputs we may call authoritative 
policies, decisions and implementing actions. 
(Easton, 1979, page 17) 
This study focuses on the interactions resulting from the 
decision to establish three independent public broadcasting 
corporations made by the third Labour Government in 1973. 
Whilst Easton03 theory will predominate in the study it is 
felt that some attention should be given to other policy theories 
to explain some of the actions that do not apparently accord with 
systems theory. Specifically. Elite theory, Group theory and 
incrementalism will be referred to. These have already been 
suffici~ntly explained for the purposes of this study in the 
previous chapter. 
4. MEDIA 
It is not too long ago that studies of mass persuasion 
argued that exposure to mass media messages was unlikely to make 
any difference to the political thinking of audiences. This 
°minimal effects O position arose largely from a series of 
studies conducted 'in the 19/+0s and 1950s) 'particularly in the 
United States and later in Britain~ of the role of commun:lc.ation 
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in election campaigns. A widely ~ccepted view of the typical 
effects of the broadcast media on communication was expressed by 
Joseph Klapper (1960): 
Persuasive 
frequently 
as an agent 
communication functions far 
as an agent of reinforcement 
of change. (page 14) 
more 
than 
The theory of those days vlaS simply summed up in 
LasswellOs well known paradigm of the communication process, 
first published in 1948: 
\\Tho 
Says ,-,hat 
In whic.h cflcmncl 
. To whom 
\Hth Hhat effect 
Corresponding to each question is a field of analysis: control, 
content, media, audience and effect. This·model which became the 
focus of much research such as that by Klapper and Greenstein 
(1965) was narrow and static.- Noreover, it focused enquiry 
predominantly upon the audience. Seymour-UTe (1974)criticised 
this formula by sho,\-ling that to ans"er all the four questions 
abou t the elements of a cotnmunication proc.ess all that is needed 
is for the researcher to concentrate on the process itself (page 
42). To find out about content, one examines content; to find out 
about senders~ one examines sender. But to find out about 
effects, what does one examine? There is no group or object 
integral to thecomnunication process corresponding to the 
question. The answer depends entirely on prior 
questions such as "Effect of VlhiJt kind upon vhom or Ylhat?" In the 
absence of this question being asked Lasswell and others 
naturally graVitated to the audience and h~nce the predominance. 
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of audience effects surveys. 
(1) A Hedia ~lstems Hod~l. 
Seymour-Ure sees effects, a:c~ being depend2nt, upon the 
social and political cont'ext In which they operate. His 
structured analysis stdtes thQt ;effects of mass cotrllrcunication 
ope-rate exclusively on relationships of vlhich he {dentifies three 
levels - individual, intermediary group or institution, total 
system. (I suspect its EastonOs total system also although he 
nOvlhere says so.) Effects consist of c11anged relationships within 
one level or between two levels. with the following possible 
combinations: 
System/Individual 
System/Institution 
Institution/Institution 
Institution/Individual 
Individual/Individual 
Since there is only one °total systemO there cannot be any change 
within that level. The model is outlined in Figure 2. 
Using just one element of this model .~ political ,systems 
and the individual, - it is clear t.hat the processes of mass 
c.ommunication ,·lill have an effect on the politician who uses the 
media just as much as on the audience who watch it. Seymour-Ure 
-draws attention to this by ,studying the role of British 
politicians like Enoch Powell who effectively use the broadcast 
media to gain their follo\-:ing. Cleveland (1980), bighlights the 
phenomenon in New Zealand: 
l1uldoon "as the first NCi) Zealand, politician 
to fully adapt (underlining added) to the 
requirements of teleVision reporting, and he 
succeeded so well that his television image 
,r:". 
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FIGURE. 2.1 
EXAMPLES OF MASS MEDIA EFFECTS: CLA.SSIFIED BY LEVELS OF rOLlTICAL 1'.t.Lf>,.llO-r-;SHIP 
Political system 
Institution/G roup 
Entrenchment of the British monarchy 
Acceptance of the British judicial system and 
forces of law and order 
Role of parties in political systems 
TV'S effect on the British Parliament 
Acceptance of the importance of general elections 
in Britain 
J nstitution/Group Rciative strengths of political parties 
1 ndividu3.1 
Effect of televising parliamentary debates 
lJpOn, Government and Opposition 
Effect of Times Sudctcnln.nd article (1938) on 
relations of European governments 
Institutional consequences of media's power 
to define political crises 
Effect of Sunday Telegraph disclosure of secret 
document on .Nigerian/British govts 
Baiance of power between Pres.ident and Congress 
in the USA 
Indivi.dual 
Media coverage of Northern Ireland (1969- ) 
Norlhcliffe's impact on the political system (from 
c. 1896); llis own political career 
Enoch Powell in British politics (1968- ) 
Media role in protecting citizens against bureaucracy; 
consequences for relations of individual 
bureaucrats and the bureaucracy 
Resignation of Bugh Dalton from Attlce govt (1947) 
Resignation of J. ProfurnQ from Macmillan govt (1%3) 
Enoch Powell in the Ccr.scf'I!8.tivc party (1968) 
Downfall of Senator Joe McCartllY (1954) .' 
Richard Nixon's candidacy as Vice-President (1952) 
Decline of Sen. Muskie's presidential aspirations (1972) 
JVlacmil1an's cabinet purge (1962) . 
Resignation of George Brown from \Vilson govt (1968) 
(Nixon/Eisenhower relations (1952) 
(Brovm/Wilson relations (1968)) 
(Powell/Heath relations (J 968) 
Kennedy/Nixon TV debates (1960) 
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was almost irresistable. He seized every 
opportunity for media exposure, established 
himself as a star of a one-roan soap opera in 
which enemies were put down, critics' 
discomfited or shown to be hopelessly wrong, 
and intervievlers rebuked, con t:caclic ted, or 
discredited. (page 191) 
Thus another element is introduced to this study. Because 
it is an analysis of broadcasting. the effects of the broadcast 
media on the decision-makers must be taken into account .\\1hen 
analysing the policy process. 
Using Seymour-Ureos model therefore this study sought the 
attitudes of the principal actors in the, conversion process 
their perceptions of the nature of media effects, how those 
effects are produced and the perceived political context of 
effects. A summary and explanation of these categories is 
appended. (Appendix B). 
(2) Other Media Models 
Two other media effects models are used. Both to help 
explain the failure of the policy 'rather than the policy process 
itself. Morgan (1982) has developed a convinctng hypothesis \'lhich 
suggests that the media and politicians ,.Jill ahvays be in tension 
because the politician sees the broadcast journalist as invading 
the politicians territory and taking over the politicians role as 
the elected representative and spokesperson for the people. The 
politician sees there c,2ing one truth but it is told t'i\1ice ~ once 
by the politician and once by the media. The politician will 
always resent the second telling for it is often not retold the 
way the politician would wish it. 
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The second theory is one put forward by Australian 
political scientist, Pamela Steele (1981) '. She like,oJise sees 
eternal conflict based on the incompatibility of the Westminster 
sys tem of cabinet government which deTilanc1s secrecy) and the mass 
1':1eoia systems which al~e based on'the ddemoeratic 'concepts of 
freedom of information and openness. 
Both these models shall be reconsidered in the final chapter. 
5. DISCIPLINED ENQUIRY 
Systematic investigation is much valued, especia~ly in the 
physical sciencE:.$) it has much to offer the social sciences also. 
°Lasting changes .• (in any discipline) •• cannot be safely made 
except on the- basis of deep objective • 0 enqulry. (Cronbach & 
Suppes) 1969, page 12). 
Such systematic investigation c.an be of many types 
covering such spectrums as from a laboratory experiment to a mail 
survey. HOHever the1-'e are qualities common to each: they 
distinguish sound argurJlent from questionable . argument, the 
debate is well controlled s errors if ~hey cannot be eliminated 
are taken into account, documents are authenticated, reports do 
not rely on the eloquence of the writer. 
Disciplined enquiry does not ne~es~arily 
follow well-established formal proceedures. 
Some of the most excellent enqujry is free-
ranging and speculative in its initial'stages, 
trying OUI. ",hat might seem to pc bizarre 
combinations of ideas and proce~dures, or 
restlessly casting about for 
~deas •••• (Cronh3ch & Suppes, 1969, pages 15-
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Worthen & Sanders (1973) list three different and yet 
interrelated elements to enquiry: empiric.al enquiry. historical 
enquiry, and philosophical enquiry. Figure 3 il~ustrates their 
interdependence. The relative si'zef> being indicative of vyhat the 
authors estimate 'is the frequency of occurrence. 
Empirical enquiry is that which encompasses observations 
and experiments used for the purposes of describing existing 
conditions, or verifying or disproving claims, statements or 
hypotheses about rel~tionships. Historical enqui~y is the study 
of the developmen~ of organisations of people i.e. -cultures, 
nations etc.) the pa~ticular lives involved, and the movement of 
events surrounding those lives. Philosophical enquiry is rational 
analysis based on formal logic and semantics. It also embraces 
the study of morals and ethics. 
Much of this study ,.;rill, be subsumed under the heading of 
empirical enquiry for it desc~ibes conditions, verifies 
statements and makes observations. However, it is loosely 
historical in scope also. It takes on the se~blance of a 
philosophical enquiry on occasion, especially when participants 
in events comment on the °rights p or o,.,rrongs ° of decisions and 
actions that are the subject of the study. The study reveals a 
surprising volume of, intense personal feeling~ expressed by 
participants suggestion a strong philosophical if not ideological 
COnlmj. tment to their 'respective pbsi tions. 
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DATA COLI .. ECTION 
The collection of data guided by the research 
questions outlined in Chapter I. They were frame~ bearing iri mind 
EastonOs political systems model. ThuG the questions r~late 
directly to the input conversion - output cOliS true ts 
j.jcntified by,Easton. Questions are asked about the genesis of 
the policy, about key influential groups, about the broadcasting 
environment at the time the policy "las being formulated. 
Attention is then directed tOVlards the policy-making procedures 
that were adopted. Finally the studY,a4dresses ihe output phase 
by delineating the eventual policy. 
The two major sources of data for the study were 
documentary data and supplementary interview data. 
(1) Documentary Data 
All the events examined ~n the study hGppened over ten 
years ago. Distance from the events to be investigated presents 
problems and advantages. Problems, because primary records may be" 
lost, damaged or destroyed by the ravages of time; memories 
become weak and fantasy about O",hat might have been o is confused 
with Dwhat was 0; participants in the actions move away from 
involvement l.n the field under study, others may die. Advantages, 
because sound historical research more easily carries out 
critical investigation of events; time O1l101'i8 for a more accurate 
perspcc ti '.12 tm'lards the environment sULTOUndil'.g' the events under 
study; and prejudices that may have domina.ted 
proceedings at the time may have °cooled b or otherwise have been 
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~odified. Hindsight can also add an,edge to critical evaluation. 
(2) Interview Data 
Selected interviews were cairied out principally to 
.suplement the data collected from documentary sources. The 
interviews also served as a 'means of cross-validation. On 
occasion the interviews assisted with the interpretation of 
documentary material. 
The method of interviewing used was that classified by 
(Dexter, Elite interviews are 
based on the assumption that fhe interviewe~ possesses greater 
knowledge of and insights into th~ subject under study than the 
researcher. 
In general, elite interviewing can encompass any interview 
design within which the respondent is given °non-standardisedo 
treatment. To be specific: 
1. it stresses the intervieweeos definition of the 
situation; 
2. encourages the intervie\,Tee· to structure the account of 
the situation; and 
3. lets the interviewee introduc.e to the maximum extent) his 
or her motives of what he or she regards as relevant) instead 
of relying on the intervieFer o s notion of ",That mayor may 
not be relevant. 
An interview guide was used outlining the major issues of 
the enquiry and this was also related to the models used as a 
basis for the study. (Appendix C). These questions were by 
nature of °startersO only. Supplementary questions were asked of 
each person and as a consequence the exact form and structure ·of 
the interviews varied considerably. 
The relationship between interviewer and those interviewed 
is vlOrthy of some comment. 
Interviewing is rather like a marriage: 
everybody knows what it is) an av7ful lot of 
people do it, and yet behind each closed door 
there is a world of secrets. (Oakley, 1981, 
page 31) 
However, unlike a marriage, interviewing, particularly in 
Social Science research must never have the warmth, the 
informality, the give and take, the equal partnership that one 
would expect from a °good D marriage. Indeed, the literature 
suggests exactly the opposite: 
Regarded as an information tool, the interview 
is designed to minimise the local, concrete, 
immediate circumstances of the particular 
encounter - including the respective 
personalities of the participants - and to 
emphasise only those aspects than can be kept 
general enough and demonstrable enough to be. 
counted. As an encounter between these two 
particular people the typical interview has rio 
meaning; it is con.ceived in a frame,,70rk of 
other, comparable meetings between other 
couples; each recorded in such a fashion that 
elements of communic.ation in common c.an easily 
be isolated from more idiosyncratic qualities. 
(Benny & Hughes, 1970, page 196-7) 
Good and Hatt (1952, page 191) confirm this distancing of 
interviewer from intervie',7ee. DHe(the interviewer) is a 
prOfessional researcher in this situation and he must demand and 
~ln respect for the task he is trying to perfOrlI1. (Underlines 
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added.) 
The writer tends to agree with Oakley (1981) that this may 
be an admirable policy ~n theory but not only ~s it very 
difficult to practice but perhaps ~ontains an irreconcilahle 
contradiction, for, in most cases, the goal of finding out about 
people through interviewing ~s best achieved ,.;>hen 
relationship of intervie\.;rer and interviewee is non-hierarchical 
and when the: .:.l,::erviewer is prepared to invest his or her own 
~~L~onal identity in the relationship. 0 (page 41) Certainly, the 
value of a warm and friendly relationship with those interviewed 
was proved ~n this study. 
(3) Sources 
Historical research has been defined as: 
... the critical investigation of events, 
developments, and experiences of the past, the 
careful weighing of evidence of the validity 
of sources of information of,the past, and the 
interpretation of the weighed evidence. 
(Kerlinger, 1973, page 701) 
Kerlinger also distinguishes between primary and secondary 
sources. "A pr~mary source is the original repository of an 
historical datum .. ,the original record." (page 702) A secondary 
Source is an account or record of an historical even One or more 
~~teps removed from the original repository. Researchers are 
admonished by Kerlinger not to use secondary sources \>Then primary 
sources are available. 
Every endeavour has been made Ln this'study to obtain 
primary sources. This has oot aluays been possible however. The 
vlriter d.id not gain access to the fi.les of the NZBC. ROvlever) 
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pel"lnission was 'granted to st'udy the personal records of the 
Hon.R.O. Douglas, Minister of Broadcasting in the Labour 
Government. The Opposition Research Unit also ,supplied some 
papers. Much reliance has been placed on the publisbed report of 
the Adams Committee and newspaper reports from the period. The 
parliamentary debates were examined. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANTECEDENTS TO TRE POLICY, 1926 - 1972 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The rugged terrain which gives NeH Zealand its unique 
beauty presents broadcasting with technical difficulties of 
monumental proportions. Couple this with the ,,;ride spread of 
population over two long and narrow islands \-lith only Auckland 
able to be considered a population centre of metropolitan status 
in international 'terms and the problems arc exacerbated. 
Furthermore New Zealand Os history as a vn~lfare state dictates 
that any public service must be a service to a;U. All these 
factors combine to give a broadcasting system that it is 
estimated . would serve a population twenty times as great. 
(Gough,19S1). 
2. EARLY RADIO 
New Zealanders were quick to seize upon the advantages of 
radio. As early as 1922 amateur stations were dotted around the 
countryprovidi~g entertainment to their local cOBmunities. 
Commercial pressure and Post Office bureaucracy forced the 
government into establishing a national system of broadcastirig 
and in 1925 this task was entrusted to the Radio Broadcasting 
Company of New Zealand Ltd. This private company was charged with 
the responsibility of providing a regular' service to the rour 
main centres of popUlation} Auckland, Wellington. Christchurch 
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and Dunedin. It was in the latter':city that the countryOs first 
successful radio station broadcast and Dunedin still boasts the 
oldest continuously broadcasting station (4XD) in the 
commonweal th. 
The company was peculiar for its times. It was non-
commercial; its income being drawn from a receiver license fee 
levied by the government'and collected by the Post Office. The 
government also allocated the company an initial setting up grant 
for capital expenditure and limited by regulation the ° company s 
nett profit to seven and a half per cent of inc.:ome.(OODoDoghue) 
1946). 
As mentioned previously, New Zealandos fascination with 
things British led the New Zealand government to decide that the 
company should be replaced by a corporation similar to the 
British Broadcasting Corporation which was 'set up in 1926. 
3. THE NEvi ZEALAND BROADCASTING BOARD 
The New Zealand Broadcasting Board came into existence in 
1932 by taking over the facilities of the previous Broadcasting 
Company.' Meamvhile amateur stations continued to m-Jl tiply) 
espeCially outside the main population centres. By 1932 the 
number of such statioDs reached fort,y-'t\;rQ (Harshall 1966). 
By this time radio broadcasting was building up a popular 
follm'iing and there "Jere demands for an expansion of the main 
serVices. Early on the Board gained a larger catchment area by 
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granting affiliation status to eight . private amateur 
installations They in effect became repeater stations for the 
BoardOs programmes. This move was the result of the first 
official enquiry into broadcasting in New Zealand 
Coverage Commission (Marshall,1966). 
the 1933 
Further . broadcasting legislation in 1934 saw the Board 
take over responsibility for supervising the programmes broadcast 
by all private stations. °Unification of the whole system was the 
obvious aim.O(Marshall,1966). 
Significant moves during this period saw the establishment 
of an alternative programme in the four main centres and 
substantial improvements to the technical facilities with the 
establishment of high-powered transmitters sighted on points to 
achieve the best coverage. These sites remain in use to this day. 
In the four year period from 1932 licensed receivers 
trebled in number reaching 210,000. As Marshall notes this wa~ 
possibly the only area of growth in what was otherwise a very 
depressed period. 
There was a Minister responsible for broadcasting during 
this period but like most other countries and for reasons 
previously outlined this tended to fall within the portfolio of 
the Minister of Post and Telegraph. 
4. THE NEH ZEAlJL.1\D BROADCASTING SERVICE 
In 1935 New Zealand had a change of government. The social 
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policies of the Labour Government took full cognisance of the 
social forces of broadcasting .. Indeed events such as those noted 
earlier confirmed these policies. (Edwards, 1971). Within a 
remarkably short period broadcasting fell under direct government 
control. The 1936 Broadcasting Act abolished the Board and 
replaced it with the New Zealand Broadc<Jsting Service (NZBS), a 
government department with a minister fir.mly in control of a 
broadcasting portfolio. 
This step moved New Zealandos broadcasting policy well 
away from the ambit of loose government surveilance practised ln 
most other countries. In other democracies ministerial interest 
",as limited to matters of technical consideratio:'l and thus came 
under Post & Telegraph or telecommunications. The first Labour 
Government clearly meant to have a say in matters of policy and 
programming. Government interest in these areas remain today. 
The Prime Minister, Michael Joseph Savage, quickly 
confirmed the governmentOs intentions by requirillg the Service to 
carry live broadcasts of the proceedings of parliament, openly 
acknowledging that the measure was to counter the government Os 
inability to get a sympathetic hearing from an antagonistic and 
conservative press. Such directives became common place. 
(MacKay, 1953). 
The 1936 Act allowed private amateur station~ to remaln ln 
operation. However ~vi thout revenue-earnl.ng powers, their financial 
base remained lnsecure and over the years all except 4ZD were 
either absorbed into the national system or ceased operating. 
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5. COtWERCIAL BROADCASTING 
In 1937, one year after the introduction of the new 
service the government introduced a further development in the 
countryOs broadcasting patter~, . one that was destined to remain 
unique in the annals of international broadcasting policy 
commercial broadcasting under government public service control. 
The commercial system was to support and complement the existing 
national system. Thris the Minister of Broadcasting had control of 
a single government monopoly in broadc.asting \,71 th two elements: a 
national service supported by a receiver licence fee, and a 
commercial system earning income from advertising. The two 
elements were merged into a single administrative unit during the 
second world war and remain that way until this day. 
Up until the end of the war broadcasting coverage was 
limited to national needs. However radioos potential as a world 
service had been amply demons trate,d during world war two, so it 
followed sociewhat logically that New Zealand should launch its 
own overseas service. This \olaS done appropriately on Dominion Day 
1948. However, although be-gun \.;rith a fanfare, international 
?!,oadcas ting \,,;'s the cinderella of the Service. Limited in scope 
to the Pacific Islands and Australia, it ope:t:'ated on second-hand 
equipment from its inception, had little financial support for 
programming> and was completely overwhelmed by its larger 
competitors - Radio Australia, The Voice of lUucrica and the BBC. 
6. DIVERSIFICATION 
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The government during this period charged the service with 
expanding far beyond broadcasting into the field of patron of the 
arts and culture. In 1939 the NZBS ~ndertook the responsibility 
for publishing the New Zealand Listener vlhich, apart from 
offering programme information became, and remains today, the 
countryOs leading cultural journal. In 1947 the The New Zealand 
National Orchestra appeared under" the auspices of the NZBC and 
began the Services entrepreneurial role as concert master for the 
Nation. Thus the broadcasting body became the largest supporter 
of the. arts in New Zealand providing valuable cmployment for New 
Zealanders with creative ability. 
7. LIMITATIONS 
In other areas however the NZBS was not nearly as 
forthcoming. NevI Zealand stood by as the "rest of the world took 
on television. It was reluctant to offer any comprehensive 
national news service; as late as 1962 radio offered a once a 
week (Sunday evening at 9.00pm) survey of the weekos events 
compiled in the Prime MinisterOs Departmentl Every other day it 
Was content to take live the" World Service of the BEC. Talk on 
radio vias stictly controlled. Everything vlaS scripted in advance 
and genuine discussion on radio was non-existent. 
Horeover the Service had great difficulty in coping with 
the enormous changes in social tastes during the 19508 and early 
sixtys. For example, Elvis Presley, the most prodigious recording 
star of the late fifties, was producing a record a week and 
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selling them in the tens of millions. A programme organiser on a 
city radio station kept all copies of PresleyOs discs under the 
carpet Ln his locked office, releasing two each week as the 
maximum number to be played. This at a time Hh~n the listening 
audience '\olaS demanding to hear thill" popular singer constantly. 
Dis\..-: that contained what was determined as °offel.lGiveo material 
were physically 'mutilated to ensure no °accidentalO broadcast. In I; 
l-
I 1960 it was still impossible to hear some songs from the Rogers and Hammersteins °South Pacifico, virtually all of °Kiss Ne KateO 
from the pen of Cole Porter was banned and BrechtOs °Thr~epenny 
OperaO was censored! To put it 1n the words of one veteran 
broadcaster, broadcasting had become Os bit of a joke.o 
8. THE NEW ZEALA.ND BROADCASTING CORPOlLt\TION 
In 1960 television at last came to New Zealand, the result 
of a Labour Government decision made tvlO years earlier. It ,-las to 
be controlled and operated by the NZBS under similar conditions 
and constraints that applied to radio at the tin~.1960 also saw a 
change of government. Part of the National PartyOs election 
platform was the promise to end the direct government control of 
broadcasting. (National Party,OPolicy AnnouncementO, page 20). In 
1961 legislation was introduced to create the New Zealand 
Broadcasting Corporation to take over the fuctions of the NZBS. 
The legislation was passed in the same year, however, the promise 
of the governmentOs r~Goval from hroadcasting affairs remained aD 
illusion. (Rowe,1968). 
64 
Confusing lines of control were established in the 1961 
legislation. Ultimate authority was veste.d in three different 
bodies: the government appointed Corporation, of a chairman and 
up to six part-time members, to direct policy; the Director 
General as chief adminis trator; and the }1inister of Broadcasting , 
a portfolio mysteriously retained to ensure a continued firm hand 
of government_ on broadcasting. Parliament continued to debate 
broadcasting estimates, questions were asked in the House, there 
was a cabinet committee on broadcasting. All this added up to a 
total °ever-present environment of political conscience for the 
NZBC.O(Toogood, 1969, page 105). 
Furthermore, the Act required the Corporation to comply 
with government directives, and, under the financial provisions, 
the Governmen~ was to approve all expenditure proposed to be 
undertaken by the Corporation in excess of $50,000. Whilst the 
Government made only one attempt to issue a directive and the 
Corporation, after seeking legal advice, ignored it 
(N.Z.Parliamentary Debates,l965, page 2614), the government 
during this period was particularly insistant on coritrolling 
financial expenditure~ There were many consequent~y frustrating 
delays in bu·ilding programmes, in .. purchasing much needed 
-equipment) particularly for television development, and in 
expansion of services (Combroac1~1971). 
It was also a period of much unhappiness within the NZBC. 
In 1961 all management personal merely moved ac·ross from the NZBS 
to the new Corporation taking with them all their years of 
training' as public servants answerable to government. Cautious 
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'management, a perceptable lacK of boldness in programming, and 
the ever-present threat of political interference led to the 
Corporation losing many of its most creative production personal 
because of the resulting blandness in leadership. 
A top television producer left in 1966 claiming °direct 
government censorshipo of the public affairs programme which he 
produced (Bick 1Q68). Administrative weaknesses were the claimed 
reasons for ,the resignation of the countryOs most popular 
television personality of the period (Edwards, 
political interference reached a head in 
1971). Charges of 
1972 when the 
Corporation dismissed the editor of the New Zealand Listener. 
While an official enquiry found no evidence of political 
meddling, the uproar that the incident provoked continued the' 
disillusionment with so called °independent public broadcasting. D 
9. PRIVATE RADIO 
With the passing of the Broadcasting Corporation Act in 
1961 a provision was made for the establishment of privately 
owned broadcasting stations and, although strongly opposed by the 
Labour Opposition, this was ,,!riten into legislation. However, 
b~fore such stations were established the NZBC was required to 
undertake a review of existing coverage to see if the 
establishment was justified. It is not at all surprising that the 
Corporation never found the need, and that no private 
applications were sought. 
However public dissatisfaction with the CorporationDs 
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radio programmet became apparent when in 1967 a pirate radio 
station went on air broadcasting to Auckland from outside New 
Zealandos territorial limits. At first the government tried to 
put an end to these private activities. Subsequent public support 
for the °pirates O was so considerable that the government not 
only turned a blind, but also a benevolent eye. Eventually 
legislation was introduced to take away some of the Corporations 
powers and legitimise the activities of private broadcasters. 
10 THE NEH ZEALAND BROADCASTING AUTHORITY 
This was done with the creation of the New Zealand 
Broadcasting Authority in 1968. The Authority had three full time 
members and the chairman had to be a practicing lawyer. The 
legalistic overtones of this provision meant that the Authority 
tended to act in a judicial manner. Legal prudence prevailed. The 
Authority did not see itself as an innovator or bold leader in 
broadcasting matters. As an enitiy the Authority had been charged 
with four functions: 
1. To consider and adjudicat~ on license applications, 
both public (NZBC) and private; 
2. To grant such licenses for up to a five year period; 
3. To regulate license holders, both public and private, 
with directives on programrning and adve:r;tising; and, 
4. To advise the minister on ani matters that he IDay 
wish to direct to it. 
The Authority dealt with all broadcasters, including the 
public sector. It was also the ultimat~ authority on licensing 
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matters, subject only to the Court o~f Appeal. 
Control over the NZBC quickly gave rise to hostility 
between the two parties. The Corporation resented the interloper 
that assumed many of its previously exclusive functions and to 
whom it was now answerable. Not helping in this was the fact that 
the members of ~he Authority lacked broadcasting experience. This 
led to some of their earlier decisions being overturned in the 
courts (Combroad,1972). 
However, on the whole, the Authority merely continued to 
retain the standards 'set pre~iously by thet6rporation. They were 
, 
cautious about easing up the advertising restrictions ,radio 
permitted 18 minutes of advertising per hour, television only 
six. There were restraints on advertising certain products such 
as liquor and proprietary medicines. Sunday advertising was 
banned. Programme directives were minimal. There \"as no New 
Zealand content ruling; merely the request that locally 
originated material be broadcast °as far as possibleo. However, 
stations were not to editorialise and there was no political 
advertising. Private stations were unable to form networks in an 
attempt to encourage them to provide fo~purely local needs. 
To confirm its caution and keep with tradition, the 
Authority in 1971 conducted a hearing into FH broadcasting and 
rec.ommended to the gove.rnment that there \oms no need to introduce 
it in the forseeablefuture. This at a time when FM broadcasting 
Was developing with rema~kable rapidity elsewhere. 
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The major ,reason for the existence of the Authority was to 
foster private radio. In 1969 the Authority received sixty 
enquiries and thirteen official applications for license's, 
including one from the successful pirate radio station Radio 
Hauraki. By 1972 five stations were operational, two in Auckland 
and three in other centres, and the Authority had before it 
applications from three other companies. 
11. TELEVISION 
Throughout the period of the Authority the NZBC had a 
monopoly on television. The Corporation pursued a policy of 
providing a one channel service to all' New Zealanders before 
embarking on the provision of an alternative service. By 1972 the 
service could reach 99% of the population. The single television 
service originated from four stations located in the main centres 
and supplemented by translator services, some state owned, but 
many privately mmed by television translator societies. These' 
were set up by individuals or groups impatient with the 
Corporations reticulation progress and they carried the NZBCos 
signal to outlying areas. In 1960 an embryonic network service 
was established but it was primitive and"limited to nightly ne'lo7S 
and coverage of important events. Regular programming was 
physically transported from one station to another. 
It was during this period that current affairs programming 
on television provided some of the most exciting broadcasting in 
the country. Progra~nes like °Galleryo and °CompassO actually 
topped the ratings for viewer popularity. They were frequently 
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a~so the cause of much controversy as the nation, unused to news 
and current affairs on public service broadcasting, grappled with 
the social and political effects of such television. 
12. FINANCING THE NZBC 
As mentioned earlier Ne\V Zealand has an expensive 
broadcasting service due mainly to its scattered population 
centres and its rugged topography. During the Corporation years 
most broadcasting development was financed without government 
largesse (Stringer, 1964). With revenue from license fees, 
collected by the Post Office and discounted before pagsing on, 
and commercial activities both media were expected to pay for 
themselves and provide enough profit to cover losses in other 
areas. 
This blending of commercial income "7i th taxation revenue 
enabled the corporation to provide good profits throughout most 
of the period until 1971. The reversal in that year was blamed by 
the corporation on increased personal costs, which, many 
broadcasters anyway were saying ,,,,,ere long overdue, bearing in 
mind that the body was noted for its m9dest salary structure. 
However, perhaps it was also a case of the °chickens come home to 
roost.o The strain of financing such vast activities as the 
establishment of a national television service from such limited 
revenue sources must have contributed to the emptying of the 
coffers. 
The Corporation w~s hamstrung in different ways to other 
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commercial ventures. As a public body it had strict limitations 
imposed. on its borrowing policy. The ent'ire financing of the 
large cost of introducing television came out of past radio 
profits. Televisionos income not only supported broadcastingOs 
bureaucracy, but also covered the losses of the Orchestra, and 
the difference between radioos income and expenditure. Unlike 
many countries when they first developed Television, New Zealand 
at the same time continued to maintain and expand its radio 
offerings. Since coming into existence in 1961 the corporation by 
1972 had opened 14 new radio stations and had increased 
transmission power, updated equipment, and improved studio 
facilities in many others. 
While the country joined the international scene by 
opening its own satellite receiving station by 1972 there were 
indications of more important changes. Colour transmission was to 
be introduced and plans for a second television channel and 
subsequent reorganisational changes came to a head. 
13. THE SECOND CHANNEL DEBATE 
Whilst it was the stated policy of the NZBC to extend 
Coverage of the first channel to the total population before 
embarking on alternative programming it was obvious that the 
Corporation had made an early start on second channel 
preparations. As long ago as August 1962 the NZB.C planned to run 
a two channel television sel~ice each channel sharing the same 
facilities. (Greymouth Evening star quoting Reeves Harris, Feb" 1, 
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1973) • 
By early 1964 the Dominion reported' that plans were being 
prepared by the NZBC for second television channels in the four 
metropolitan centres. (Dominion, Feb 22, 1964) Later that year 
the Director General of the Corporation said: "The opening of a 
second channel television service in New Zealand could come 
sooner than most people might think. "(Dominion, May 27, 1964). 
This was reinforced by the Chairman of the NZBC a short time 
later when he said: "a second television service, beginning in 
the main centres, would be started as soon as possible." 
(Dominion, July 13, 1964) 
Speculation continued until toward the end of 1964 it 
became clear that the thinking of the NZBC aI}d the" Government 
were not the same. 
The New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation was 
prepared to proceed forthwith when the 
Government finally made its decision on a 
second television channel, the chairman of the 
Corporation, Dr F.J. Llewellyn, said last 
night. The GovermentOs procrastination in 
deciding on the CorporationOs second channel 
proposals made in March was now becoming 
serious, Dr Llewellyn said. (Dominion, Nov 7, 
1964) 
and 
Mr Scott, Minister of Broadcasting said: "that 
for reasons I am not prepared to discuss I did 
not take (the Corporations proposals) to the 
Cabinet." (Christchurch Press, Nov 7, 1964) 
"By early in the neyl year the governmentOs thinklng was becoming 
clearer: 
Several alternatives to a second channel owned 
and controlled entirely by the NZBC have been 
suggested in a report on future television 
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services made by the Attorny-General, Mr 
Hanan, to the Prime Hinister, Mr Holyoake. The 
submissions are believed to suggest that: 
••••• There is a strong economic argument 
against simple duplication of station and 
transmitter plant and equipment; there is, 
however, a need for a °second voiceD 
controlled by an authority, public or private 
or both, distinct from the existing 
Corporation. (Dominion, Jan 28, 1965) 
In 1966 the Central Region Advisory Commitee of the NZBC 
recommended the early introduction of a second television 
channel. It made no impression whatsoever on the government and 
silence reigned on the issue for many months despite constant 
queries, particularly in the daily press. 
1969 was an election year. On April 16 the Evening Post 
reported: 
The Minister of Broadcasting, Nr Adams-
Schneider, intends making submissions soon to 
Cabinet for approval to amend the New Zealand 
Broadcasting Act to enable the NZBC to meet 
the challenge of private e~terprise ••••• The 
Board of the Corporation was at present asking 
for amendments to Act which vJOuld provide 
further independence in areas other than 
programmes. 
In July 1969, DEB Industries, Kerridge Odeon, Wright 
Stephenson and J.Wattie Canneries made application to start a 
national commercial radio and televisio~ network. The Minister in 
rejecting the approach said: °There is no chance of a second 
channel within a yearO (N.Z.Herald July 27,1969). 
As the election got closer the National Party made a 
policy decision to, proceed with °urgencyO ~o establish a second 
television channel. (N.Z.Herald, Oct 20, 1969). The Minister of 
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Broadcasting said that they had reached the stage where it was 
certain that owe will have second channel coverage before very 
long.o (Christ~hurch Press, Oct 24,1969). In announcing that the 
Broadcasting Authority would conduct. an enquiry into the need for 
a second channel, including the possibility of colour he 
indicated that it was not known when tlle Authority would have the 
time to consider it for it was presently busy reinviting 
applications for private radio stations, following the writ 
served on it by the NZBC for incorrect procedure. 
The Authority began its enquiry in November 1969, 
continued until November 1970 but did not reach the Hinister 
until August 1971! 
In the event anyway the Authority told the Minister in its 
report that it ·couldmake no recommendations on the matter. It 
felt that to advise on the best way to introduce a second channel 
and private enterprise competition would lay it open to charges 
of prejudicing the case against public ownership of a second 
channel. All the Authority would say ,,7as that a second channel. 
should be introduced at an °appropriate timeo, and that 
.applications for warrants should be called for °no later than two 
years O after colour was to begin in 1973. Legal prudence still 
prevailed! 
The °urgentO enquiry certainly put paid to 'the Minister of 
BroadcastingOs belief that: 
Government .is vrorking towards .3 secQnd channel 
as fast as it c;m. My bel1ef is there ,.Jill be 
a second channel, colour or black and white, 
well before the 1972 elections. (Auckland 
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Star, Sept 6, 1971) 
Finally, in February 1972, the government charged the 
Authority with the job of deciding who would get the second 
channel but curiously not when they would get it. In fact the 
hearings did not begin until October 1972, a bare month before 
the General Election, having been postponed by the NZBCos 
preoccupation ~ith the inquiry into the Listener editorOs 
dismis sal. 
14. AND SO TO A GENERAL ELECTION 
Such was the situation when Labour came into power in November 
1972. The Authority had at long last been coaxed into studying 
the issue of the second channel. The NZBC was suffering internal 
strife as creative staff, mainly producers and directors, 
clashed, as one broadcaster put it - °endle~slyO, with public 
service minded administrators. Radio, for many years an highly 
profitable concern, was quickly losing money and morale as it was 
drained to pay the development costs of television and fought to 
stuve off competition from the fledgling but aggressive private 
radio stations vying for the lucrative advertising market. There 
was tension between the Authority and" the NZBC. And tension 
bet'"een the NZBC and politicians. Piqued at the Corporationo s 
decision not to screen a programme featuring himself, Mr Muldoon, 
then Minister of Finance, commented: 
When I took part there was no guarantee it 
would be shoHn. But it turned out to be the 
most interesting piece of television. This has 
provided an excellent reason \-Ihy a second TV 
cha~nel should be in independent hands. 
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(N.Z.Herald, Dec 10, 1970 ) 
Finally, there was a dissatisfied public. New Zealand 
television audi~nces have not been noted for their interest in 
the finer points of television. A second channel would give them 
more of what they wanted - entertainment. Letters of coinpJa:lnt to 
daily newspapers, the Minister of Broadcasting and the 
Corporation all indicated a preference for an immediate second 
channel rather than the introduction of colour. The Christchurch 
star stated on September 7, 1971 that the average citizen "would 
prefer a choice of two channels on his present set, rather than a 
prohibitive outlay of up to $900 simply io' get one channel in 
colour. An Evening Post survey revealed an overHhelming 
preference for a second channel rather than colour (September 4, 
1971). 
History was repeating it-self. Government bowing to the 
needs of television set manufacturers to have a new market just 
as they bowed to the needs of the commercial radio manufacturing 
industry forty years previously. On this occasion however, there 
was an added pressure: the impending Commom,7eal th Games in 
Christchurch just chad to be in colouro to meet international 
demands. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE DEVELOPHENT OF A POLICY, 1972 - 1975 
1. THE ANNOUNCEHENT 
Ori the 31st of January, 1973, the Minister of Broadcasting 
Mr R.O. Douglas announced Labouros new policy on Broadcasting in 
New Zealand; He announced the new policy in broad outline only. 
In essence he called for the conversion of the New Zealand 
Broadcasting Corporation into three separate and independent 
corporations serviced by a third and overriding body, a converted 
Broadcasting Authority, - which would provide the common services 
shared by the corporations such as transmission facilities, news 
gathering and - supply, programme and advertising standards and 
certain overseas representations. 
The reaction to his announcement was swift and emphasised 
the surprise v7hich often comes "lhen something is totally 
unexpected. Literally no-one had predicted such a major change; 
Newspapers reflected this surprise. The announcement, said 
the Timaru Herald, came °virtually out'of the Blueo; °Radio,T.V. 
Reshuffle Bombshello headlined'the Hanawatu Evening Standard; 
°Shock Bold New Moveo vlaS the immediate response of the Evening 
Post (All February 1 y 1973). After all the Labour PartyOs 
election manifesto "reconfirmed the partyOs commitment to public 
service broadcasting hut talked in terms aT strengthening the 
NZBC. Three days after the election the newly elected Prime 
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Minister Norman Kirk announced that the second channel, currently 
the subject of Broadcasting Authority enquiry, would go to the 
NZBC regardless of the outcome of the AuthorityOs deliberations 
(N.Z. Herald, November 28, 1973). 
What occurred between the time of the election and the 
announcement to create such a radically different policy? Roger 
Douglas, the minister is recorded as saying the the idea just 
came to him. 
O(Douglas) •• decided the basic. fate of the New 
Zealand broadcasting system ·while he was 
sipping champagne at Government House."I stood 
around sipping drinks and talking to a few of 
my colleagues, "he says. "I suppose the seeds 
were sown at that stage. Actua'lly, it was not 
a hard decision to make. Quite. obviously •• I 
had no intention of handing a second channel 
over to private enterprise •••• I also thought 
it was too important to give to one group that 
would then operate two channels from one part 
of New Zealand. So that ruled out the NZBC. 
Well, we talked about those things at the 
Govos and, once I saw the pretty obvious 
alternative, it was also pretty clear what to 
do with radio". (N.Z.Listener, December 
9,1973, pages 10-11) 
Immediately after his appointment, and especially over the 
1972 holiday period, he engaged in an intensive study of 
broadcasting literature, he talked to broadcasters and to 
°interested parties outside the systemo • 
•• People like educationalists who I found had 
a broader perspective than worker~ within the 
industry. (Ibid) 
There is a level of sophistication behind the concepts of 
the announcement that suggests a significant input from sources 
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that were familiar with broadcasting theory. The Minister spoke 
of the °intellectual GhettoO of second channel non-commercial 
television; he frequently talked about the concepts of 
°excellenceo in broadcasting; about centralism inhibiting the 
development of regional identity; about the difficulties in 
m0Dopoly within communication; °lowest common denolllinator 
programmingO - the result of the ratings war thatOs permanently 
embedded in competing cOIT~ercial television. This is the more 
significant in the light of his own deprecation: 
Mr Douglas says he is not a creative person 
and he does not have any deep understanding of 
creative people. Heos not particularly 
interested in the arts, heos not a tele~ision 
philosopher and he has little personal 
experience to bring to a medium basically' 
concerned with" the communication of ideas. 
(Ibid) 
Be that as it may, from the time of conceiving of the idea 
until its release on the last day of January 1973 it was held 
tightly within a close circle of consultants. Jonathan Hunt, MP 
for New Lynn, has been identified as °being helpfulo and Hunt 
himself indicated in the first reading debate in the House of 
Representatives that he was present when °ideas were thrown 
aroundO with the Minister (Hansard Vol 387,page 4856). Others who 
"assisted have yet to be identified. However, very little other 
consultation went on at this time. Caucus was not consulted (I), 
the' Prime Minister, often a critic of existing broadcasting 
policy and structures, played no part in the exercise. It seems 
that Kirkos only comments ,vere to ask the question: "Can it 
work?" and to make, the statement: "ItOs nice to make a bit of 
policy rather than what bureaucracy dishes up!"(2) A memorandum, 
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for cabinet was approved w~ th very little discussion and 
made the consequent press release. (3) Above all, no 
Minister 
members of the 
was made with 
current 
d They 
were shocked and resentful at the 
tive or Boar. 
fearful of the changes~ 
and, the evidence 
consequently uncooperH t~ ve and at times perhaps even 
fuctionis t. (4) 
The attitude of the NZBC can be ascertained froID press 
by members of the Board ~ the editorial position of the 
I.h;tcner, and correspondence and comments recorded elsel·rhere. 
Listener of February 26, 
1973 talked of the °Broadcasting 
o i ° of fragm~n tat on , of °neg1ec ted experts ° • M. H. 
roft, in that edition, wrote a highly passionate editorial in 
ddl'IlCC of the l-\'"ZBC. The Auckland Star headlined: °NZBC Head: I 
(;moot hide my worry at the shakeupo (February 2, 1973), and the 
Chrluteilurch Star: °Nobody Told Us -, Fume NZBC Staff
O 
(February 
I 1973) 
On February 8, The Minister met with the board of the NZBC. 
answered Hri tten questions ~ Shortly after that meeting Major-· 
w.s. NcKinnon spoke. His was a dignified 'defence of his 
ion, highlighting 
.' 
'Ylhat he saw as its strengths and the 
tVed Heeknesses of the new system. (5) In less public 
the Corporation "las more free i.n its comments: 0 •• its 
tOlllplete °minister delighted in 
off a bombshell without any p~ior consulatation Vlith 
".responsible ' for broadcastingO; O.~oone senior man is 
in hospital suffering from the strain .• &since the 
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The Minister clearly had not consulted at all with his 
organisation. This he justified at the February 8 Board meeting 
by saying that at times Governments have to decide policy 
°independentlyq and that he was sure the Board would °appreciateO 
tl,i G - (7). 
Public reaction tc the announcement varied. The newspapers 
tended to be critical, highlighting expense, a multiplying 
bureaucracy and the socialist tendencies of a Government 
ideologically opposed to private enterprise. However some, like 
the Wellington Evening Post stated that °it could pay offo 
(February 1,1973). Letters to the papers were generally 
supportive. In fact such support that. there was combined with a 
lack of any 'significant flow of correspondence led the New 
Zealand Listener to comment: 
The silence \vi th which the Government 0 s 
proposal to dismember the NZBC was received 
could have indicated approval rather than 
apathy, Newspapers criticised the plan: 
their readers generally remained silent, or 
mildly applauded; and in our columns, where 
the subject could have been expected to 
receive full attention, only a few letters 
appeared. (June 11, 1973) 
2. THE COHHITTEE ON BROPJ)CASTING 
On Harch 30> 1973 th~ Minister of Broadcasting announced 
the appointment of the Committee to advise him. The ComraitteeOs 
task was to prepare a White Paper, and to prepare or have 
prepared a draft of the legislation that would be necesary to 
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give effect to the policy as presented in the White Paper. The 
committee consisted of: 
Professor Kenneth Adam, of Londou; 
Professor Robert McDonald Chapman, of Auckland; 
Dr John Lochiel Robson, of Wellington, and 
Dorothea Frances Turner, of Wellington. 
The Committee was to report not later than July 31, 1973. 
(See Apendix D). The committee had technical advice from Ronald 
HcDonald, an Australian and the CommitteeOs secretary was Ira 
Buckingham. 
The Minister placed a great deal of importance on the 
Committee. He saw both its status and the work it would do as 
crucial to the success of the whole reorganisation.(8) There 
was little time for him to select the Committee. Such was the 
shortness of notice that many of the Ministers choices had to be 
forgone. It would appear that there was something of a scramble 
to find an °appropriateO person to chair the Committee. The 
Minister had determined that it should be an °overseas expertO of 
sufficient standing to gain as much public acceptance of the 
recommendations as possible. The list of names canvased, many of 
whom were approached, is lengthy arid Professor Adam was far from 
being °first chotceo. The assistance of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was enlisted and approaches on the Ministers behalf were 
made from both London and Washington.(9) The Government, to quote 
the New Zealand Herald, even °went outside- official channels in 
. search of the CommitteeOs head o (April 2!+~ 1973), Geoffrey Cox, 
one of those suggested but unavailable, actually contacted Adam 
and asked if he would be interested. Adam had been lecturing in 
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the United States' as a visiting. Professor at Temple University in 
Philadelphia, having resigned his position as head of BBC 
Television after differences of opinion over policy. (10) Leave of 
absence from the University was obtained, and Adam wjs able to 
accept the position. Professor Chapman was a prominent accademic 
with an extensive knowledge of broadcasting affairs. Lady Turner 
had h~~u one of the first to congratulate the Minister on his new 
policy, she was also a regular broadcaster. Mr Robson was a 
retired head of the Justice Department and an expert on public 
administration. 
The CommitteeOs task was formidable. Given the basic 
policy already decided by the minister i.e. three separate and 
independent corporations, two for television and one for radio; 
an overriding authority to provide common services and to carry 
out the functions of the existing Broadcasting Authority; 
regionalising the corporations so that programnnng was 
decentralised; and ensuring that the mixture of commercial and 
non-commercial broadcasting was maintained. The Committee had to 
put flesh on the bones, fill out all the detail and write and 
present the result in a way that would ensure both acceptance and 
performance. Appendix E is a checklis't of all this issues the 
committee was asked to deliberate upon. 
The Committee worked hard. Six and 'seven day weeks vlere 
common (ll ) . They travelled widely throughout New Zealand 
visiting over forty centres, received some 1,500 submissions, 70 
of them being substantial and were able to report within the 
deadline. 
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Adams liked to Dmeet the peopleD. He called it Dtaking the 
Temperature of the local citizens. D (Listener, August 8,1973). 
DOne was av:are of the intense interest throughout New Zealand in 
broadcasting and the proposed a~tivites.D (ibid). The Listener 
described how the Committee Dbarnstormedo. 
, 
It usually involved asking the mayor to get 
together all interested groups, such as the 
Chambers of Commerce, headmasters, womenso 
organisations, farmers federation. Informally 
the Committee took every opportunity to talk 
to drivers, receptionists, chambermaids, 
people in bars. "Maybe it wasnDt scientific 
but it certainly was illuminating", ~ays Adam. 
(August 8, 1973) 
Adam was able to say that the Committee found Dnothing to 
suggest that the public were not happy with public service 
broadcasting. D (Ibid) What else did the Committee find? 
The overall tenor of submissions was favourable to the 
proposed restructuring. Individual submissions tended to be the 
most supportive and uncritical. Those that came from more 
substantial organisations tended to reflect greater Drealismo 
and less idealism. Interest· groups within the broadcasting 
structure tended to reflect their own conservatism or liberalism, 
engineers showing strong reactions against the new structure, 
announcers very cautious, journalists and producers supportive to 
the extent of. at times, showing strong enthusiasm. These views 
tended to be in line with the threats or, conversely, 
oportunities perceived by these groups in employment terms within 
the new structure. Engineers resisted strongly the three 
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corporation set-up arguing against it in engineering and economic 
terms. They also did not want a separate central body controlling 
common services. If the split wa.s to go ahead they would have 
wished for three separate engineering and technical services. 
Announcers were particularly concerned vlith maintaining 
standards, and most particularly standards of the spoken word and 
saw competing commercial television as a threat to these.(12) 
Some staff submissions, were highly critical of the NZBC. 
The extensive and almost standard condition of 
total secrecy concerning the internal workings 
of departments of state also apply in the 
NZBC. It should be noted that the Corporation 
has disciplined and dismissed employees for 
criticising. its decisions in 
public .•••• Because one of the prime functions 
of the publicly owned broadcasting system is 
to create an informed community, it should not 
take advantage of its povler as a comrnunic:a tion 
monopoly to stifle debate on its own 
performance, or to hinder the development of 
the dialogue which must exist between 
broadcasters and the community they 
serve.(Submission from ~our producers) 
There was an interesting dichotomy noticed by the 
Committee as it travelled around New Zealand. Within the main 
centres where transmission facilities were good interest 
concentrated around programmes and progranme content. In rural 
New Zealand and the many sm~ll communities that serve it, the 
Aominant interest was the quality of transmission and the 
extension of services.(13) 
Total opposition to the proposals did not prevent the 
National Party from presenting submissions \-lhieh interestingly 
included: 
The National Party believes that one of the 
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pillars of a democracy is the free expression 
of a wide range of di~fering views, opinions 
and interpretations. The provision of 
alternative views is vital in ,broadcasting 
when the instantaneous presentation of news 
and current affairs has a powerful and 
dramatic effect. We urge therefore that each 
corporation have a separate news 
service. (National Party Submissions,page 8) 
Relations between the National Party and the Committee 
were, on the whole, cordial.(14) The Committee not only heard the 
partyOs submiss.ions, but also met informally with the 
parliamentary leadership of the party on June 6, 1973. Notes 
taken at that meeting included the following: 
The National Party could not but agree that 
three corporations would open· up an immense 
number of opportunities for news and current 
affairs activity. This would be useful. Each 
corporation would presumably use existing 
news agencies. To that extent each would be 
drawing upon a common source of news. The 
Party wanted to urge however that each 
corporation have its own news service. 
and 
Mr Adams- Schneider said he could clearly 
remember how the problem of questioning a 
minister on broadcast programmes arose in 
1961. It was then that the first question on 
programming was put. A point of order was 
raised that the Minister could not be held 
resonsible to answer such a question. The 
Speakery Mr Algie, ruled it to be in order. 
~hat decision opened up the whole field of 
questioning that had ensured. 
and 
Mr Marshall said that 
intended to abolish( the 
of Broadcasting) if it 
power last November.(IS) 
the National Party 
portfolio of Minister 
had been returned to 
In the acknowledgments in the CommitteeOs reports it states: 
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The Committee wishes to record its 
appreciation of the consid~rable assistance it 
received from the New Zealand Broadcasting 
Corporation, the New Zealand Broadcasting 
and the New Zealand Post Office.(page142) 
This can be contrasted with the following, taken from Notes for 
Discussion with the Committee on Broadcasting, prepared by the 
secretary;(16) 
The Authority, for it part, has assured us of 
its intention to assist. The NZBC, for a 
variety of reasons, adopts a rather differeDt 
attitude to the Committee and the GovernruentOs 
objectives. 
Furthermore, in the notes of a preliminary discussion 
with the executive of the NZBC, the CommitteeOs secretary records 
that the Corporation wanted no informal or personal contact with 
the Committee but wished to conduct all its dealings with the 
Committee by correspondence. One source maintains that the NZBC 
was continuously disruptive of the CommitteeOs deliberations; at 
one stage it being reduced to °enquiring of telephone 
receptionists what land, buildings" and other capital assets ,vere 
associated with a particular broadcasting station. C (17) 
The Committees vlOrk was, on the whole, free of tensions 
and disagreements. However, the debate on the structure and size 
of the °controlling bodyo i.e. the Bro~dcasting Council was long 
and divisive. One memberos ideal °councilo being a body of °wise 
me nO whereas other members \'lanted a more praf,'1Ilatic basis for the 
Councils activities. This difference of opinion is highlighted in 
the report where some committe members pushed for a sixth member 
of the Council to handle the °mechanics of division and 
consensusO (Page 24). The draft bill continued this division of 
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opinion by offering alternative Council membership sizes. (18) 
The Committees workload. was extraordinarily heavy. Perhaps 
the Minister was expecting a little too much from four people in 
so short a time. Evidence of the speed with which the committee 
worked and the consequent strain exists. Whether it affected the 
quality of the' result is arguable. However, one significant slip 
suggests that it may have. Professor Adams reviewed for the New 
Zealand Listener April 4, 1974 a European Broadcasting Monograph 
called °Structures and Organisation of BroadcastingO by Albert 
Namurois. In the review Adams said that. ;Lt: he had known of °the 
existence of the document (at the time) it would have been an 
important source book (for the CommitteeOs deliberations)o. 
Major-General McKinnon, Chairman 6f the NZBC, drew the attention 
of the Committee to the book and made significant reference to it 
in his own submissions to the Committee in. May 1973! 
The Committee worked in closed session, without public 
hearings. Other than for its public forums in various centres and 
the invitation to some persons to appear before the Committee, 
submissions were in writing.. The CommitteeOs terms of reference 
__ required it not to divulge its findings before reporting finally 
to the Minister. Thus it was able to work, on the whole, without 
the spotljght of public attention. Questions \>Tere asked from time 
to time in Parliament, usually by the Opposition Spokesman on 
.Broadcasting the Han. H.J.Walker.These reflected the Oppositions 
continued rejection of the restructuring proposals. 
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The Report was in the hands of the Minister by due date and 
released to the public in earl.y August. 
3. RECEPTION OF THE REPORT 
Newspaper 
Christchurch 
response to the Report was varied. 
Press headed its editorial 
The 
°The 
N.N.N.Z.Z.Z.B.B.B.C.C.C.O It was not at all complimentary about 
the proposals and eVen less so about New Zealand Talent, 
suggesting that real ability to entertain to an acceptable 
broadcast standard was a skill held by a very few people. °New 
Zealanders in larg~ doses are not always very entertaining.oC 
August 4, 1973,page 12). The Dominion in Wellington and'Dunedinos 
Otago Daily Times gave a cautious °thumbs upo to the proposals. 
Whilst Minhinnick, the New Zealand Heraldos cartoonist probably 
summed up that paperos attitude. He showed the Minister of 
Broadcasting as a snake-charmer encouraging four tangled snakes, 
labelled °corporationso, from a basket called the Adam 
Report.(August 4, 1973) 
Generally, constructive comment indicated full support for 
the revitalisation of radio that the changes would bring, but 
expressed reservations about what turned out to be the most 
controversial part of the report and ensuing legislation 
competitive/complementary tHo-channel television programming. 
What the Report called ° Guided Competitiono. 
The comments of Robert Cornell, then head of Management 
Services for the NZBC reflected this general concern: 
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I 
While the Committee does not see their co-
existence' to be diametr,ically opposed, still 
they do not, perhaps could not, offer any 
clear plan as to the practical attainment of 
complemen tary yet competi ti ve programming'. 
(N.Z.Listener, August 27, 1973) 
Opposi tion to the policy, as it gre\<l, repeatedly came back to 
this theme. 
Gregory (1974) laid a more substantial criticism on the 
Report. Quoting 'from the 1960 Pilkington Report on Television in 
Great Britain he said that fragmentation meant that none of the 
individual corporations would possess sufficient authority to 
conduct their affairs as they saw fit. 
Authority and responsibility for the exercise 
of authority should go together: Regulation by 
one body of a service provided by another 
makes for negative, after-the~event control, 
and a lack of positive purpose in the 
regulatory body. It is in the provision of the 
service that the positive purposes of 
broadcasting reside; and those who shape those 
purposes should in fact be 
responsible.(para.424) 
Further, Gregory said: 
It will be interesting to see how two 
television channels competing for advertising 
revenue are able to subsume the necessities of 
commercial competition based on market 
demands, with the wider task of developing a 
public . service based on~ enlightened 
leadership.(page 74) 
He suggests perhaps a °philosopher-kingO as Director 
General. 
These criticisms were later to become signficant, but at 
the time the CommitteeOs report was given a qualified blessing. 
Even the Listener saying: °A first reading of its report 
90 
indicates that it has done a difficult job with flair and 
imagination.o (August 27,page 12) 
4.THE LEGISLATION 
Parliament opened early in 1973. The Governor-Generalos 
speech was giv~n on February 13. In that address mention was made 
of the GovernmentOs intentions to restructure broadcasting. The 
first substantial comment from the Opposition came in the Address 
and Reply debate the following week. The Leader of the Opposition 
the Han. J.R.Marshall then raised what was to become the basis of 
repeated criticism from that side of the house. The NZBC was a 
fine organisation; the new structure was less efficient; it was 
more costly; there was unnecessary duplication and there had been 
no consultation with broadcasting authorities. The Minister 
replied, in the same debate, o~ March 1 s~ressing the beliefs of 
the Government in the proposed changes and confidence in the 
consultative process they had laid down. On March 7 a debate, 
initiated by the Opposition, and calling for a return to the 
status quo for the time being, was held. The main feature of the 
debate being a lack of a q~orum that held up progress for some 
minutes. The Broadcasting Committee was announced in the House on 
March 14. On Harch 15 a short bill was introduced proscribing the 
rights of the Broadcasting Authority to issue warrants to Private 
bidders. This bill was in keeping vlith the GovermentOs election 
manifesto pledge to keep broadcasting in the public domain. A 
further debate was held on June 13, this time initiated by the 
Government but once again going over the same ground as 
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p~eviously. 
The Adam Committee had produced draft legislation as part 
of the White Paper proposals. It was assisted in this by the law 
drafting office which gave the Committee a memorandum based on 
previous legislation and on work done by the International Radio 
consultative Committee of the International Telecommunications 
Union.(19) This draft bill was slightly modified and presented to 
the House of ~epresentatives for a first reading on September 12. 
The Debate was not a particularly good one. As happens 
frequently in New Zealandos parliament the Opposition did not 
receive copies of the bill until minutes before its intioduction. 
This is reflected in the lack of detail in the Oppositionos 
response. A total of 12 members participated in the debate. The 
Hon H.J Walker responded to the MinisterOs introduction and made 
only a few points, all of which we~e quickly answered by the 
Minister. The remainder of the debate was not much more than 
points-scoring. The Minister moved that the bill be referred to a 
select committee and the debate ended in under one hour. 
(Hansard, Vol 385,page 3467) 
The Select Committee met for the first time on September 
26 and on six further occasions, the final meeting being held on 
October 17. The Committee comprised: 
Government: 
Hon.R.O.Douglas 
Mr O°Flynn 
Mr Mayson 
Mr Quigley 
Opposition: 
Hon.H.J.Walker 
Hon.L.RoAdams-
Schneider 
Hr Comber 
Submissions were written and circulated in advance. They 
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vere therefore not read in the Committee thus allowing greater 
time for question and discussion. A total of sixty-one 
submissions were received. These resulted in thirty-nine 
amendments being made to the bill.(20) Only one submission was 
totally opposed to the concepts behind the bill. The remainder 
vere supportive to a greater or lesser degree, ranging from the 
Television Producers and Directors Association who indicated 
total support through to the New Zealand Public Service 
Association and the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council both of whom 
had substantial critical comments to make. A summary of the 
changes is listed in 'Appendix F 
The bill was reported back from the Committee on October 
17. The irreconcilable differences between the two parties can 
-best be seen by contrasted speeches from the principle spokesmen 
during the report-back debate. The Hon.H.J.Walker, Opposition: 
The evidence placed before the committee 
clearly showed that the proposed fragmentation 
of the NZBC is not in the public interest. 
According to the evidence submitted, under 
fragmentation programme standards could be 
lowered, costs could be appreciably increased, 
and the upgrading and New Zealand- wide 
coverage of the first television channel will 
be seriously delayed •••• The Bill is con~rary 
to the Labour PartyOs policy as enunciated at 
the last general election and as stated in the 
partyOs manifesto .•.• ,I want to move an 
amendment to the motion before this House, 
°That all the words after the word "that" be 
omitted, and the folloHing Hords substituted: 
"the Bill be referred back to the cOruinittee 
for further examination with ~ view to not 
proceeding with the fragmentation of the 
NZBC."O(Hansard, Vol 387,page 4438) 
The Minister of Broadcasting replied: 
After listening to the member for Papanui I 
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can only conclude that we must have been 
sitting in different committees. I oppose the 
amendment he has moved, and I do not believe 
it is in the public interest, as he has 
claimed, that the Bill should be referred back 
to the committee. In fact, •••• in the main the 
submissions presented supported the 
GovernmentOs policy ••••• I should like to make 
the point that the changes made by the 
committee do not alter in substance the bill 
as it was originally introduced, but do, I 
believe, improve it. (Hansard Vol 387,page 
4440)· 
The final speaker, Mr V.S. Young, before the amendment 
was put and lost by a majority of 17, said: 
The whole idea, dreamed up by I know not who, 
but for which the Minister takes 
responsibility, is no more than an Alice in 
Wonderland ~utfit. It will be of no benefit to 
broadcasting, television, the news media or' 
the people of New Zealand, and the Bill should 
be referred back to the committee for 
reconsideration. (Hansard, Vol 387,page 4449) 
The second reading debate was held on November 6. In 
contrast, the ,first part of this debate was a model of 
Parliamentary courtesy and procedure. The Minister of 
Broadcasting (R.O.Douglas) made a long and detailed speech that 
was frequently interupted by courteous and perceptive questionin~ 
by Mr Adam-Schneider from the Opposition. Douglas answered each 
question well. It was during this debate that the Opposition 
first raised the compatibility of competitive yet complementary 
television programming. An issue that was to dog both this debate 
and also future argument on Labouros broadcastin~ policy. Urgency 
was taken by the Government on the second reading and it \<13S 
completed just before midnight. 
The committee stages of the Bill took place on November 
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14, 20 and 21, the Opposition forcing many divisions during the 
clause by clause debate. The Government conceded an amendment to 
Mr Adams-Schneider on clause 74a, subsection 1. (Hansard, Vol 388 
page 5306) It was an aIlIIDendment by way of addition of a clause 
requiI'illg the Minister to table in Parliament any amendments to 
the conditions of warrants for private stations within 28 days of 
such a change •. 
Finally in what Bassett (1976) called °a rather brief but 
acrimonious debate O the Bill was read a third time on November 
21. 
The Bill became law on December 18 1973. On December 11 
the new boards of the corporations and Council were announced and 
on the Act coming into force took over asa reconstituted NZBC 
Board. 
5. THE INTERREGNUM 
Shortly before the Adam Committee finished its 
deliberations, Adams wrote to the Hinist..er of Broadcasting saying 
inter alia: 
We believe that in order to avoid a period of 
indecision in which those opposed to the new 
broadcasting proposals will have opportunities 
to attack the White Paper, it is imperative 
that the Bill be introduced in August and, 
preferably in the first fortnight. Unless 
. (this is so) you as Minister will tend to lose 
the initiative. (21) 
Not only was the Bill delayed until Mid-September, but 
there was also a delay between the signing of the Bill into law 
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in early December and the Act coming into force on April 1, 1974. 
However, it was not until twenty months after the White Paper was 
tabled, April 1975 that the Act became operational in total. It 
took that long for the NZBC to finally be abolished, the three 
corporations to come on air and the BCNZ to take on its statutory 
role. 
It was during this period that serious opposition to the 
Act began to emerge. 
As early as 1973 the National Party had been looking for 
ways to stop the abolition of the NZBC. Walker, as Minister of 
Broadcasting in the National Government, along with Adams-
Schneider, the previous Minister, . had built up a close 
relationship with the NZBC hierachy. This was reflected both in 
the nature of appointments to the Board and dealings with the 
Executive of the Corporation. In 1969 the Government (National 
Party) Caucus was overwhelmingly in favour of private television 
in competition with the NZBC. By 1971 the Caucus had been 
convinced that the NZBC should have the second channel. Indeed, 
even although the Broadcasting Authority at its hearing granted 
the second channel to private enterprise, members of the National 
·~arty were quietly confident that the NZBC would regain that 
right after an appeal to the courts - something it had 
successfully done in the past.(22) Major-General McKinnon, 
Chairman of the NZBC and a National Party member wrote to Douglas 
on April 27, 197~ suggesting the alternative proposal of one 
corporation and three servicesl(23) 
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By mid 1974 the newspapers were uniting in opposing the 
two-channel television serv~ce. The Wanganui Herald called the 
second channel an °extravaganceO (June 6, 1974), the New Zealand 
Herald referred to °storm clouds over second channelO(April 24, 
1974), the same paper °leakedo a story that a report to the NZBC 
indicated that over six hundred new staff would be needed to run 
the second channel (June 6, 1974). This was immediately 
contrasted with the original NZBC plan to run a small non-
commercial second channel operation - the one referred to the 
Authority hearing - which would employ only nineteen more 
staff than already then employed by the old NZBC. The Southland 
Times attacked the °costly second channelo and, adding 
parochialism to righteous anger, lambasted the channel for 
beginning its transmissions only in Auckland. (May 7,1974) 
Staffing levels were criticised. Gordon Dryden, the 
unsuccessful applicant for the television warrant at the 
Authority hearings, claimed that he planned a total national 
television serv~ce with four hundred people on the staff. (24) 
Finally, it was becoming apparent that the capital costs for the 
extension of Television One to the last one per cent of the 
_population, coupled with the costs for bringing Television Twoos 
coverage up to or close to Television One was escalating rapidly 
and the Government \'18S going to have to help in the long term. 
Even the Government Os O\>1n MP Os 'vere becoming critical) and 
although not speaking out publicly, were putting pressure on the 
Minister. (25) 
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When Television Two at last went on the air barely four 
months before a general election, broadcasting was once again 
becoming a political issue and the corporation structure was far 
from secure. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY 
1. POLITICAL SYSTEMS THEORY 
Analysing the events using EastonOs theory there is no 
evidence to suggest a sustained and generalised demand being 
transmitted from the environment to the political system 
immediately subsequent to the 1972 general election. There was 
some pressure for second channel coverage, particularly in the 
four main centres. However in some of the rural and provincial 
electorates the pressure was more for the introduction or 
improvement of first channel television. Three of the four 
politicians spoken to by the writer said that television matters 
were low on the priority Of. issues raised by the general 
public.(l) However it would appear that commercial pressure for a 
substantial changes to broadcastingOs structure had been in 
evidence for some time. (2) 
The narrow base from which Labouros broadcasting policy 
developed does support qU elitist interpretation of the 
development of broadcasting policy at that stage. Certainly, on 
the MinisterOs own admission, only a small number of persons was 
involved in allocating the values for this particular policy, 
and were not typical of the masses who are governed and 
undoubtedly represented higher socio-economic factions within our 
society. The policy, as initially enunciated did not reflect the 
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demands of the masses but rather the prevailing values of an 
elite. 
Finally, in recalling Dye and ZieglerOs (1978) matrix of 
elite theory, the policy when first announced elicited very 
little response from the masses even if calling the masses 
°apatheticO is going too far. Thus the inputs would be classified 
by Easton as °withinputsO, i.e. initiated from within the 
political system: 
(1) The Conversion Process 
Under these circumstances the conversion process adopted 
is of special interest. It can be ana~ysed almost exclusively 
using the Almond and Powell (1966) model of the conversion 
process. The three steps are (1) interest articulation, (2) 
interest aggregation, and (3) rule making. 
(a) Interest articulation. This is the process by which 
groups and individuals make known their demands. In a sense the 
government had already become aware of these demands. They had 
been °te1egraphedO through the informal interest group 
activities. It knew that there was dissatisfaction within some 
groups in the NZBC, that delays in establishing the second 
television channel had become a public issue, that there was an 
uneasy relationship between the broadcasting authorities and the 
politicians. 
In order to focus this demand the Goverrulent set up a 
process of consultation. This °opening-up of the policy making 
processO (Hall, 1982, page 83) meant that the Government. was 
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prepared to at least put its own policy under scrutiny. It may 
have been made in an elite environment but would be tested in the 
political system. The consultation process was initiated with the 
White Paper. By calling for submissions it allowed interested 
groups and individuals to comment on the policy. By travelling 
around Nev7 Zealand the way it did the committee was able to, at 
least in to a litmited degree, consult wi~h the masses. 
The composition of submissions is interesting. Of the 1500 
only some 80 were classified as substantial - the type of 
presentation expected of active pressure groups the rest was 
':: 
I 
either informal or in simple letter form. The Minister, in 
setting up the co'mmittee, could therefore be stated as having 
removed the broadcasting issue from the arena of debate and by 
doing this should have set the machinery in motion for the 
development of some broad parameters for alternative policies 
thus following the function of inter~st articulation. However, it 
should be said that the very narrow terms of reference given to 
the Committee considerably restricted its ability to do this and 
somewhat limited the role the committee could play in interest 
articulation. 
(b) Interest Aggregation. This is the phase when demands 
-are converted into general pol.icy alternatives. The Mazzoni and 
Campbell (1976) adaptation of EastonOs theory divides this stage 
into two proposel formulation and support mobi~isation. 
(i) Proposal formulation: In this process issues are 
developed as specific recommendations for P?licy change. This is 
exemplified in this case by the publication of the White Paper 
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and the accompany1ng draft legislation. In this case the 
alternatives were a choice between the existng broadcasting 
system and the new one proposed as, an elite theory and modified 
by the interest aggregation process. However the White Paper 
itself was a motivator of other alternatives. Some, like Major-
General McKinnonos three services proposition, remained within 
the policy process and were rejected by the elitist element 1n 
this policy process. Others were generated more publically, like 
the proposal of C.G.Coste110 to the select committee suggestng a 
compromise structure. (Appendix F). 
(ii) Support mobilisation: This also had its genes1s 1n the 
publication of the White Paper. The Paper'was very much an appeal 
to New Zealanders to back the new proposals. It used a familiar 
mode of argument to generate support. 
The vast majority of correspondents ••. saw in 
the proposed extensions of broadcasting not 
only as an opportunity for more varied 
diversions but also as a source of education 
and citizenship. (page 7) 
The assumption was that °y.ou too O would see it this way. 
Furthermore. 
We have, as a committee, seen and read enough 
since we were conven~d to dispose of the fear 
that what the New Zealand audience wants is to 
watch and listen to bad programmes. On the 
contrary, it wants to watch and listen to good 
programmes. Its tastes are neither undemanding 
or predictable. 
A somewhat condescending congratulatory message. Unsound logic but 
totally approved marketing! 
In this way society is prepared to support the legislation 
and the changes it will make as being in their best interests, as 
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being °goodO far all, as being a sound alternative even 
although no other alternatives were soundly canvased due to the 
elitist approach at the beginning of the policy process. 
Support mobilisation also occurred when the Committee went 
visiting. It not only listened, it explained what it intended to 
do, thereby encouraging support for the policy. A further element 
in the process was the choice of committee. The Minister was very 
conscious of the need to have a quality committee. The calibre of 
membership would determine its effectiveness as an opinion leader 
, 
and persuader. I' , 
(c) Rule Making. The final ~tage of the conversion 
process as described by Mazzoni and Campbell (1976) is rule 
making or decision enactment. This is the output phase within the 
Easton model represented for Easton by decisions and actions of 
the authorities. This study argues that the process to introduce 
a radically new broadcasting policy was begun by an elitist 
decision made within the Government and more specifically by the 
Minister himself. It was an Easton type withinput decision and 
not one made in direct response to any clearly defined input from 
the environment. With the policy decision made, the conversion 
process, although it involved some of the steps mentioned above, 
became primarily one of legitimation. The Government was not 
required to make a choice between a number of alternatives. What 
little choice it was involved in was no more than deciding what 
minor changes it would make to the already defined policy to 
either improve it, or placate a particular group. The conversion 
process, in summary, required the development of the finer 
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details of the p,olicy and the !llobilisation of public support for 
the policy. The White Paper was geared towards these ends. 
The final stage of the rule making process lay with the 
passage of the Bill through Parliament. In this example the 
promulgation of the policy preceded the legislation. The White 
Paper quickly generated the necessary legislation. Because of the 
elitist beginnipg of this policy a safe conclusion is that there 
was a high degree of compatability between the aspirations of the 
government and the recommendations of the Adams Committee. 
In this respect it is interesting to note the parting comments of 
Adam to Walker. According to Walkeros recollection, when asked if 
he had had a free hand would he personally have done it this way 
he replied: %m sorry, that is a polit16al question and I cant 
answer it, but please dont think too badly of me after lave 
gone. ° (3). 
Analysis of the case study uS1ng EastonOs theory is· 
compact but not very satisfying. Applying any imported and 
unadapted theoretical model to indigenous events hardly ever 1S. 
An alternative hypothesis is therefore suggested in the final 
chapter. 
2. HEDIA THEORY 
The political effects thesis (Seymour-Ure, 1974 and 
Morgan, 1982) 1S supported by this case study. The evidence 
collected being both empirical and personal. Without exception 
all politicians and broadcasters acknowledged the °powero of the 
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media, particularly television. In seeking what effect the media 
had on the politician who uses it, the writer had a striking 
example. A Saturday visit to one politician caught him Ln the 
midst of prepar1ng a press release for that day. "If it goes out 
at the weekend its got a greater chance of exposure because 
overseas stories and local political stories are scarce and will 
not crowd it oULo Hhy such attention to exposure? "A politician 
survives by exposure. The Television image of the leader could 
win or lose an election."(4) 
Others confirm this reaction. Broadcasters', although more 
cynical, still used the word °powero with frequency anft freely 
acknowledged that their dealings with politicians confirm in them 
that the politician sees the media as powerful. Seymour-Drees 
thesis is that whether it is or is not powerful, the individualos 
perception that it is will influence behaviour. 
During the period under study both leading politicians and 
senior broadcasters talked publicly about the °powero of 
broadcasting, the especial responsibility of broadcastersO and 
the °uniquely pervasive roleo of television Ln our society. (5) 
Observation during the period under study confirms 
MorganOs thesis that politicians are unable to leave broadcasters 
alone. The stated policy was: 
We want to get rid, as we believe· the 
Government does, of what has been described as 
°the omnipresent environment of political 
conscience." (Hhite Paper, page 10) 
Yet during the period the Deputy Lender of the Oppositon was 
reported 1.n one newspaper: 
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Mr Muldoon agrees that the NZBC was due for a 
shake up. He referred to the NZBC as a 
°monolithic structure with the" hide of a 
rhinoceros. What went on inside was nobodyOs 
business. ° (Dominion, February 14, 1973) 
Furthermore, the Prime Minister of the party proposing 
this legislation was involved in more than one incident during 
the period. He involved himself in a somewhat unbecoming argument 
with a talk-back journalist on radio, threatening both the 
station and the broadcaster with legal action (Sunday Times June 
30, 1974). He attacked the television programme °Ga11ery o over an 
item that featured the Opposition spokesman on immigration and 
three young Fijian "boys on the issue of overstayers. Commenting 
on broadcasters policy of saying that politicians °declined to 
appearO, Kirk said: 
Gallery gives 
special duties. 
Gallery has 
responsibility. 
1973) 
the impression that it has 
It has no such duties at all. 
power and that demands 
(N.Z.Listener, September 17, 
Politicians who made complaints about broadcasting during 
the period of the study included; Mr Harrison, Mr Thompson, Mr 
McCready, Mr Muldoon, Mr Kirk, Dr Finlay. (6) 
MorganOs hypothesis that truth has two versions, as its 
told by the politicians and as i~s reported by the media, is used 
to explain the forever uncomfortable relationship, the uneasy 
truce, so easily broken that lies between the politician and the 
mediaperson. She sees it as a symbiotic relationship. The 
politician needs the media to tell his or her truth, yet the 
media will often tell it their way and not the politicianos. 
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Firmly believing in their own versions each exposes the other to 
constant misinterpretation. 
Seymour-Ure hypothesises that the individualos perception 
of the media is just as important for the performer as it is for 
the audience. Politicians shape their performance by their 
perception of the medium they perform on. MorganOs hypothesis is 
of two truths inextricably bound together, needing each other to 
survive, yet .in that need forever ensuring tension and 
misunderstanding by °misappropriatingO each otherOs truth. 
It is the belief of the writer that much of the behaviour of 
politicians during this period supports these theories and leave 
the way open for further study. 
3.PRESSURE GROUPS 
Using Levineos (1979) dichotomy of pressure group activity 
between promotional and protective, the role of the promotional 
grouping was less significant in this study. The protective 
groupings played a larger role. This can be explained by the 
nature of events. As pointed out earlier, using EastonOs model, 
the imputs for change did not come from the environment. There 
was not a strong mass movement for ~substantial broadcasting 
changes. Therefore promotional groupings would not have been 
formed for this specific policy change. Existing promotional 
groups that have some longevity did contribute but they were the 
lesser actors.(7) Because the proposed changes had great 
significance for groups working within broadcasting those with 
established protective groupings were highly active. The Public 
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Service Association, the varLOUS occupational groupings within 
broadcasting, the political parties, and the media were all 
featured. 
One grouping that, for the purposes of the study, would 
fit into a pressure group definition was the small coterie of top 
NZBC executives that centred on the Director- General. As 
mentioned earlier, this small, but powerful group, played a 
significant and, on the whole, disruptive role in the policy 
formation process. One source suggested that they formed, with 
others, a tightly-knit grouping based on the office of the 
Opposition spokesman on Broadcasting. (8) This involvement lasted 
for the duration of the exercise. Certainly their intentions 
were the protection of the existing NZBC. Sources close to the 
policy process have suggested that they were acting Ln true 
pressure group fashion in protecting their own interests also.(9) 
Many of the changes that were made to the draft 
legislation were the result of successful pressure group activity 
(see Appendix F) and the White paper acknowledges the 
contribution of some 84 organisations that made substantial 
submissions. HOli7ever, re-enforcing a previous comment about 
Levineos typology, many more contributions were made by 
individuals and some of these were also successful in generating 
change. 
There were absolutely no bipartisan approaches to this 
policy study. Cleavages were firmly down, party lines. 'l'he 
divisions within the NZBC aligned themselves with these 
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cleavages. The Administration being seen as supporting the 
National Party approach, the more liberal producers and directors 
siding with Labour Party policy. This separation was carried over 
to °outside O organisations also. The more liberal tending to 
support the proposals, conservative groups being more critical. 
This perhaps gives some support to the worrying trends identified 
by Levine (1979) that cumulative rather than cross-cutting 
cleavages are dominating New Zealand society. It should be 
emphasised however that the study is too narrow both in scope and 
social importance of the subject matter to give too greater 
emphasis to this support. 
4. THE PRIMACY OF PRAGMATISM 
Two comments stand out. One politician said that °a party 
needs to keep its policy bland to give freedom. o Another said: 
O'the party didn ° t make policy the ministers did. ° Both. talked 
about the need to be pragmatic. Now pragmatism has a long and 
noble history. As it was conceiyed by such people as William 
James and C.S. Peirce it was a philosophical position that could 
be defended with some vigour. Stated simply pragmatism is based 
on the concept that the meanlng of any proposition is its logical 
,consequences. 
In order to ascertain the meaning of an 
intellectual conception one should consider 
what practical consequences might conceivably 
result by necessity from the truth of that 
conception; and the sum of these consequences 
will constitute the entire meaning of the 
conception. (McGill 1968, page 247) 
Adapting the philosophy to a political context has 
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produced such concepts as instrumentalism and John De~.,reyOs 
experimentalism. In many of the conversations the writer had with 
politicians and broadcasters the phrase °pragmatismO 
frequently used. It was used most often in the context' of the 
need for a broadcasting policy to be °pragmaticO, or that the 
policy under reV1.ew was not pragmatic. This unfortunate 
confusion between pragmatism and practical was too often 
present. It appears that the broadcasting policy of the third 
Labour Government was above all else an exercise in pragmatism. 
It was conceived entirely 1.n terms of its outcomes. The 
consequences of the policy really became the basis of the policy 
itself. Both the MinisterOs initial announcement and the White 
Paper devoted much to what they saw as the,outcome of the policy. 
They often addressed the problems in terms of their outcomes. 
i.e. the way they addressed the debate on the future of radio~ 
the arguments for decentralisation, and so on. Pragmatic does not 
necessarily mean it will work! Pragmatism is often contrasted 
with idealism. That 1.S not a logical negation. The policy under 
study was idealistic but it was also pragmatic. 
This little °homilyO is served because each of the 
statement& above, and they are interesting statements 1.n 
themselves, had annexed to them °thatOs being pragmaticO 0 (10) 
5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has observed the events under study 1.n terms 
of the political systems model for policYlllaking proposed by 
David Easton. It concluded that the model can be used to describe 
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the process but can do little more.~ It would be more interesting 
to observe what the outcome of the policy was in terms of a 
theoretical hypothesis. This is attempted in the final chapter. 
Further, the chapter reflected on the role of pressure 
groups in the policy process and the also attempted to apply 
current theories of media political effects to the process. 
These are raised again in the final chapter which looks at 
reasons for the pOlicyOs failure. 
..' 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE FAILURE OF THE POLICY 
1. MEDIA ISSUES 
There appears to by one major me~ia policy issue which 
contributed to the failure of the policy under study. A further 
policy, relating to radio, was highly successful. 
(1) Complementary v Competitive 
A key concept in the Adam CorrmitteeOs report and a 
cornerstone of the legislation was what the ComIllitt'ee called 
°Guided Competition°. 
Out of this a new definition of public 
broadcasting could emerge, which would be °sui 
generiso, but which could also offer an 
example to other broadcasting organisations 
which are in some cases themselves looking 
anxiously at the need for restructuring. 
The co-existence of complementary and 
competitive planning does not seem to us to 
require that the total philosophies of the two 
television channels have to be diametrically 
opposed ••••• Both channels will be in a 
considerable degree and naturally 
complementary for five nights of the week, 
when one ••• , will be non-commercial, and 
rivalry will tend to be confined to the 2 
nights when both are seeking advertising 
support. (page 40~41) 
The Committee was cautious not to define the concept too 
carefully. Critics suggest they could not (1), the Committee had 
other reasons: 
The Committee does not feel that it should lay 
down in advance precise detail of what 
complementary planning may come to mean. That 
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is a matter for the Council and for its 
representatives from the t~levision channels 
to work out ...• (page 41) 
Much of the success of the television restructuring was 
based on the ability of the two channels to be both complementary 
and competitive. ( The Committee, ironically, did not mention 
that the last time such a division occurred 1n New Zealand 
Broadcas ting, Y7hen radio had two separate controlling bodies from 
1936 - 1943, only one body was commercially based. That division 
ceased when a unified control was introduced supposedly as a war-
time cost-saving measurement. (2) 
However, that period of radio was ~e-ferred to more than 
once during debates on the policy. The Adam Committee was 
determined to avoid a °minority/majority split' happening in 
television. (3) There seemed to be a strong fear of °elitismo 
within the Committee. They wanted to avoid, for television, the 
°intellectual ghettoO they saw radio having created with over 80% 
of the listening audience opting for the commercial and light 
entertainment stations. They saw- this as °cutting down the 
variety of communication which the audience will encounter by 
tuning to their favourite station.O( Page 18) 
Mixing the character of both Ty channels and 
altering their commercial and non-commercial 
programmes must have the effect of reducing 
this self-segregation and minimising the 
di vis ion of communicated experiences -';vi thin 
the community. (page 18) 
(The wri.ter finds it significant that such thinking, a 
sort of cross cultural fertilisation - combining wands v7ith needs 
- was prevalent in 19700s educational literature.)(4) 
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The Committee wanted to ensure that the broader concept of 
mass media communication, as it has come to be enshrined -in 
public service broadcasting, should have a high profile: 
The assignment of a non-commercial role to 
both television services will therefore act as 
a constant reminder to them that they exist 
"to inform, to educate, and to entertain" and 
that their commercial activities are solely a 
means to a public end. (page 18) 
(It. is interesting to note the order that the committee selects 
for these three ° benchmarks ° of public service broadcasting and 
to compare them with broadcastingOs own priorities.) 
Criticism of the concept was first raised in Parliament 
during the second reading debate on November 6. The Opposition 
spokesman on Broadcasting Hon H.J. Walker: 
If there is competition for advertising there 
will not be complementary programmes - that is 
alternative programmes. If there are endeavours 
to have complementary and competitive programmes 
on both channels, the programmes have to be 
regulated.(Hansard, Vol , page 4851) 
Walker, in support of his argument, referred to the evidence of 
both Alphonse Quirnet and Hew Wheldori given to the Broadcasting 
AuthorityOs hearings into second channel allocation in 1971. 
Quimet, Chairman of the board of Tels~at, Canada, and a former 
__ Chairman of the Canadian Broadcasting Commission said: 
In my opinion the key question \-lhich) when 
ansvlered, will provide the framework for all 
other elements to fall neatly into place, is 
whether New Zealandos second television 
service should be complementary to a or 
°competitive withe the existing service? It 
cannot be both at the same time. (page 27) 
He was supported by l1r Hew ylheldon, Hanaging Directo~ of 
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Television for the BBC: 
That you can be, in the long run, both 
complementary and competitive at the same 
time ••• is strictly for the birds. In terms of 
hard experience, it is a pipe dream ••••• lt has 
always been in my experience, at best a pious 
intention, and generally, in fact, so much 
eyewash; and indeed has been so proved. (page 
27) 
The Government was convinced that the Adam Report 
suggestions would work and resisted any change. However within 
six months of Television Two going to air the Chairman of 
Television One, Mr R.G. Collins, said publicly: 
The present state of television .~roadcasting 
in New Zealand has followed inexorably from 
the prescriptions laid down in the Adam 
Report .•• Every experienced broadcaster reading 
the Adam Report recognised very quickly what 
the television result would be. In a country 
of this small population base, two commercial 
channels competing hard for advertising 
revenue, and wishing to expand the total 
revenue, must inevitably throw out two broadly 
similar programme patterns. The °smallo 
complementarity of not broadcasting like 
against like can easily be. achieved; but the 
larger complementarity of producing t'olO quite 
different programming patterns can never be 
achieved under tne Adam prescriptions, simply 
because under those prescriptions it is 
a financial impossibility. 
If the members of the Committee did not 
appreciate this, orie would be left ~using 
about their qualifications. If they did 
appreciate it and disapproved,~ it was open to 
anyone of them to record a dissent. The 
probability, of course, is that with personal 
misgivings they hoped for the best. 
(N.Z.Listener, March 13, 1976) 
Professor Chapman and Mr Robson have, to this day, 
remained silent on these matters. Lady Turner spoke out early in 
1976 expressing strong disappointment at the direction that both 
channels were taking. o ••• TV1 •• was awful, but I never expected 
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much good to come out of Avalon, which is a grandiose monument to 
centralism.o She also felt let down by TV2. °The discrimination 
'and vitality of Auckland, the marvellous things.of Christchurch, 
the solid glory of the place, are just not coming 
through.O(N.Z.Listener, March 6, 1976) 
(2) Radio 
The criticism levelled at telev~sion both during the 
interregnum and in the period immediately following the 
establishment of the four corporations, significantly omitted 
radio. 
With a few exceptions - the consensus is that 
radio has corne back into its own.(N.Z.Listener 
March 5, 1976, page 15) 
It was acknowledged that the Adam proposals had allowed radio to 
break free from television which had been, at one and the same 
time, a °hulking shadow of a progenyO and a financial and 
competitive burden. Thus the Listener was able to say: 
Its potential is 
in the fields 
community affairs 
being realised particularly 
of news and current and 
programmes. (Ibid) 
The article went on to comment, hovever, that it felt that these. 
changes that had occurred for the best in radio would have been 
possible without the complications of a °completely new 
structureO. 
Gregory (1974) predicted that a revitalised radio could 
become the centrepiece of broadcasting in New Zealand. 
It is not unreasonable to expect that Radio 
New Zealand could emerge as the institutional 
leader in the future Ne\'l Zealand b1.:oadca~ting 
system. Untroublea by the need to compete to 
the extent that the two television networks 
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will be, and gaining dynamism through its 
ability to play an important role in the life 
of local communities, radio might emerge as 
the central institution of New Zealand 
broadcasting.(Page 75) 
The consensus among broadcasters in radio is that the 
restructuring °saved public service broadcasting in New 
ZealandO, gave radio a new °lease of. lifeo, pnd, because 
television was the dominant medium, allowed radio to °get on with 
its job unfettered and untrammelled by the high profile attention 
devoted to television. (5) 
, 
2.POLITICAL ISSUES I: 
It is suggested that a significant number of political issues 
played a role in the lack of success for the policy under study. 
Although a slow process, legislation from 1976 onwards, whilst 
initially accepting the two channel dichotomy, inexorably ate 
away at the basic concepts and structures,. until by 1982 unified 
controlled was re-established. 
(1) The Political System . 
Pamela Steele (1981) argues that the heart of the issue of 
policy-makiug in broadcasting lies in a yet to be acknowledged 
eternal conflict between the mass m~dia and any Westminster 
"system of cabinet government. Media organisations are caught 
within a model that is incompatible with the rules and 
conventions that govern the behaviour of the mediaos most 
important subject categories - politicians and public servants. 
The major reason for conflict between the mass 
media and cabinet government is that the model 
of cabinet government, based on the principle 
of secrecy, has been superimposed upon a 
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political system based upon the principle of 
freedom and the associa~ed concept of open 
government. It is upon the principle ·of 
freedom that journalists and the mass media 
are functioning within the •• political 
system, placing them in direct conflict with 
the priciples underlying cabinet government. 
(page 1) 
She goes on to argue that the democratic model predate~ 
the Westminster model by sixte~n hundred years. It has a longer 
and hence greater heritage than the Westminster model that began 
evolving from the °distinctive social milieu of Britain.o (page 
3) The Westminster model has been °superimposedo on the 
democratic model. She believes that whilst democracy has stood 
the test of time. the °constitutiona1 framework of cabinet 
government is almost entirely anachronistic and archaico.(Ibid) 
Steele sees the Westminster model departing from the framework of 
the democratic political system in many ways but it is 
demonstrated no more strongly -than in its involvement with the 
mass media. 
Access to, and use of, information is the main arena in 
which the government and the media do battle. The cabinet model, 
supposedly based on the concept of collective responsibility, 
requires information discuss'ed by mini~ters to be confidential. 
.It also requires officials advising ministers to remain anonymous 
and keep their counsel also. 
Whilst the cabinet system of government has been around 
for a long time, the mass media has developed as a significant 
means of communication within the political process only 
recently. Newspapers with limited impact began mass circulation 
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in the nineteenth century, radio and television are not a half-
century old. Yet the rapid growth of the media continues with 
continuous pressure for more stations, greater access and swift 
expansion of services. The imposition of this 'mass media 
technology upon the Westmirister system has been a burden hard to 
bear. It is significant that even today journalists are located 
within Parliament on the basis of privilege, a privilege that 
parliament may withdraw at any time. 
Journalists may act upon the principle of press freedom 
I 
but in New Zealand, as with Britain and some other Commonwealth d I 
countries. there is no legal basis for their position. Indeed, a 
British High Court ruling, widely referred to in the news media 
at the time, ruled that journalists, under British law, have 
never had any absolute right to protect the confidentiality of 
their sources. Granada Television was ordered to name the person 
who leaked to it confidential documents belonging to the British 
Steel Corporation. (5) 
SteeleOs thesis is that as long as the government and the 
\1 
media operate under different sets of principles, rules and 
conventions theY'Hill remain in a permanent state of conflict. If 
_this is so then no broadcasting system is capable of being freed 
from °the omnipresent environment of the political • 0 conSClence 
(Adam, page 10) whilst the cabinet system of government remains 
in New Zealand. And furthermore, the statement of the new 
Chairman of the BeNZ, upon the abolition of the policy under 
study: 
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I seek to create an atmosphere of continuity, 
so that people in authority recognise the same 
sense of purpose as those putting the sound on 
the air. (N.Z.Listen~r, July 3, 1916) 
suggests, using SteeleOs analysis, that either democracy gives 
way to secrecy, or secrecy is given up. Significantly the 
legislative changes made in 1976 were to broadcasting and not to 
the New Zealand constitution! 
Steele was writing in 1981 some months after the 
introduction of a Freedom of Information Act in Australia. She 
saw the Act as making no significant difference to her theory. If 
is too early yet to predict whether a similar Act here will have 
any impact. 
(2) Accountability 
Politicians, who often deal with the same °productO as 
broadcasters, are conscious of the fact that if they handle the 
°productO _unsatisfactorily they are held accountable to the 
electorate every three years. Contrary' to this, broadcasters have 
permanent jobs. The new National Government wanted to restore 
apolitical accountability to broadcastingO 
With its °three million shareholders ° , our 
public broadcasting service depends for its 
near-$60m income on a~out 50 per cent public 
money - from licences - and the rest from 
advertising. With so much public finance 
involved, together with the capital required 
for its burgeoning development programmes and 
its educational, cllltural and entertainment 
responsibilities) the broadcasting service Din 
our view requires ministerial responsibility 
and a greater degree of accountability to 
ParliamentO (Hugh Templeton, interviewed in 
the N.Z.Listener, July 6, 1976) 
With such a policy no broadcasting system, independent of direct 
ministerial control could survive. 
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However there is confusion between accountability and 
responsibility. This is highlighted in the current controversy 
over UNESCOos attempts to establish international standards for 
the mass media. The McBride Report (1979) suggest.s that the tbird 
world is dominated by first world media serV1.ces. These on the 
whole are not understanding of the particular problems of 
developing nations. Whilst not wanting to exert control over 
media reporting the report suggests that media responsibility 
could be exercised °more fairlyO for the journalist is 
accountable to the concepts of °truth and accuracyo. Further, 
Heller (1978) points out the very significan~ ~ifference between 
what 1.S called the °national interestO and what is called the 
°public interesteD This difference can lead to confJict as it did 
most recently during the Falklands War. 
t" 
The GovernmentOs desire 
for the media to °serve the national interestO came into deep 
conflict with the media belief the it was in .Othe public interest 
to be informedo, When Sir Terence Lewin (Chief of Defence Staff) 
was asked whether deceiving the press or deceiving the public 
through the press was reasonable, he replied: 
I do not see it as deceiving the press or the 
public; I see it as deceiving the enemy. What 
I am trying to do is to win. Anything I can do 
to help me win is-fair as ~ar as I am 
concerned, and I would have thought that that 
was what the Government and the public and the 
media would want too. (Harris, 1983, page 94) 
This 1.S contrasted with the American vie1;v: 
The American view of war reporting stems not 
only from the First Amendment guarantee of 
a fair press) but from a simp Ie democratic 
conviction that the taxpayer has a right to 
know how his money is being spent and to 
express his opinion about it. (The 
°Guardianoso correspondent 1.n Washington 
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reported in Harris, 1983, page 92) 
Both the McBride view of accountability and that expressed 
by Harris suggest that the media can be accountable without 
requiring ministerial control. Politicians in New Zealand have 
too narrow a view of accountability and other than accepting 
their OWli capabilities to act responsibly, deny that capability 
in others, particularly within broadcasting. It appears that 
its broadcaster-s the politicians most readily seek to control. 
The press which does a similar job seems tantilisingly out of 
reach. Politicians tend to compensate by verbally attacking press 
journalists they do not favour. If the emphasis on accountability 
in New Zealand lies only within the legislature then, while the 
Westminster model remains, there 1S little scope for the 
development of broader and more flexible concepts of 
accountability. Some form of Ministerial control of broadcasting 
seems inevitable. However, the New Zealand politician seems 
reluctant to be seen to control. New Zealandos intimate society 
allows them therefore to try and influence. This °informalo 
political pressures has been very evident in broadcasting. 
(3) Speaking for the Public Interest 
Jane Morgan suggests that a major .. clash within political 
systems such as ours that mitigate against truely independent 
broadcasting lies within the conflict over who has the °rightO to 
interpret and speak for the public interest. She identifies three 
pOlilerfu 1 groups who claim this right: Public Servants who believe 
their task is to do just that on behalf of their Ministers unto 
Whom they are accountable; Politicians, who believe that th~y 
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are elected to i~terpret and speak for the public, and have to 
face them every election for an accounting" and who, strangely, 
accept the perceived role of the public servant because it is not 
carried out in public, and, on the whole, assists them to more 
ably state their case; and the broadcasters and journalists of 
the mass media. 
Politicians and officials are °temperamentally alike. Both 
lay stress on le'gitimacy and accountability.o (page 60) However 
their authority is derived from different sources, one from 
election and the other from appointment. It is this division and 
yet unity that makes up what Morgan sees as the political and 
bureaucratic conscience. It is these two kinds of person that 
have the authority to make decisions that' affect broadcasting. Is 
it any wonder then that they will unite to keep, at the very 
least, a loose re~n on broadcasters? In New Zealand this process 
has a double implication for broadcasting for many years was 
controlled directly by public servants, and more recently, those 
same public servants under the guise of a corporation. Using this 
analysis), the 1972 policy was, for New Zealand, a rare attempt to 
allow broadcasters to °freely interpret and speak o for the 
public. 
(4) Leadership 
Gregory (1974) argued that the new structures would fail 
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on leadership counts. He saw the fragmentation of responsibility 
as weakening the total broadcasting organisation particularly in 
relations with its political masters. He called the restructuring 
irrelevant at best and irresponsible at worst: 
It is irrelevant because the problems that the 
government professed to be concerned about are 
likely to remain within the ne"7 framework 
unless the right type of leadership is able to 
establish itself; and it is irresponsible 
because the restructuring itself makes it less 
likely such leadership will emerge.(page 73) 
The leadership problems that he saw existing in the 
previous NZBC and remaining in the new structures were: (a)it 
allowed production of programmes to be overburdened by 
bureaucracy because the leadership failed to create sound 
professional and administrational relationships between 
executives and programme production staff; (b) it allowed non-
commercial radio to become bland and lacking in vigour; (c) it 
neglected to have clearly defined organisational objectives; and 
d) it failed to grasp the difference bet,,;een formal statutory 
powers and the many informal powers that it could have created. 
He saw none of these .problems being solved by the new 
structure because fragmentation of leadership would weaken even 
.' 
further the chances of stropg leadership emerging, thus 
incteasing the reluctance to take informal power to itself. The 
need to engage in commercial competitiveness would continue to 
make non-commercial broadcasting bland and lacking style New 
Zealand was too small to allow the deep-ro~ted institutionalism, 
so necessary if an organisation is to °believe in itselfo, to 
grow in 'four separate bodies when such a concept had great 
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difficulty flowering in a much larg~r organisation. °The identity 
of the local grocer becomes more tenuous in relation to the 
number of grocers in the same street.o (Page 75) Prophetically, 
Gregory foresaw the reuniting of the broadcasting structures as 
inevitable; he only misjudged the time - it happened sooner than 
he thought. 
(5) The Time Factor 
One of the many questions raised about the events under 
discussion surrounds the inordinate delay between the legislation 
coming into force on December 12, 1973 and the actual 
establishment of the Broadcasting Council of Nev7 Zealand some 
twenty-one months later. At the time the Minister of Broadcasting 
announced the new policy he said: 
We aim to have the second channel established 
about October 1974. To enable us to do this it 
will be necessary for-us to call tenders for 
various equipment at an early date. 
(N.Z.Listener, March 23, 1973) 
Yet it was not until six months later, September 21, 1973 
that the Minister tabled in the House of Representatives the 
following instruction to the Director General of the NZBC: 
In accordance with Government policy to 
establish a nati"onwide second television 
channel in New Zealand as expeditiously as 
possible, I direct you, in terms of section 11 
of the Broadcasting Corporation Act of 1961, 
to proceed with the preparation of the 
necessary 
financial 
provision 
aerials 
microwave 
necessary. 
s'.lbmissions to Government seeking 
approval to call tenders for the 
of transmitters and transmitting 
for the second channel and such 
networking facilities as are 
It was well known that such equipment had to be specially 
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made and that it would take around eighteen months for the whole 
process from tender to operation to take place. Early in the year 
(February 1973) the Minister received a formal request for 
approval to purchase equipment to upgrade existing television 
facilities. The Director-General, in the request, pointed out the 
long delays that the process would be subject to. 
The Minister was aware of the necessity to have the second 
channel operational and the new structures well in place during 
his first term of office to prevent it becoming too much of an 
election issue in 1975. Furthermore the Adam Commitee was aware 
of this urgency. -As previously mentioneD-the Chairman of that 
Committee wrote to the Minister urging all speed. Why did the 
Minister not issue the Directive earlier? Why did the NZBC not 
take upon itself to seek the initiative? 
The writer was not able.to obtain satisfactory answers to 
these questions. It is clear, however, that the late start to the 
new regime did contribute to the GovernmentOs difficulties in the 
1975 general elections. The structures had no time to settle 
down, to prove themselves, to cope with the controversies that 
inevitably arose, before the issue became an election one. 
It is clear, furthermore, that the NZBC executive would 
not have been particularly helpful in urging on the GovernmentOs 
policies to success. Did unecessary delays occur within the 
Corporation? 
With these delays, why did the }linister not hold off 
implementing the legislation until it could be put into practice? 
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These are questions that still need answering. Meanwhile 
it is suggested that the policy was perhaps too large, too 
radical, and perhaps too important to be accomodated within the 
short three-year life of a New Zealand Parliament. Particularly 
for a one-term government - something uncommon in recent New 
Zealand history 
3. FINANCIAL ISSUES 
Independence, in the final analysis, is finance. 
Independence in broadcasting is not just the freedom to film, 
edit and screen the news and current affairs of your own choice, 
to select programmes for broadcast within the frameworks and 
policies selected by you, to choose who shall speak on your behalf 
and when. Lasting independence for broadcasting comes when there 
is a conscious abstention by government from the exercise of its· 
legislative prerogative, when the broadcasting body is placed on 
a firm financial footing and when all matters of finance, both 
capital and cash flow, are the sole responsibility of the 
broadcasting booy. As long as the bropdcasting bodies have to 
-apply to the government for approval on capital expenditure, and 
as long as the government, and the people of New Zealand, refuse 
to accept that for three million people to have a fully 
independent broadcasting system offering variety and choice. they 
will have to pay for it; in other words public broadcasting 
standards cannot be maintained by commercial revenue alone; .then 
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broadcasting will not be, indeed,' cannot be' independent. The 
abolition of the post of Minister of Broadcasting was not enough. 
The Adam Report, whilst acknowledging that cost for the 
broadcasting system would increase and that the licence might go 
up, did not fully expound the financial dilemma that faced 
broadcasting in New Zealand. The country wanted, perhaps had, a 
broadcasting system equivalent to Britain and other countries 
qith considerable large populations but was not prepared for the 
costs this would incur. Overspending by New Zealand governments 
is a favourite target for the mass media. It is no wonder that 
the press picked up'on this, issue very early and that it was used 
very effectively by the opposition during the 1975 
campaign. (Levine , 1980, page 27) 
'Perhaps as long as New Zealand wants a broadcasting system 
that it is either unable or unwilling to pay for the country 
will need to keep broadcasting under some form of government 
financial control. 
4. INCREMENTALISM AGAIN 
'None of New Zealandos attempts to organise 
broadcasting have seriously faced up to the 
need to guarantee the autonomy of 
broadcasting; instead they have concentrated 
on problems of profitability, administration, 
and accountability. Policy making in 
broadcasting, as in most other policy areas, 
has been incremental; it has lurched from one 
financial crisis to another, and from one 
election campaign to the next. (Cleveland, 
1980, page 184) 
Lying within this historical °habit O of incremental policy 
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making 1S perhaps a major reason for the failure of the policy 
under study. 
Historically, policy 1n New Zealand has been made 1n 
Lindblomos (1968) °give and takeo arena. Decisions are made 
Yiithin frameworks limited by time, by the intelligence of the 
decision-makers; by uncertainties, and lack of resources. New 
Zealand politicians both praise and have been praised ·for their 
practical nature. On the whole New Zealand decision makers make 
short, limited yield, practicable and acceptable decisions. Our 
policy-makers muddle through •. 
The reasons for this could be many: the historically canny 
and cautious people that made up the countryOs p10neer stock, the 
paternalism bred by New Zealandos colonial heritage which leaves 
difficult decisions to the °MotQer CountryO, the egalitarian 
nature of the society which breeds an inbuilt °rightO for 
everyone to °have a sayo, the small popu lation v!hich, at one and 
the same time, makes politicians' more accessable and more 
vunerable, the short political cycle, the limited horizons of the 
average New Zealander. 
the New Zealand dream has never been, for the 
majority of its inhabitants, the hope of 
making it big, going west or even rising up 
the class ladder. Essentially materialist, 
gentle, unambitious, it fixed upon a modest 
home on a separate plot of land, a protected 
job 1n both senses of limited competition and 
assured employment, free education for 
children) and a mild boom to make it possible 
for the restless to achieve spatial if not 
social mobility (Levine, 1980, page 11) 
Thus the Ne,y Zealand decision-maker is encouraged to search for 
the acceptable rather than the optimal solution. 
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the acceptable rather than the optimal solution. 
Policies which are discontinuous, radical or unpopular 
tend to be avoided by policy-makers and are only encountered at 
times of crises or great public dissatisfaction. The 1935 Labour 
government was able to push through extremely radical social 
policies because of the depression and the resultant hardships 
that prepared the population for change.(7) Likewise the Liberal 
government, prior to the turn of the century, was able to build 
on the collapse of provincial government and the need to push 
through communication networks that would mould the nation.(8) 
Otherwise, except -for times of war, policies that espoused 
radical or discontinuous change were not popular or successful. 
Successful politicians avoided them. 
On occasion, when such radical change has been resorted to 
it has usually been the result of pressure from the group 
affected to bring about the change and such change has had 
limited effect outside the boundaries of the group concerned.(9) 
The broadcasting changes, which were radical and. 
discontinuous, were not in response to such pressure. Nor was it 
a time of national crisis. Every .- change in broadcasting 
legislation since 1936, and there had been many, were incremental 
in nature, building upon the organisation that already existed 
and tampering with the structures. As mentioned previously, even 
the· change from government department to corporation in 1962 was 
more a change in garb than a new body. 
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There was no public demand 'for such radical change. The 
public, if it voiced its feelings at all, related its wants more 
to second channel coverage and improved first channel coverage. 
There was therefore, no substantial support for the policy to 
counter opposition. And opposition came from two highly 
articulated and interested pressure groups - the newspaper lobby, 
which had deep motives of its own for not wanting the change, and 
the National Party opposition. 
It is significant that three major and discontinuous 
policies introduced by the third Labour government suffered 
similar fates, they were either substantially modified or 
reversed. These were the broadcasting policy under study, the 
Local Body Reform Bill, and the New Zealand Superannuation 
Scheme. 
Perhaps this analysis presents a major problem for 
governments of reform and change elected to power other than at 
times of national crisis. Certainly the two Labour Party 
governments that have been elected to power as a result of normal 
preference for change have not survived re-election. The New 
Zealand voter has shown loyalty over m?ny years to a party that 
-if it has not the slogan °incrementalismO written in its 
manifesto cetainlyhas the phrase °steady does it. o 
5. SUl1NARY 
The Political Systems model allows for an explanation of 
the policy process but does little to highlight reasons for a 
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polityOs failure, unless that failure lies in some crucial 
process in the policy formation that was omitted or grossly 
distorted. Th~ previous chapter demonstrates that this was not 
the case for this study. Further, the model does little to take 
into account the peculiarities of the New Zealand environment, 
the system of inputs so vital to the conversion process. 
This chapter has highlighted a number of possible reasons 
for the failure of the policy. It is the writers belief that they 
all could be said to °play a parte in the outcome. Within purely 
media issues the concept of Guided Competition failed. It failed 
because the Adam Commitee was unable to clearly define Jt and the 
two television channels who were left with the task were too 
locked into the survival game to give sufficient attention to it. 
Political issues include, Pamela SteeleOs hypothesis that 
conflict is ineVitable; the concept of accountability which 
leaves politicians either having to face up to broader meanings 
of the concept or confining it within the narrow boundaries of 
°ministerial responsibilityO; and the time factor, which is 
always crucial in political decision making and which is extra 
crucial when the political system has ,such a short term life as 
-in New Zealand. The costs of. policies and the costs of their 
implementation have to be ,,,ithin acceptable public parameters. If 
not costs can qcickly become part of the input process which 
forces a modification of the conversion process and in EastonOs 
model a consequent modification of the po~icy. Finally it is 
suggested that the policy under study was incongruent with the 
132 
r 
broad history and tradition of incrementalism within New Zealand 
.. 
policy-making. This places an inordinate strain upon both the 
policy and the policy-makers and impairs the pOlicyOs progress. 
5~. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A study of this size and scope can only raise issues and make 
tentative suggestions. Broadcasting policy in New Zealand 
requires substantial academic research. The period immediately 
following the one under study continues the unseemly volume of 
legislation on broadcasting matters with legislation making 
incremental adjustments to broadcasting occurring in every year 
until 1982. 
Major changes have occurred in the broadcasting structure of most 
western nations during the last ten years. (Smith, 1978) and in 
New Zealand the changes have been both severe and frequent. Why 
is br6adcasting such an attractirin for the legislators? Why 
cannot New Zealand follow the lead. of most other nations and give 
broadcasting a substantial period without interference to develop 
its own philosphy of broadcasting? At least the BBC, often held 
up as the ultimate model of"broadcasti?g standards, is given 10 
_years between each charter review. These and many of the other 
question raised in this paper are worthy of study within the 
context of broadcasting in New Zealand. 
Most significantly h01,>7ever, it is the \.,rriters view that there is 
scope for the examination of policy development and application 
within the New Zealand context. Such a study could focus on the 
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problems of introducing, successful}y, radical or discontinuous 
public policy within this country. 
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NOTES 
CHAPTER I 
(1) Letter dated February 1, 1973 and marked "URGENT'! 
(2) e.g. DAY, P.A., A Content Analysis in New Zealand Television 
Fiction in Regards to Audience Effects, University of Canterbury 
(1971). VINTINER, R., Commercial Television in New Zealand, 
University of Canterbury, (1976). A substantial Thesis, GREGORY, 
R.J., The Politics of Broadcasting in New Zealand, Victoria 
University of Wellington, was not obtained by the writer. 
(3) Interview, August 11, 1983 
(4) See SMITH, A (1977, 1979, 1980) & HELLER, C. (1978) 
CHAPTER V 
(1) Four Government }£p°s confirmed this was so. Nr M. Moore does 
not recall the matter even being announced in caucus before the 
general announcement. 
(2) Interview with Hon R.O. Douglas 
(3) A 13 page document which. relates the new policy to what was 
announced in the manifesto and endeavours to reconcile the two. 
_However, even this paper differs markedly from the subsequent 
announcement. For example, each of the corporations, it is 
suggested in the cabinet paper should be located in a different 
centre, and the names used for the t .. 70 television channels were 
rspectively ~'Domill.ion Television" and "The New Zealand 
Television Corporation". 
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(4) Newspaper reports confirm their shock. Future behaviour as 
recounted later, suggests lack of cooperation and perhaps 
obstructionism. 
(5) See New Zealand Listener, March 27, 1973 
(6) Recorded in notes of a Preliminary Discussion between the 
CommitteeOs secretary and senior NZBC Executives. 
(7) Notes of MinisterOs answers to questioni at NZBC Board 
Meeting March 8, 1973 
(8) Comment recorded at interview 
(9) There is considerable corespondence between the Minister and 
Foreign Affairs on the matter. Names prefered included: Hugh 
Greene, Richard Attenborough, John Freeman, Waldo Mcquire, Fred 
Friendly, Geofrey Cox, Stuart Hood. and Loid Hill. 
(10) The writer believes, but cant confirm, that differences 
occured over what Adam saw as- "elitist~ policies pursued by 
BBC2. 
(11) Interview with Douglas 
(12) Staff group submissions to Committee on Broadcasting 
(13) Interview with Douglas 
(14) Notes on Discussion between the Committee and National Party 
MPs ~ Marshall, Adam-Schneider, Walker, held on June 6, 1873 
(15) See (14) 
(16) Notes prepared for discussion with the Committee on 
Broadcasting 
(17) Source to remain confidential 
(18) The question raised is one of "balance of power". If the 
three Director- Generals should combine against the two appointed 
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members they would out-vote them: However, with three appointed 
members the casting vote of the Chairma~ would favour the. 
appointed members 
(19) This source was acknowledged by the Committee 
(20) See Appendix F 
(21) Letter to Douglas from Adam dated July 11, 1973 
(22) Hon H.J Walker in interview said that he was "quietly 
convinced" that the NZBC would get the second channel at the 
Authority hearing. Earlier, the National Government caucus had 
been favouably disposed to a private enterprise second channel. 
It is believed that the combined approach of the °big fiveo 
companies to run the second channel made the caucus realise that 
the NZBC relied on those very same five ·companies for a large 
percentage of its revenue from advertising. Support for the NZBC 
was quickly re-established. 
(23) Letter to Douglas dated April 27, 1973 
(24) Press Association report, Christchurch Press, June 7, 1974 
(25) Intervie\vw wi th Douglas 
CHAPTER VI 
(1) The writer can confirm this also, being a candidate during· 
that e1elction 
(2) This was heaviest when a consortium of five large companies, 
Kerridge-Odeon, Fletchers, Watties, NZ Forest Products and Wright 
Stephenson, applied for a warrant. Walker recalled: "They were so 
confident they even supplied me with press releases that they 
wished me to make under my own name!" 
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(3) As recounted by Walker in interview 
(4) Mr M. Moore, 1n interview 
(5) A casual study of speeches made by both broadcasters and 
politicians confirms this. e.g. Douglas 1n a speech to the 
Advertising Institute of New Zealand on April 24, 1974 said that 
" ••••• broadcasting brought to mind the interaction of old Greek 
City-States, but this time the broadcaster has in his hands a 
huge unseen audience who can ••• feel their involvement ••••• " 
(6) A detailed coverage of many of these complaints appeared 1n 
the New Zealand Listener, April 4, 1974 
(7) e.g. Nga Tamatoa, CitizensO Association 'for Racial Equality 
(8) Interview with Walker 
(9) Confindential source 
(10) Comments in interview with both Douglas and Walker 
CHAPTER VII 
(1) See Letter l.n NZ Listener, March 13, 1976 from R.G. Collins, 
Chairinan. of TVI 
(2) See EdwardsJ, (1971) 
(3) Interview with Douglas 
(4) i.e. GROOMBRIDGE,B. Television and the People, Penguin, 
London, 1972 & LENGRAND, R. Lifelong Learning, UNESCO, Paris, 
(5) Interview with Geofrey Whitehead, Director-General Radio New 
Zealand. November, 1983 
(6) As reported in STEELE, (1981) 
(7) See SUTCH, W.E. Poverty & Progress in New Zealand, Reed, 
1969 
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(8) See SINCLAIR, K. A Short History of New Zealand, Penguin, 
1965 
(9) For example the recent decision to centralise all meat 
marketing overseas in the hands of the Meat Board 
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T APPENDIX A 
Broad casting' 
II LABOUR favours the present principle of public ownership of the facilities of Broadcasting and Television. The main object of 
that policy is to provide the best, most independent, and enter-
prising television and radio' that can be provided. A further 
objective will be to provide the highest possible New Zealand 
content in both broadcast programmes and capital equipment. 
rOLleY DETAILS 
J. Corporation control of the facilities of both 
radio and television is considered in the best 
public interest and will be supported without 
. infringing the freedom of existing licence-
holders. 
2, The N.Z.B.C. will provide a nationwide radio 
and television coverage of both a commercial 
and non-commercial character. Its responsi-
bility will include the preparation of pro-
grammes on education, the arts, consumer 
interests, sports, public affairs, and news, in 
addition to general programme material. 
3, The establishment of the second television 
channel will proceed with expedition. This 
channel will have a colour capability. 
4. Responsibility for the provision of all tech-
nical facilities for television in New Zealand 
will rest with the N.Z.B.C. but regional coun-
cils will be given a measure of local control. 
These councils will be charged with providing 
adequate local content and with determining 
leasing arrangements for a designated view-
. ing period. Such arrangements will involve 
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some competitive tendering for both pro-
gramme and advertising time. 
5. The N.Z.B.C. will be required to ensure that 
the sound broadcasting system. makes ade-
quate provision for programmes of popular 
interest to young people. The regional 
councils will be similarly charged in the field 
of television. 
6. A television education system with the widest 
possible application will be instituted. Em-
phasis will be placed on training in television 
techniques so that advantage can be taken 
of the latest overseas development in educa-
tional television. The concept of a "University 
of the Air" will be promoted. 
7. The Broadcasting Authority will be restruc-
tured and charged with the independent 
oversight of programme standards. It will 
also form an appeal authority empowered to 
receive and act on complaints lodged by the 
public. 
8. Within technical limitations, complete Tv 
coverage of the country will be given a high 
priority. 
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APPENDIX B 
(a) The natufe of media effects 
'(i) Media may be a necessary and sufficient cause of a political 
effect; a necessary but not a sufficient cause; a sufficient but not a 
necessary cause; and the catalyst or occasion of a political effect. 
(ij) All political effects are initially upon individuals. They consist 
in increments of information, which mayor may not modify attitudes 
which mayor may not modify behaviour. 
(iii) Political efrects n1ay be primary (i.e. on an individual directly 
concerned in a communication process) or secondary (i,e. upon 
individ uals not directly concerned in that process). 
(b) The prodllctioll of effects 
Media effects so defined may be produced by: 
(i) One or more elements of a particular communication process: 
i.e. sender, message, medium, receiver; 
(ii) the communication context: i.e. the timing (and s~quence) of 
that communication; its frequency (strictly, its similarity to previous 
communications); its intensity (in relation to other, possibly com-
peting, communications). 
(c) The political cOlllext of effects 
(i) Effects of a communication procc,ss may vary according to the 
level of political relationships considered. These relationships may 
be between individuals, institutions (or groups) and the political 
system, in a variety of possible combinations. 
(ii) The significance of media-ind uced effects on those relation-
ships will depend upon the virtually endless range ofpoliticaI questions 
in which an inquirer may be interested. 
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APPENDIX C 
GENERAL INTERVIElv GUIDE 
The elite interviewing approach does not require that a 
specific set of questions be asked of each respondent (as in a 
structured interview.) Nevertheless, an interview guide is 
necessary to direct attention to the major areas of enquiry. 
The interview guide presented below also relates to the 
issue statements outlined on page 3. 
(l)Genisis of·the Concept: 
- is it possible to identify the origin of the concept? 
of the policy 
- why did the broadcasting changes become an issue? 
(2) Identification of key influentials/groups: 
what individuals and g~oups were involved in the 
development of the policy? 
who initiated discussion on the idea and why? 
who supported the idea? 
who opposed the idea and why? . 
which groups had influence? 
- what were the bases of the groupOs interest? 
(3) Development of policy: 
what procedures were followed in the. development of 
the policy? Specifically, what role was played in the formation 
of the policy by the. Committee on Broadcasti~g? 
- what were the critical incidents or events in the 
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development of the policy? 
(4) Awareness of political influence: 
- what was the political climate surrounding the 
developement of the policy? 
(5) Awareness of media issues: 
- what perceptions were held as to the role of the 
media, particularly broadcasting? 
INTERVIEWS 
The Following people were interviewed: 
Hon. R.O. Douglas, MP and former Minister of 
Broadcasting for the period of the study. 
Hon. H.J. Walker, former Minister of Broadcasting and 
Opposition spokesman on ~roadcasting for the study 
period. 
Mr M. Moore, MP 
~ 
Mr Alan Martin, Director General. Television New 
Zealand 
Mr Geofrey Whitehead, former Director General of Radio 
New Zealand 
Mr Des Monaghan. Head of Programmes', Television New 
Zealand. 
Mr B. Parkinn. Head of programme purchasing, Television 
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New Zealand 
Mr John Craig, Programme Supply Manager, Radio New 
Zealand 
Mr Brian Jamieson, Chief Assistant to the Director-
General, Television New Zealand. 
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APPENDIX D 
E.\t,I~::'~_l .i~~)~ N.~. GlI::,('II<'. 5 April; 1973, No. 29, page 687 
,I p{Juin1IllclI,' {If CUl11mitte£! 10 Advise the Millisler of 
Broadcasting 
. Ill:., cxerci:ic of authority given to him by Cabinet 
:In'. ~-J\ll"suant to the Go\'ernment's policy of creating a new 
!'I~.':,t'2rl': of control and operation of broadcasting (including 
l.: '~\ i,ion) in New ZeaJand under publicly owned but 
~()il1Peliti\e ch;tnncls, the Minister of Broadca'iting hereby 
;\ p!,oi nts 
J>rof~::.~ur Kenneth Adam, cn.E., of Lcndon; 
pii.)r~S~l)J~ Robert McDonald Chapman, of Auckland; 
Dr .I ohl1 Lochiel Robson, c.n.E., of Wellington; ?nd 
D,H'\)lhca Frances Turner, of Wellington 
!." 1 .... ; :t C,)mmitlec, of which Kenneth Adam shall be Chair-
r:1 !Ii, I;) ~Id\ i"l! the M iniskr upon the said policy. 
~. j he Committee ~hall consider and report to the M inisler 
;If)(;,·. lhl: I1lJnncr in which the said policy should be carried 
,L;, .:Ih.:c:, in::luuing the principles on which the publicly 
:)\', lied ~y:\tl'l11 :-.hould oreru!e and the \rays in which compe-
l;!; ):1 !-.>':[\\Cl:Tl L'hanTlcl" can be encourageli, the co-ordination 
C'! ih: ti...:.11!1ic.tl liH:iljlic,~ of all channels, the administrati\e' 
,I r:'n~'L'jj)Li'lh i.nd olher felt.: \ dill matters, including any specific 
11!·":'.:i'~ [hi,t n~:ly frul1l time 10 time be r~fi:rred to it by the 
\ 1 i; ,i:JL r 
~. F.>r II-.~ purpo:-.cs afoll!'i:Jid, the Committee is authori~eJ 
ill:l ~'I"'P')\\ ~l',-'d 10 m:il-;...! any inquiry or investigation it may 
\' ."11 in \\h:lll:\ ef' manner it chooses, 
4. rha.: COJl1milk:.: IS directed to prepare a White Paper 
;,.;u ll) pr.:p:nc 'oJr h~t\ c rrcpared a draf!. of the legislation that 
\\il1 he r,eCl'-.sary td gi\.: effect to the policy as presented ih' 
\h~! \VlJile Paper. Clnd further to prepare and set out a 
i.:.:..;li1cJ ~.Lhem~ of the practical steps necessary to set up the 
;",~!chin~ry In carry out the policy and ensure a smooth 
ir:lrl~'J-L'reni..'l: of the functions and operations of the present 
:! 1Ilhorities to those to be constituted under the new legislation, 
S, Thl! Committee is directed to report to the Minister not 
I:,it:;, than 31 July 1973, or such later date as the Minister 
m:!y SPecify hy notice in writing [0 the Chairman, and in the 
:iw',ntime n\)~ to rublish or otherwise ·disclose the contents 
nj' pmj1nl'i of its reroil or any information obtained by it 
ddi'ing its deliL~ratiol1s. . 
D,ll~d at \V~lIinglon this 30th day of March 1973. 
R. O. DOUGLAS, Minister of Broadcasting, 
;\. R, Sm:.\hLJ:, Gm l']'Jlllll'1l1 Printer, "'t'lling-tull, Ncw Zealand. 
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APPENDIX E 
CHECKLIST FOR COMtllITTEE ON BROADCASTING 
ON PRINCIPLE 
AI What should be t,he main aims of broadcasting in Ne\'l 
Zealand? 
A2 How best can New Zealand broadcasting include the 
principles of competitive enterprise within a system 
of public ownership? 
A3 The s'i,ze, scope and composition of the boards of the 
operating corporatidns. 
A4 The structure and scope of the central organisation 
concerned with the supervision of broadcasting stan-
dards and the provision of common services. 
(a) The size, scope and composition of the board. 
(b) Should the working corporations provide one 
director each for this board? Should the private 
operators be represented? 
(c) What common services should be provided? 
(d) How should the existing p~ivate warrant holders 
be regulated? 
(e) What provision ,should be made for future non-
commercial private Harrant holders? 
A5 What should be the relati,onship of the new boards to 
the Government? Specifically, should there be a 
Minister of Broadcasting once the new structure is 
in running order? 
A6 Who should control The Listener, how should this be 
done, and should it be represented on the central 
board? 
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A7 
A8 
A9 
ON PROGRAMMES 
BI 
The pla'ce and financing of the present NZBC 
Symphony Orchestra, and ·the relationship of broad-
casting in general to the arts. 
The place of educational television in this structure. 
How is it to be paid for? Who is to design the 
programmes? Who is to make them? How and Vlhen 
are they to be transmitted? 
Should ·the provisions of the Copyright Act 1962 
apply to the programmes of any of the Corporatio~s, 
or should their rights be enlarged or restricted? 
How can the New 'Zealand conte~t of program~es be 
encouraged, and how far should this be done? 
B2 How·a substantial measure of complementary pro-
gran@ing is to be secured? 
B3 
B4 
M1at steps should be taken to avoid needless 
duplication in the coverage of news while still 
guaranteeing freedom in nev-lS presentation. 
specifically:-
(a) How programmes or programme opportunities 
such as major sporting events can be compe-
titively bid for, allocated or shared between 
the television corporations. 
(b) Whether th~ provision of a news service should 
be the responsibility' of the radio corporation 
or central body. 
(c) In either circumstance, what should be the 
relationship of any New Zealand-wide news 
service to television news or current affairs 
programming. 
(a) The constitution, staffing dissemination and 
limits of the news service, including the 
sporting news service. 
eb) The desirability of establishing some form of 
overseas representation for news purposes. 
i' 
B5 What policy should apply for the purchase of 
overseas television programmes to enable New 
Zealanders to see the best of these programmes 
without unnecessary increases in costs? 
B6 How should programmes desired by both corpo~­
ations be allocated between them? 
B7 How to achieve the best balance between local 
origination of radio programmes, regional net-
working, four-centre networking, and New Zealand-
wide networking. 
ON PEOPLE 
CI How the status, promotion, and salary structure 
should be determined for the different corporations. 
C2 How best to protect the interests of present NZBC 
staff during the change~over, particularly in such 
matters as salary and superannuation. 
TECHNICAL SERVICES 
DI How best to provide technical facilities for both 
radio and television services, having in mind the 
need to conserve the resources of technical skills, 
equipment and sta~ion facilities. This also applies 
to linking requirements as mic'rmvave stations have 
been established by both the Post Office and NZBC 
and these resources should not be duplicated 
unnecessarily. The shared use of these stations 
when established should also be taken into account. 
( . 
D2 Examine and advise on -
(a) The most appropriate organisation to prescribe 
technical standards; 
(b) The extent to which the television and sound 
radio broadcasting corporations should separately 
provide technical facilities for their own use; 
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(c) The extent to which they should rely on 
facilities provided by some other organ-
isation; 
(d) What organisation, either existing or to be 
set up, would be most suitable for providing 
technical facilities for the broadcasting 
corporatio!)s. 
In consid~ring D2, the following matters should 
be taken into account: 
(a) The need for adequate integration of technical 
with other aspects to secure desired standards 
in overall performance; 
(b) The need for efficiency and economy in the 
provision of technical facilities; 
(c) Personnel aspects. 
ADMINISTRATION 
EI M1ether the committee should lay down structural 
guidelines for the new corporations and, if so, 
what those guidelines should be. 
E2 
E3 
E4 
E5 
The names of the new corporations. 
In what form the corporations should report to 
Parliament. 
Whether there should be a Broadcasting Council 
in New Zealand and', if so, what its constitution 
and powers should be. 
How the regional programme advisory bodies should 
be selected and related to the radio and television 
corporations? 
REGIONAL 3ALANCE 
FI How best to establish effective liaison between the 
corporations so that needless duplication in premis8s 
and staffing is avoided. 
F2 Where the radio co~)oration should have its head-
quarters. 
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F3 
FINANCES 
GI 
What should be the inter-relationship between the 
four bodies in respect to forward programme planning, 
research in New Zealand and elsewhere, joint meetings 
and j oint membership, comrnon standards and common 
services? 
The relationship of regional and New Zealand-\:"ide 
programming. 
How the control and ownership of the NZBC's existing 
assets should be re~llocated, including Avalon, 
under the new broadcasting system. 
G2 How licence fee revenue should be split between the 
three operating corporations and the central body_ 
G3 How rates for central services should be fixed. 
G4 How charges for the news'service should be fixed. 
G5 The determination and distribution of advertising 
opportunities between the two television channels. 
G6 
. CHANGEOVER 
Setting standards for and controlling advertising 
on public and private radio and on televisiori . 
HI What steps should be taken to hasten the changeover 
to the new system with the least possible disruption 
and specifically: 
(a) How staff should be reallocated to achieve 
the dual aim of promotion on merit whilst 
safeguarding the rights of current NZBC staff 
to continued employment. 
(b) ~lO should be in charge of this reorganisation. 
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APPENDIX F 
BROADCASTING BILL, AS RE~ORTED FROM THE 
BROADCASTING BILL COMMITTEE 
CHANGES FROM INTRODUCTORY. BILL 
Clause 40 Terms of office of members of Council 
Changed to 'anyone or more of the first appointed members 
of the Council may be appointed for any term less than 3 years". 
Gives Minister more flexibility with his first appointments. 
Clause 10. Remuneration and expenses of members of Council and 
Committees 
L 
New subsection (3) changing source of remuneration from 
"out of the funds of the Council" to "Consolidated Revenue 
Account~ thus putting an item on the Estimates, thereby 
allowing a debate in the House. 
Clause 11. General functions of Council 
(1) (c) 
Clause changed to allow more flexibility in the Television 
Corporations' use of the news made available to them by the 
Council. "to gather news and make it available to TV-l and 
TV-2 for their use in the planning, production and presentation 
of news bulletins and related programmes, and for that purpose 
to receive news gathered by Radio New Zealand." (Suggested in 
submission by Messrs George Andrews and David Beatson g current 
affairs contract employees of NZBC). 
(1) (cc) 
New clause making it a function of the Council lito establish., 
extend and improve New Zealand sources of news in other countries", 
i.e. allowing for New Zealand news representatives overseas. 
(Suggested in submission by Messrs George Andrews and David 
Beatson) • 
1.1) (j) 
Addition of word public, thus limtting the Council's 
responsibility for representation of New Zealand's broadcasting 
interests at conferences, etc. to representation of the public 
corporations. This enables private broadcasting interests to 
represent themselves, if they so wish. (Suggested in submission 
by Federation of Independent Commercial Broadcasters). 
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(1) (jj) 
New clause making it a f~nction of the council to 
establish a procedure for adjudicating upon any complaint 
from any person who believes himself to have been treated 
unjustly or unfairly in any programme broadcast. 
Clause 12. Symphony Orchestra 
New clause stating that the Council shall organise 
and present concerts to be given by the Orchestra for the 
general public •••• ~ and make the services of the orchestra, 
or any section of it, available ••••• 
(Submission from Association of Ballet and Opera 
Trust Boards). 
"Consultation with the State Services Commission", 
with regard to terms and conditions (salaries D allowances 
or otherwise) deleted in view of Orchestra's type of casual 
employment". 
ill 
Clause rewritten to avoid confusion over delegation. 
Clause 13. General powers of Council 
(2) (c) 
(2) (k) 
Clause widened to enable programme research. 
(Submission from Churches· Education Commission). 
Clause extended to cover negotiations with organisations 
representing contract emprbyees. 
(Submissions from Actors Equi ty, N. Z. l-1usicians Union 
and Public Service Association). 
~( 2) (l) 
Clause widened to allow Council to undertake training. 
2 (11) 
New clause glvlng Council power to combine with any 
organisation to promote and undertake training for persons 
engaged in or intending to engage in the arts or educational 
or other activities with which broadcasting is concerned. 
(Submission from Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council). 
ill Council given permissive power to make-results of audience 
surveys available to other persons (Submission from Mr R.Kerridge) . 
__ dlllll'!b-' 159 . 
Clause 14. Council may make rules 
This clause made mandatory. 
Clause 16. Use of Council's property for purposes of 
Corporations 
Clause rewritten.. Council given permissive power to 
make arrangements for its property to be used by any of the 
Corporations or by any person, or body of persons with whom 
any of the Corporations has arranged for the supply of 
programmes. 
(Submission from Pacific Film Productions). See also 
new clause SIB 
Clause 21. Levy 
(1) Drafting alteration. 
Clause 27. Accounts 
Alteration requested by Audit, Department. 
Clause 30. Officers and Employees of Council 
(2) Struck out - accepted suggestion by PeS.A. that this 
and also Clause 54 (5) are unnecessary. This provision usually 
covered by insurance. 
(3) Drafting alteration - conforms new with other clauses 
which refer to salary scales. 
New Clause 30A. Delegation of powers of Council 
Suggested by NZBC Engineering Association, who also 
wanted the Council to have the same powers as given to the 
Corporation in Clauses 53 and 55. 
This clause could allow, for ex~mple, delegation of 
the publication of the N.Z. Listener direct to the Editor, 
rather than through the Secretary of the Council. 
New Clause 41A" General functions of CO_lJ2orations 
This clause answers to some extent those submissions 
which wanted' inclusion of lithe public int,erest ll in the 
functions and powers of the Corpo~ations and Council. 
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Clause 44. Deputy Chairmen of C'orporations 
(2) Rewording to enable Deputy Chairman to resign. 
Clause 47. Meeting of Corporations 
Wording made more clear. 
Clause 50 
New sUbsection 3 providing for money payable under 
this section to ,be paid from the Consolidated Revenue 
Account, not from the funds of the Corporation as orig-
inally provided in Subsection 2. This enables an item 
to be placed on the Estimates. 
Clause 51. Powers of Corporations 
(2) (g) Original clause struck out and new clause added 
making audience research surveys carried out by 
the Corporations an extension to those,carried 
out by the Council. The Corporations will not be 
able to compete with the Council with respect to 
audience research. 
(2) (i) Addition after the word lIor" in line 38, of the 
words "educational or". 
(2) (j) Addition after the word "and ll in line 448 of the 
words lIeducational and". 
Both widened after submissions to the Select 
Committee. 
New Clause 51A Use of Radio New Zealand's facilities for 
broadcasts, by certain organisations 
a 
Allows R~dio New Zealand to·lease or hire ltS studios, 
facilities and equipment to any organisation desiring to en-
gage in non-commercial radio broadcasts relating to education, 
religion or the arts. Every such contract or arrangement must 
be made with the consent in each case of the Council. 
~ew Clause SIB. Qse of Corp£E~tion'sjQropertz 
New clause giving the Corporations permissive power 
to make with any person such contracts or arrangements as it 
thinks fit for that person to have the possession or use, 
for any purpose which in its opinion will contribute to the 
purposes of broadcasting. 
(Submission from Pacific Film Productions). See 
also Clause 16. 
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Clause 52 
"Provide", in line 37, changed to "produce". Allows 
each Corporation to enter into contract's to have prograrn.rnes 
produced. However, programme purchase will still be made 
by the Council, as set out in Clause 13 (2) (j). 
Clause 54 
(4) (b) Clause changed to provide for terms and conditions of 
service of contract employees to be determined by the 
Corporations, not the State Services Commission.' 
(5) 
(6) 
Clause struck out see note about Clause 30 (2). 
Insertion of words "employer-subsidised" after the 
word "other" in line 21 - clarifies type of super-
annuation scheme. 
£Jause 61. Accounts of CorRorations 
Alteration requested by Audit Department. 
Clause 64. Temporary reconstitution of NZBC 
(5) 'Sub-clause widened to allow appointment to the Council. 
New sub-clause added to ensure that until terms and 
conditions of employment are determined under the 
Act (i.e. in Clause 54) officers or employees shall 
remain subject to the same terms and conditions of 
employment as previously applied to them. 
(6) Drafting addition consequent upon widening of sub-
section (5). 
~lause 67. Officers and employees of NZBC 
New sub-clause (3) providing"that the salary and 
allowances payable to a person transferred under subsection (2) 
shall not be less than those payable to him immediately before 
his transfer. 
flause 70. No network programm~~ 
New sub-clause (2) permitting, with the prior approval 
in writing of-the council; the networking by private warrant 
holders of programmes covering any specified event of special 
significance and major public interest. 
New sub-clause P2. defines the term "network". 
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Clause 74. Renewal of warrant 
New sub-clause (4A) .. Further maGhinery clause. 
New Clause 74A 
New clause enabling the amendment of private radio 
warrants and providing the machinery to do so. 
Clause 75. Transfer of warrant 
(7) Further machinery clause. 
'Clause BO. Appeals 
Further machinery clauses. 
Clause BI. Broadcasts in cases of emergency 
(1) 
(2) 
Deletion of wor:ds "item or" to avoid any possible 
confusion over definition of words. (Item tends to 
refer to news item). 
Original clause struck out. New clause requiring 
the corporations to state that the announcements 
have been made on the direction of the Minister. 
(N.B. This is the only clause which gives the 
Minister the power to direct the cor-
porations). 
f:lause B2. Short-term broadcasting aut.hQ.,risati,?..,!:ls 
(1) Extended to allow the Minister to grant an authorisation 
for a specified period not exceeding 12 months to an 
educational or scientific institution· or organisation 
for the purposes of research or experimentation or for 
the purpose of training persons in broadcasting. 
f:lause 21. SUperannuati2n service oj offic~L~ and emploJ[ees 
~.§.ub-claus~L (6~ defining the term. "controlling 
authority". 
New Clause 9lA 
Providing for the appointment of employees to the 
Public Service for one year after the abolition of the NZBC 
and the NZBA, as if they were officers. This clause is similar 
to that passed earlier this year relating to hospital and 
education services. 
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New. Clause 91B 
(1) Provides that nothing in the Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act shall apply, thus reenacting 
present NZBC law. 
(2) Under this new sub-clause, regulations may be made. 
providing for the settlements of disputes in respect 
of matters relating to the terms and conditions of 
employment, and also providing that the decisions 
of this body can be binding on all parties affected 
by such decisions. 
~. Taxation 
New sub-clause lA - reenacts present NZBC law making 
the Council and Corporations liable for the payment of land 
tax. 
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2. 
3. 
SUBMISSIONS TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE 
ON BROADCASTING 
Mr Bob. Kerridge SUI2I2ort for Bill 
1.2 AcceI2ted change to Clause 13, subclause 
1.1. Not accepted. 
1.3 Covered by 11 (l A) 13 (l) • 
3. 
1.4 Changed word Clause 52 from "provide" to "produce". 
Mr Michael Maxwell Orchestra 
Make provision for lIa fully professional managemental. 
Clause 12(2) provides that this can be done. 
Pacific Film Productions Mr John O·Shea 
1. Clause 13, subclause (2) para. (j) - Not accepted. Corpor-
ation responsibility. 
2. Clause 16, subclause (1) line (2-3) Partly accepted. 
See also amendment to clause 51, new clause 51 (B). 
4. Wellington Polytechnic 
Clause 82 Extension to period of short term broadcasting 
authorisation. 
Agreed to for educational or scientific iristitution or 
organisation. 
s. fhurches Education Commis'sion 
6. 
Made 11 recommendations - most of which were administrative 
rather than legislation matters. 
Clause 13 (c), hbwever, was widened to cover research in 
programmes. 
~z. Radio and T~evis~~Enalists Society 
§~nior Editorial Staff NZBC News Service 
Clause 11 (1) (c). Reworded to provide for more flexibility 
in gathering, planning, production and p~esentation of news. 
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7. The Manaki Society 
'8. Mr Gordon Dryden 
1. Suggested amendment Clause 11 (1) (c) - see 6 above. 
2. Suggested change to terms of office of members of 
Council - Rejected. 
9. Dr Bryan Trenwith 
Wanted one channel free of advertising - Rejected 
10. McNair Surveys NZ Ltd 
-
Proposed amendments to Section 13 (2) (c) - met in part but 
substantially 
II II .. 1\ 51 (2) . (g) rejected 
11. Submissions on behalf of Film Sound Technicians, DN TV2 
Expressed concern about position of Film Sound Technicians 
in Christchurch and Dunedin - also extension of contract 
services. 
Fears expressed groundless - uncertainty over future main 
problem. 
12. Mr Frank Curzon-Hobson - Con~ract Television Producer; NZBC 
13. Committee of Small Magazine Editors & Publishers Australasia 
Specific clause concern-ing educational broadcasting. 
Matter provided for in general way. 
14. The Pre-School Association (Inc.) .;;;.;;.;;.;;;......;;;..;,;;;.;;;;,~~.-- -
Wanted advisory committee on pre-school programmes. 
Administrative mattero 
15. Mr D.J~Ji~haghan - Televi~_i£n Producers and Directors Assn. 
Support. 
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16. B. McLaughlin - on behalf of group of NZBC programme-
makers 
Concern over employment - misunderstanding offfimily tree 
17. New Zealand Electronics Institute I~. 
180 Te1epress News 
19. Messrs G.I. Andrews and D.C. Beatson 
(1) News - accepted. 
(2) 50% quota - not accepted but policy statement that 
this is aim. 
(3) Rules - not accepted. 
20. Mr L.G. Lukey - Educational Television 
Accepted in part. 
21. Independent Broadcasting Co. Ltd. 
Required that provision be made to cover amendment to 
warrants - accepted. 
22. Asia Pacific Research Unit 
The aim of this submission is to invite Parliament: 
(1) to consider the statement of 'first principles' in 
the proposed Broadcasting Act; 
(2) to ensure the national interest is secured through 
adequate provision" for news .and analysis of New 
Zealand's international relations; 
--(3) to extend the contribution the Broadcasting Council 
and Parliament should make to educational television; 
(4) to provide for adequate public access to material 
that has been broadcast and is desired by affected 
or interested citizens for reference; 
(5) to make provision for the review and repeal of law 
and convention that inhibits free speech. 
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23. Mr J.C. Dakin 
Made submissions on t~o particular features: 
(1) the absence of any statutory provision imposing 
upon the broadcasting corporations or the BeNZ 
a responsibility for producing and transmitting 
educational programmes 
ACCEPTED IN PART 
(2) the lack of provision in Clause 68 for the 
granting of a warrant to a private non-profit 
organisation such as an educational institution, 
permitting it to establish-and operate a broad-
casting station. 
ACCEPTED 
24. Mr H.W.J. Nixon Advertising-free channel 
25. Group of NZBC Transmission Officers. 
Summary of Recommendations 
(a) Clarification of the role of the Council's 
ch~ executive in Clauses 9, 13 and 30, if 
nece~sary by the addition of a new clause. 
(b) Amendment to Clause 11 with regard to the 
distribution and transmission of programmes. 
(c) Amendment to Clause 13 covering the allocation 
and control of transmission frequencies; also 
provision for the Council to handle technical 
functions of Corporations where appropriate. 
(d) Support for Clause 22, the borrowing powers of 
the Council. 
(e) Minor amendments to Clauses 36, 39 and 41 covering 
the functions of the three Corporations., 
26. Mr R.E. Coury - News 
27. Mr P.H. Rothschild 
28. Film Cameramen - DN TV2 
Concern over one or two aspects of employment. Details 
of needs of Dunedin in next 5 years. 
Film Camera Section. 
" 
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29. Gospel Radio Fellowship Inc. 
30. 
31. 
. . 
Make provision for private low powered religious radio-
station in specific communities. 
Accepted, New clause 5lA - Use of Radio New Zealand 
facilities for broadcasts by certain organisations -
may, with the consent of the Council, enter into con-
tracts and lease or hire studios, etc. to organisations 
broadcasting non-commercial programmes relating to 
education, religion or the arts. 
Television Presentation Directors' Society Inc. 
1. Clause 13 (2) (k) - wanted consultation with organi-
sations such as theirs - Not accepted as legislative 
matter. 
2. Clause 67 (2) - wanted additional words "provided only 
that this office or position is directly associated 
with the officer's present position, whether or not 
the transfer involves a change of location"- Not 
accepted. 
3. An independent news service is highly desirable. 
Accepted, Clause 11 (1) (c) reworded to provide for more 
flexibility in gathering, planning, production and presen-
tation of news. 
NZBC ~ngineering Association 
Clause 9 - amend to permit the Chief Executive of the Council 
the same access to Council meetings as the Directors-General 
of the Corporations. 
~ot accepted. Administrative matter 
Clause 30 - amend to allow powers in Clauses 53 and 55 -
partially accepted - N~~ Clause 30A - delegation of powers 
of Council _·to the Secretary o~. any other officer of the 
Council. 
Clause 11 (1) (b) - amend to read lito distribute and transmit 
telev~Jradio programmes from the studios of the 
Corporations and to develop, extend. and improve these distri-
bution and transmission services in the public interest". 
Not acce~ted - Clauses 39 and 41 - functions of Television 
cprporations' cover this - "establish and operate a television 
service for the whole of New Zealand, and from time to time 
develop, extend and improve that service." 
Wanted other changes centralising engineering and technical 
services in the Council - not 2ccepted. 
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32. A.S. Harris 
33. J.B. Elkind 
Clause 11 (1) or elsewhere insert paragraphs enabling 
co-operation with educational institutions, etc. by 
making such resources as original tapes, transcripts, etc. 
available on a hire basis for the purposes of teaching, 
research and scholarship - Not accepted. 
34. ~~blic Relations Institute of New Zealand. 
Clause 11 (1) (c) - add words that will provide a statutory 
right for any member of the public to have access to printed 
transcripts of newscasts - Not accepted 
35. N.Z. Theatre Federation 
Clause 21 - extend power to include the right to levy private 
commercial radio and other stations of an amount to be paid 
to an organisation such as the Queen Elizabeth II Arts 
Council for the encouragement of the performing arts. 
Not needed - power to levy is sufficient. 
l6. Association of Ballet and Opera Trust Boards 
Spell out activities of the Symphony Orchestra 
New Clause 12 (lA) - liThe Council shall organise and present 
concerts to be given by the orchestra for the general public 
or any section of the general public; and may make the ser-
vices of the orchestra or any section of it available to 
persons or bodies engaged in the performing arts, for the 
purposes of public performances." 
37. Newlands Broadcasting Society 
Clause 68 - be amended to permit private, non-profit-making, 
VHF/FM broadcasting - Not accepted - too expensive at this 
stage. 
38. J.P. Carter 
39. Federation of Independent Commerc~~l Broadca~ters (NeZ.) Ltq. 
Clause 3 - consult with private stations before recommending 
appointment of 3 independent Council members by 
Governor-Qeneral - not accepted. Minister would 
accept nominations. 
Clause 11 (j) - be reworded to make it clear that th~s power 
.;;;..;;;;..;:...;;.;;.;;;..;~=--'-~ ~s to appoint representatives of the three 
corporations, and not the independent private 
radio stations. 
Acc~pted. Reworded to co~er 'public' broadcastin~ 
interests. 
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Clause 13 (2) (c) - allow only commissioned audience 
surv~ys. 
Clause 21 {I} 
Clause 36 
Clause 70 
Clause 76(1) 
Not accepted - Corporations will be 
permitted to conduct their own audience 
surveys. 
- amend to require consultation of private 
stations before regulations are passed 
and specific levies imposed. Not accepted 
- amend to require Radio N.Z. to obtain 
prior approval of Broadcasting Council 
before establishing a commercial radio 
station in an area where there is an 
established private radio station - Not 
accepted 
provide for networking in some instances, 
subject to the prior approval of the 
Broadcasting Council. Accepted. 
~ See Clause 70 (2) and (3). 
- suggested change from ·shall B to Gmay' -
Not accepted. 
A number of ~inor breaches could constitute 
a serious breach. 
sought provision enabling amendment of 
warrants. 
Accepted - see clause 74A 
40. Churches I Committee on Broadcasting 
Clause 8 - sought specific mention of Central 
41. Actors Equity of N.Z. 
Religious Advisory Committee. Not accepted. 
Acceptance in principle of Adam Report should 
cover this. 
(1) ~egal re~ognition ~~_~ill - partially accepted. Name 
not spelt out. See Clause 13 (i) (k). 
(2) Provisio£ for arbitration for disp~tes. Accep!£Q. 
See new Clause 91 B (2). 
42. Announcing StEf of :th.e NZBC 
Sought to have entire announcing staff employed and controlled 
directly by Broadcasting Council. Not ac_c~12ted as legislative 
matter. . 
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New Zealand Public Service Association 
(2) 
Clause similar to Section 17(8) of 1961 Act. 
Accepted. See new Clause 91 B (1). 
Negotiation with Musicians Union and Actors Equity 
on fees for casually employed artists - partially 
accepted - names not spelt out - see clause 13 (2) (k). 
(3) Mandatory Disputes Authority with binding decisions. 
Partially Accepted - see new Clause 91 B (2) - may 
make regulations providing for the settlement of 
disputes, and for the decisions of any body to be 
binding on all parties affected by such decisions. 
(4) Staff representation on Appointment Committees -
Not accepted as legislative matter. Matter for 
negotiation with new Corporations .. 
(5) Appointments Review Committee - Not legislative matter -
to be negotiated with new Corporations. 
(6) Clause 67 - want new subsection providing that 
employees transferring from the Council to one of 
the Corporations be assured of the same terms and 
conditions of employment, salary and allowances 
as they enjoyed as members of the Council - Accepted -
See new Clause 67 (3) - applies to salary and allow-
ances. 
(7) Amend legislation to allow for the 1inancial stability 
of the Broadcasting organisations to be guaranteed 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
by the Government - Not accepted. 
Clause 12 - delete requirement to consult with the 
State Services commission. Accepted. See Clause 12(2). 
Clause 13 - suggest Council undertake training pro-
·grammes if there is to be "any unity of standards -
Partially accept~.sL See n,ew clause 13 (2) (11). 
Clause 30 - suggest Council have power to delegate -
Accepted - see new clause 30A 
(11) £lause )0(2) - suggest this and clause 54 (5) are 
unnecessary_ Accepted - have been deleted. 
(12) Clause 91 - does not indicate who is to be the controlling 
authority. 
~ce~ted - see new clause 91 (6) 
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44. Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council 
-"0 .. 
(1) Short Ti t1e 
(2) Clause 2 -
add "in the public interest". Not accepted 
interpretation of term 'broadcasting' -
tends to cover only that part of broad-
casting which occurs after a programme 
has been prepared. 
Not accepted - definition virtually the 
same as in 1961 and 1968 Acts. 
(3) Clause 11 (1) (a) - add "in the public interest". 
Not accepted 
(4) Clause 11 (1) (j) - amend to read "to take part in •••••• 
and the activities with which broadcasting 
is concerned ••••. " 
(5) Clause 12 -
(6) Clause 92 -
Not accepted, although clause amended to 
cover representation of New Zealand 9 s 
public broadcasting interests. 
amend to rea¢l •• o.lIthe Council shall in the 
public interest take over and continue the 
control and administration ..... " 
Not accepted in that form. However, see 
new Clause 12 (IA) - Council shall 
organise and present concerts, etc. 
recommends that whole of Orchestra's 
deficit be borne by the taxpayer. 
Not accepteS! - 'misinterpretation of clause. 
(7) Clause 13 (2) (1) - extend to cover arts and educational 
and other activities with which broadcasting 
is concerned. 
Accepted - see new Clause 13(2) (11). 
(8) Cfause 13 (2) (mL - exclude the word 'broadcasting'. 
Not accepteq. 
(9) Clause 13(2) (0) - new clause ensuring that the facilities 
and equipment of broadsasting are used in 
such a manner as may be thought fit for the 
purpose of promoting and assisting in the 
development and carrying on of these arts, 
educational and cultural pursuits which are 
usually included in the purpose of broad-
casting - parti~~~ccepted - covered by 
clause 51(2) (j). See also new clause 16 
and Clause SIB. 
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(10) Clause 14 
- change may to sha"ll. Accepted 
(11) Clause 14(1) (d) -add "immediately''' after 'providing' 
and add (b) 'That all advertising 
programmes shall have 100% New Zealand 
content. 
Not acceptei! -present NZ.B.A. rules 
will apply until new rules' are made. 
(12) Clause 14 - Add new subclause (i) providing that 
private broadcasting stations parti-
cipate in the arts and education to a 
degre at least equivalent to that of 
the televislon stations and Radio New 
Zealand. Not accepted. 
(13) Clauses 39 and 41 - add "in the public interest". 
Not accepted. 
(14) Clause 51(2) (i) - widen to cover and arts and activities 
with which broadcasting is concerned. 
, 
" 
Not accepted 0  
(15) Clause 51 (2) ej) - delete words "that are usually included 
in the purpose of broadcasting", and 
reword last phrase "educational, 
artist,ic and cultural pursui ts II • " 
partially accepted - added "educational". 
(16) Clause 51(2) (k) -widen to cover "educational and other 
services" • 
Not accepted. 
(17) Clause 51(2) (1) -delete words "cons~der of benefit to 
the service carried on by the Corpor-
ation". - Not accepted 
(18) Clause 51(2) (m)-Delete word "broadcasting". liot acc~t~ 
N.B. New clause 41A - goes some way to meet Arts 
Council requirements. 
45. National Council of Women' of New Zealand 
Clause 3 
Clause 11 
Suggests ~ppointing Committee along 
lines of that set· up to make 
appointments to the Consumer Council. 
Not acc~...Eted 
suggests more. specific guidelines as 
to: 
(1) proportion of time allowed for 
advertisements. 
(2) proport;i.on of ti.me allo1:ted'to 
serious and informative features. 
(3) proportion of time for education21 
programmes. 
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Clause 48 
(4) proportion of time for programmes 
for spe.cific groups of people. 
Not accepted - will be done by rules 
suggests women be well represented on 
Advisory Committees. 
Clause 51 (I) (j) include educational. Accepte.9, 
C.G.Costello 
Opposed abolition of New Zealand Broadcasting Authority. 
Supported abolition of Minister of Broadcasting. 
47. Friends of the NZBC STnphony Orchestra 
Submit that orchestra must be assured of essential funds 
during periods of escalating costs, and that a commitment 
from the Consolidated fund must be of such a character as 
to leave no doubts over the future of the orchestra. 
Answered by Section 92 (2) (a) 
48. Mrs J. Duncan 
49. President, NeZ. Electronics Institute - one central body 
responsible for engineering work of both television and 
radio. 
Not accepted 
50. P.S.A~.Waikato Broadcasting SUb-group 
51. 
Requests clarification of intent as to Hamilton's position 
in the television future of New Zealand. 
Not accepted as legislative matter. 
!'le .... ' Zealand Musici~ns Indu~trLc:-L Union of Workers 
Recognition of their union~ 
partially accepted. See new Clause 13(2)(h). 
pominion ~~§ociatioE of the B~in£ 
Suggests various programme improvements formdio. 
Describes receivers used overseas which are capable of only 
receiving television so~nd, and which are not equipped with 
a picture tube. Requests that such a receiver be not sub-
ject to a television licence. 
Not acce£ted, as legislative matter. 
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53. New Zealand Law society 
Clause 80 (5) power of review should be completely 
unfe·ttered. 
Not accepted - Law Draftsman·s memo. indicates that 
present law is being re-enacted and that 
full hearings are allowed for at all 
stages. 
54. Nga Tamatoa 
Recommend that I ZM be converted to a Maori radio 
station, and that a repeater be built at Rotorua. 
Polynesian station in Legislation and White Paper 
55. New Zealand Radio DX League 
"Urge the Select Committee to endorse· the proposals of 
the Adam Committee regarding the future of New Zealand1s 
radio voice to the world"" 
Not accepted as legislative. 
Ask that consideration be given to the technique of 
synchronisation of transmitters already established 
throughout Europe and now being introduced in Australia. 
Not acceptea as legislative. 
56. Mrs D. Matthews 
57. Mrs E.J. Doherty 
58. C.M. ~ 
60. 
61. 
Urged more Maori programmes. 
Not accepted as legislative 
Mr H. Pomana 
Continuation of programme - Te Reo 0 Te Maori. 
Mr s. Le~ard-Taylor 
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